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Many standard economic models that are used to study the behavior of (groups of)
economics agents assume that these agents have rational expectations. For instance,
the Efficient Market Hypothesis – developed in seminal papers by Samuelson (1965),
Fama (1965, 1970) and later extended with micro-foundations by e.g. Lucas (1978) –
assumes that the population of economic actors is on average correct and updates ex-
pectations (and thus prices) properly when confronted with new information. This
implies that investors have intimate knowledge of the underlying probability distri-
bution of relevant events as well as their effect on returns. However, a long line of re-
search in the field of behavioral finance has criticized these assumptions by document-
ing several behavioral biases people suffer from when making financial decisions. For
excellent surveys see, e.g., Malkiel (2003) and Lo (2007). Perhaps the most prevalent
biases are documented by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) and Kahneman and Tversky
(1979), stating that people do not properly evaluate small probability events and that
events that are more easily remembered, or salient, are judged to be more common.
Notwithstanding these biases, the Efficient Market Hypothesis does not assume that
individual investors all have correct expectations, rather that the entire population –
the market – is correct. The question I look at in this dissertation is to what extent
these individual biases influence aggregate behavior. Does the population of agents
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also have these biases, i.e. are the individual biases aggregated into a group bias, or
do biases average out in a group and therefore disappear?
Experimental findings, by e.g. Bottom et al. (2002), have shown that most individ-
ual biases tend to disappear in a group setting, implying that assumptions on which
the Efficient Market Hypothesis relies are correct. However, the authors find that bi-
ases related to extreme events are actually propagated into group behavior, meaning
that biases documented by Tversky and Kahneman (1973) and Kahneman and Tver-
sky (1979) do not disappear. When confronted with extreme events such as terrorism
or natural disasters – both of which have a low probability, a high but uncertain im-
pact, as well as a salient nature – the stage is thus set for overreaction by economic
actors (see e.g. De Bondt and Thaler, 1985, 1990).
This dissertation focuses on the behavioral effects in financial decision making
of extreme events, leaving the controlled setting of a laboratory in order to identify
whether individual biases relating to extreme events can be found in aggregate (price)
data. To do so, I focus my research in three lines and ask the following broad questions:
How do economics agents take extreme events into account ex-ante when making de-
cisions? How do extreme events change aggregate behavior of agents ex-post? And
how can we minimize the impact of extreme events?
The view that the world is an inherently uncertain and probabilistic place has been
popularized in recent years, raising awareness that that we only see one realization
of the underlying data-generating process (see e.g. Taleb, 2007). Extreme events are
those events that fall in the tail of the distribution: although there is a small proba-
bility of occurring, they have a potentially large (economic) impact. The September
11 attacks are an example of such an extreme event, killing 3,000 people and causing
damage estimated to be well over a trillion dollars (see IAGS). The unlikely nature
and magnitude of these attacks become apparent when considering that, aside from
the 9/11 attacks (GTD), there have been only 1,000 casualties related to terrorism in
the United States since 1990. As noted, extreme events come to mind quickly and are
therefore likely to be judged more common than they are in reality, with all kinds of
consequences. A classic example of irrational behavior of people with respect to small
percentage events is given by Johnson et al. (1993), who found that airplane passen-
gers were willing to pay more for life-insurance covering them against terrorism then
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for insurance covering any cause. Interestingly, even though agents have a short mem-
ory, research has suggested that not only do investors act on (salient) extreme events
when they occur (Klibanoff et al., 1998; Hirshleifer and Teoh, 2003), they are also likely
to remember the event and act accordingly throughout their lifetime (Malmendier and
Nagel, 2011).
Hence, extreme events have the power to change behavior in the short- and in the
long-run. However, events such as terrorism, natural disasters or financial crises are
not that infrequent at all: over 4,000 natural disasters have taken place worldwide
since 1980 (EM-DAT) and around 16,000 incidents of terrorism have been recorded
between 1998 and 2010 alone (GTD). Perhaps even more surprisingly, Laeven and Va-
lencia (2012) document roughly 150 banking crises and 200 currency crises worldwide
since 1970. Yet when asked to consider these types of events, most people tend to think
about the attacks on 9/11, London or Madrid; the recent financial crisis or the Great
Depression; the Indian Ocean tsunami, hurricanes Katrina, Sandy or more recently ty-
phoon Haiyan. While they may not have the magnitude of these larger extreme events,
the smaller events are plentiful and, analogous to the ‘anchoring effect’ introduced by
Tversky and Kahneman (1974), can still lead to behavioral biases by reminding people
of the larger, salient events.
This dissertation positions itself against this background and looks at how eco-
nomic actors take extreme events into account ex-ante, how it changes their behavior
ex-post and how the impact of extreme events can be minimized. In the remainder
of this introductory chapter, I outline the studies undertaken and briefly summarize
their results.
1.1 Pricing decisions, forecasting and extreme events
The first two chapters focus on how economic actors take extreme events into ac-
count ex-ante, and investigate the behavior of a market maker who is faced with two
sets of counter-parties in the population: noise traders and insider traders. Since the
last group has superior knowledge compared to the market maker, the latter adjusts
his prices such as to minimize the impact insiders can have on his profits. The market
considered in these chapters is a fixed-odds betting market, which encompasses direct
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bets on winning or losing and a well-defined endpoint, thereby making it extremely
suitable for testing hypotheses developed for financial markets (Vaughan Williams,
1999). Since this implies that the market maker (read: bookmaker) takes sizeable po-
sitions on the outcome of each bet (Levitt, 2004), she therefore has an incentive not to
lose money to insiders who might be better informed. Chapter 2 develops a model of
how a bookmaker will determine her odds when considering noise traders, insiders
and a population consisting of both. In line with Silver (2012), I take the view that
insiders use Bayesian reasoning and do not necessarily know the identity of a win-
ner, but rather that they have a better understanding of the true winning probabilities
compared to the bookmaker. This represents a break from the existing literature which
assumes that insiders know the identity of the winner (see e.g. Shin, 1991, 1992, 1993).
The model presented in Chapter 2 shows that the odds quoted by the bookmaker are
equivalent to offering a (real) call option to the insiders: the higher the expected mis-
pricing, the higher the chance that insiders will exercise this option. This is especially
important for bets concerning longshots (with a low chance of winning but a high pos-
sible payout), as the bookmaker is faced with possible large losses compared to bets on
favorites (with a high chance of winning but a low payout). The model predicts that
due to the presence of insiders, bets on longshots are made less attractive in order to
avoid this high payout. In this sense, the model is consistent with, and can explain the
existence of the favorite-longshot bias in betting markets (see e.g. Vaughan Williams
and Paton, 1997; Snowberg and Wolfers, 2010), which states that odds are biased esti-
mates of winning probabilities as favorites (longshots) are consistently given a lower
(higher) probability of winning than in reality occurs. By making assumptions on the
data-generating process of news inflows, I simulate the options values that the book-
maker offers the pool of bettors. I calibrate the model on quoted odds for the 1998
Australian Horse Racing season and find that the bookmaker expects 97 percent of
bets to be places by insiders. However, when combined with more objective measures
on the extent of insider trading, I find that only roughly 60% of the bets consisted of
insiders and 40% of noise traders. The bookmaker thus overestimates to a large extent
the amount of insiders and the possible losses to them, which is consistent with the in-
ability to process small probability events as documented by Tversky and Kahneman
(1973). In Chapter 3 I find that while the generated option values do increase the fore-
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casting power beyond the odds that are offered by bookmakers, which incorporate all
publicly available information, a trading rule based on them was found to have neg-
ative proceeds. While the option values do contain information that is not reflected
in the prices set by the bookmaker, this information is not economically significant,
effectively proving that the market under investigation is weak-form efficient.
1.2 Investor behavior and extreme events
Having seen how economic actors take into account extreme events ex-ante when
making financial decisions, Chapter 4 focuses on how extreme events can change their
behavior ex-post. Previous research has shown the tendency of extreme events to have
a short-run, as well as a longlasting impact on prices and behavior. One extreme event
that has been researched extensively is the attack on September 11, 2001 and its impact
on, amongst others, financial markets.1 It has been found that stock prices react to ex-
treme events such as terrorism (see, amongst others, Chen and Siems, 2004; Drakos,
2004; Eldor and Melnick, 2004; Karolyi and Martell, 2010; Chesney et al., 2011), but
these reactions show heterogeneity across attacks, sectors of the economy and coun-
tries. More specifically, although it has been established that terrorist attacks can lead
to reactions in the countries they occur in, it is unclear how and through which channel
they affect stock markets in other countries. Recently Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003)
and Drakos (2010a) have suggested that economic linkages between countries/regions
might be the channel through which the shocks of terrorist attacks are transmitted to
other countries/regions. However, the latter uses events in a post-9/11 world, dis-
regarding the possibility that the relationship might have changed over the years. In
the chapter, I find evidence consistent with the channel of economic linkages: U.S.
equity prices drop after large terrorist attacks abroad, and the drop is proportional to
the capital stock of U.S firms. When estimating the relationship on subsamples, I find
that the relationship is only significant, both statistically and economically, after the
tragic events of September 11, 2001. Multiple explanations are explored, but the most
likely explanation is a disaster myopia on behalf of U.S. investors prior to the attacks,
followed by a pronounced increase in sensitivity to attacks on foreign soil after. Inter-
1For an extensive survey on the impact of terrorism and 9/11 on financial markets and many other
aspects see Frey and Luechinger (2005).
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estingly, the reactions after the attacks are rational since they are proportional to the
stock of investment by U.S. companies. This suggests that investors do not overreact
but have rather experienced a wake-up effect following the attacks, resulting in more
awareness of the dangers of terrorism on foreign soil for U.S. multinationals.
1.3 Depositor behavior, bank size and extreme events
The final two chapters of the dissertation are inspired by the extreme events that
occurred in the United States during 2007-2008. The financial crisis forced many large
financial institutions into bankruptcy, as it did with Lehman Brothers, and even threat-
ened to collapse the entire financial system. While the general public watched on as
governments around the world had to bailout these institutions, smaller banks were
allowed to fail. Approximately 400 commercial banks were closed down by the Fed-
eral Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) since the beginning of the crisis and an-
other 500 banks in distress were forced to merge with healthier counterparts. Chapter
5 looks at depositors, who are trusted by regulators to monitor their banks and move
their deposits to other banks if they feel that their current one is too risky. Both gov-
ernment interventions and bank failures can give mixed signals to depositors regard-
ing the need to monitor banks. On the one hand, bailouts have weakened incentives
to monitor as depositors trust the government to intervene when their deposits are at
stake. On the other hand, previous literature has documented that experiencing events
such as banks failures can lead to an increase of risk aversion among depositors (see
e.g. Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Karas et al., 2010, 2013; Iyer and Puri, 2012).
After these events, depositors generally increase their monitoring of banks. Given that
both types of events occurred, it is an empirical question which effect dominates. In
Chapter 5, I find that in regions that suffered from bank failures, depositors monitor
their banks more intensely, despite the existence of bank bailouts. Moreover, in regions
with more bank failures, there is more discipline altogether.
Finally, Chapter 6 tries to draw a lesson from the crisis in order to prevent a new
one. Since many institutions had to be bailed out, thereby burdening public finances,
much effort has been focused to avoid another crisis of this kind. The emphasis in
this discussion is often placed on the interconnectedness, its level of diversification,
6
1.4. Suggestions for further research
or the size of a bank (see e.g. De Jonghe, 2010; Zhou, 2010; Adrian and Brunnermeier,
2011; Markose et al., 2012; Bertay et al., 2013). Taking the view that the supervisor is a
portfolio manager who holds a portfolio of banks, this chapter asks what the optimal
portfolio structure should be in order to reduce the portfolio (systemic) risk and there-
fore the likelihood of a new crisis. I find that the levels of concentration in the current
portfolio are consistently too high and that a less concentrated banking system could
see lower levels of systemic risk.
1.4 Suggestions for further research
These chapters are united by the same biases in behavior as described in Tversky
and Kahneman (1973) and Kahneman and Tversky (1979), namely improperly eval-
uating small probability (or extreme) events and judging them to be too uncommon.
This dissertation shows that these biases can be found in aggregate financial decision
making across many different types of events, and that they can persist for a long time.
As such, it provides evidence that standard models relying on rational expectations of
a group of agents suffer from the same biases relating to extreme events that individ-
ual suffer from. Future avenues of research need to take these findings into account
and focus on understanding the group dynamics that occur. Moreover, future research
is also needed to understand if other biases, that were found to average out by exper-





Pricing Decisions and Insider Trading in
Horse Betting Markets?
2.1 Introduction
This chapter looks at the decision a bookmaker makes when setting prices under
uncertainty in a fixed odds betting market. We argue that this decision can be mod-
eled in a call option framework to measure the degree of insider trading in racetrack
betting markets. Makropoulou and Markellos (2011) first developed an option-pricing
framework for the pricing of bets in fixed-odds markets and in particular for the Eu-
ropean soccer betting market. In this market, the odds are offered by bookmakers via
fixed-odds coupons several days before the game and they remain largely unchanged
throughout the betting period. Their model deals with expert traders who either ex-
ploit public information in a manner superior to that of bookmakers or obtain access
to new public information sooner than bookmakers do. Our approach differs in that
we focus on racetrack betting where odds change frequently during the half an hour
betting period. In our context public information is irrelevant since it can be incor-
?This chapter is based on Schnytzer, Lamers & Makropoulou (2010a) and Schnytzer, Makropoulou, and
Lamers (2014), published in the Journal of Gambling Business and Economics and the Oxford Handbook on
the Economics of Gambling respectively.
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porated into new odds as soon as it hits the market. On the contrary, we deal with
insiders who possess private information. Of course, the implications of trading with
insiders in the racetrack betting market where the bookmaker changes his odds fre-
quently can be quite similar to those of trading with experts in a market where the
odds remain unchanged. However, the MM framework could not be readily applied
to the racetrack betting market due to structural differences between the two markets.
In order to fill in this gap, Schnytzer, Lamers & Makropoulou (2010a) developed a
model for the pricing of bets in a market with insiders relying on the MM framework
and applied it to the Australian racetrack betting market. In this chapter we extend the
work done by Schnytzer, Lamers & Makropoulou (2010a) in several aspects. First, we
relax their assumption of continuous arrival of information by employing a more real-
istic specification in which information arrives in discrete amounts and therefore the
true probability of a horse winning exhibits quantum jumps and dives. Second, the
model is extended to allow for more periods in which betting takes place. Whereas
the previous work of Schnytzer, Lamers & Makropoulou (2010a) assumes a betting
period in which the bookmaker sets his prices once (at opening prices), we extend the
model to accommodate more time periods in which a bookmaker quotes prices. More
specifically, we follow the data at our disposal and allow for betting by insiders both
at opening prices and middle prices, instead of only at one of those. Finally, to derive
the probability of insider trading, the zero profit condition of the bookmaker does not
have to hold for every single horse. This condition is necessary only for the race, al-
lowing the bookmaker to make losses only on the horses he expects insiders to bet on
and to make profit on the horses that are backed by outsiders, that bet according to
subjective winning probabilities in accordance with public information as explained
below.
The way in which insiders bet involves the so-called plunge. This is where sev-
eral agents of the insider approach different bookmakers simultaneously and back the
same horse at the best odds available. The reason why a single bettor is usually insuf-
ficient is that bookmakers are permitted to refuse bets which would leave them with
large contingent debts.1 Accordingly, an insider wishing to place really large sums of
money on a particular horse will need to spread the bet across bookmakers. It should
1The precise size of the maximum bet which a bookmaker must accept varies from place to place, but is
rarely above a thousand dollars.
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be noted that on-course bookmakers are small, independent firms who compete in
selling a homogeneous product. Accordingly, competition among them is fierce and
the trend in prices during the betting is always downwards unless a horse is plunged.2
However, since all bookmakers need to determine initial odds and all bookmakers in
Australia must be members of the relevant state bookmakers’ Association, they tend to
save on research costs by obtaining a set of opening odds from the Association. These
are not obligatory, but tend to be widely used. The important thing about these prices
is that they contain a high built-in expected mark-up which serves as a cushion of sorts
against insiders. Of course, once a plunge arrives, every bookmaker is on his/her own,
and the prices of all horses in the race fluctuate freely. For our purposes, any fall in
odds (increase in price) is taken as evidence of a plunge. Similar to Schnytzer, Lamers
& Makropoulou (2010a), we combine our theoretical measure of insider trading with
data on plunging and find the degree of insider trading to be 60% in our dataset.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the second section we
discuss the general framework. In section 3 we will build the theoretical model and
the empirical model is discussed in section 4. Finally, in section 5 we will present our
findings.
2.2 General framework and model assumptions
Our objective is to build a model of bookmaker optimal pricing, assuming that
there are two populations of bettors in the market; namely, outsiders and insiders. We
begin by describing the general framework and main assumptions with respect to the
information possessed by the market agents and their betting criteria along with the
trading process and the pricing response by bookmakers.
Assume there are N horses in a race. The problem of the bookmaker is that of
determining the opening odds. We denote by θj(0) the odds quoted by the bookmaker
at time 0 against horse j winning, where j = 1, ..., N. If a bet is successful then, ignoring
taxes, the bettor receives back 1+ θj(0) on a one unit bet. An opening price OP = φj(0)
2For the purposes of this chapter, prices are defined in their economic sense as the amount which must
be bet on a horse to ensure a total payback (including the initial outlay) of $1. Odds, on the other hand,
have their traditional meaning; i.e., if the odds on a winning horse are X to 1, then a $1 bet on the
winning horse yields a total payback (including the $1 outlay) of X + 1.
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Suppose also that the horses’ true winning probabilities at any point in time t are




Pj(t) = 1. These true winning probabilities
are assumed to evolve according to the flow of information, both public and private,
throughout the betting period until the race starts and are therefore stochastic. More-
over, we assume that the flow of information is tied to the flow of bets. In this sense
new information is said to have hit the market only if bets arrive in the marketplace
in a way that alters the horses’ winning probabilities, as those were until then per-
ceived by the bookmaker. The stochastic process for the true winning probabilities
could be either continuous or discontinuous, i.e. a jump process, or a mixture of the
two. Strictly speaking, the process that affects the true probability should be seen as
discontinuous, since the flow of information from small events that may affect the
outcome of the race is not continuous. Moreover, we assume that the flow of public
information during the betting period is negligible, at least compared to the amount of
private information that may hit the market. This assumption makes sense especially
if one considers the nature of racetrack betting and the short betting period (about 30
minutes). Moreover, it implies that whenever the bets arrive in a way different from
the bookmaker’s expectation, it is due to trading on inside information, unknown to
the bookmaker until the actual trade has taken place. The above suggest that the ex-




, should be equal to the initial value
Pj(0).
Regarding the information possessed by the two presumed populations of bettors,
namely outsiders and insiders, and their betting behavior, we make the following as-
sumptions. Firstly, nobody, not even an insider, knows in advance which horse will
win the race, in contrast to Shin (1991, 1992, 1993) who assumed that insiders know
which horse will win the race. Secondly, an insider knows only the true winning prob-
ability of one horse k, P̂k, before this knowledge becomes public. However, she does
not know how 1− P̂k is distributed among the other horses. Given the quoted opening
price for horse k, φk(0), this true winning probability might involve a profit opportu-
nity for the insider. A risk-neutral insider will wager on horse k only if she expects a






or zero, whichever is greater, since the insider bets only
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if −1 + P̂k
φk(0)
> 0 ⇔ P̂k > φk(0). This is similar to saying that bookmakers actually
offer insiders (call) options on the horses. Obviously, it is in the bookmakers’ interest
to offer net out-of-the money options. However, when they err by underestimating a
particular horse’s true winning probability, they are liable to offer a net in-the-money
option on this particular horse, which the insider (who knows her horse’s true winning
probability) will be glad to snap up.
Outsiders have access only to public information regarding past performance and
current conditions. Therefore, we would expect outsiders to support the horses in pro-
portion to the winning probabilities implied by “public information”, Pj(0), which are





. However, in reality the winning probabilities perceived by the outsiders
should also account for their attitudes towards risk as well as for the existence of any
behavioral biases among them. Consequently, outsiders are assumed to support the
horses in proportion to their subjective winning probabilities, denoted by pij(t). A
favorite-longshot bias may arise if bettors are risk-loving (e.g. Quandt, 1986) or due to
behavioral biases such as those considered by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). There
may of course also be herding which would lead to plunge horses being overbet. The
bookmakers are also assumed to know the horses’ winning probabilities implied by




. Compared to outsiders, bookmakers are partic-
ularly skillful in gathering and processing public information and are therefore as-
sumed to also know the marginal density function of each horse.3 In addition, we
assume that the bookmaker can accurately predict the expectations of outsiders, i.e.,
the outsiders’ subjective probabilities are known with certainty to the bookmaker.
Trading proceeds in a number of stages. At time zero the bookmaker declares the
opening prices (OP), φj(0), based on his perception of the true winning probabilities
at this time, Pj(0). At this first stage, a proportion of the outsiders bet in the market
at the OP set by the bookmaker. Suppose now that a private signal revealed to a
group of insiders indicates that the true winning probability of k is actually higher
than the quoted OP, i.e. P̂k > φk(0). The insiders will then bet on this horse, say at
time t∗. Note that such signals indicating mispricing might be revealed for more than
one horse. The bookmaker observes the insider betting pattern and therefore the new
3As we will see in Section 4, knowing the marginal density function is equivalent to knowing the volatil-
ity of the jump size and the Poisson arrival rate.
13
2. PRICING DECISIONS AND EXTREME EVENTS
value of the true winning probability and adjusts his prices accordingly. At the other
stages, the rest of the outsiders bet at the new updated prices. Note that insiders are
faced with a timing dilemma. To understand this, suppose that there are two such
groups of insiders, each wishing to plunge their own horse. Since a plunge reduces
the prices of other horses, each group has an incentive to wait for the other to plunge
first. Insiders must utilize any special information they have during the betting, since
it loses all value once the race starts. Furthermore, since insider trading is both legal
- only jockeys are forbidden to bet - and takes place at fixed prices, insiders have no
incentive to hide their trading behavior from outsiders. Moreover, since the insider
information concerning any given horse is likely known to more than one person, the
longer insiders wait, the greater the risk that the information will leak to a third party.
The recipient of the leak will then plunge the horse and the group of insiders - except
perhaps the one responsible for the leak - may be left with odds at which betting is no
longer worthwhile (see also Schnytzer and Shilony, 2002).
In the option pricing framework developed in this chapter to model the effect of
information asymmetries on prices, we do not account for competitive interactions
among insiders since this would increase significantly the complexity of the problem
in hand while offering limited additional insight. For simplicity, we assume that in-
siders will place their bet once they receive the private signal.4
Price updating effectively continues until the last stage at which starting prices (SP)
are determined as the equilibrium prices observed in the market at the end of betting.
Since in contrast to the British market there is no legal SP betting in the Australian
market, these prices may be assumed to embody all the available useful information
regarding the race’s outcome. Although price updating might actually take place sev-
eral times throughout the betting period, our empirical analysis considers only three
stages, the first, an intermediate and the last stage, at which opening prices (OP), mid-
dle prices (MP) and starting prices (SP) are set, respectively.
The chapter develops a model of bookmaker pricing that can be used to derive
not only the OP but also any intermediate prices. At each point in time, the prices are
4One way to capture potential value erosion of the option due to other insiders would be to incorporate
a dividend yield. According to the theory of options, it is never optimal to exercise an American option
before maturity in the absence of dividends. This means that, in our context, insiders would always bet
at the last minute. It is the presence of other insiders (dividends) that makes it optimal to bet before
maturity.
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modeled as the equilibrium of a perfectly competitive bookmaker market. Specifically,
the bookmaker is assumed to be risk-neutral, (i.e. an expected profit maximizer) and
there is free entry in the market. Thus, the long-run competitive equilibrium will be
established when all bookmakers earn zero expected profits in the market correspond-
ing to each race. Moreover, assuming perfect competition allows for the simplifying
assumption of inelastic outsider demand. Note that if the bookmaker were a monop-
olist and demand were totally inelastic, maximizing profits would lead to unbounded
prices.5
Insiders are assumed to have a collective wealth Wi. When bookmakers price
horses according to the methodology developed in this chapter, they assume that in-
siders bet to the full extent of their wealth Wi should the opportunity arise and that
Wi is evenly distributed among insider horses. Therefore, in a race of N horses, up to
1
N Wi can be placed by insiders on each horse.
We do not make any assumptions concerning the likelihood of inside traders vis-a`-
vis either favorites or longshots. Finally, transaction costs are assumed to be negligible.
2.3 The theoretical model
2.3.1 Development of the mathematical model




for each one of the N horses in a race, such that his expected profit is equal to zero.
Assume for the moment that only outsiders exist in the market. Then, ignoring the
time-value of money, the expected profit of the bookmaker at time zero (stage 1) is
equal to the total amount of money, Wn, bet by outsiders at stage 1 on the N horses
minus the amount of money that the bookmaker is expected to pay out to the winners.




is the expected value of the true winning probability of horse j at the end of the bet-
ting period (time T). Note that as explained in the previous section, the proportionate
amount of money bet by outsiders on each horse,
wn,j
Wn , is known to the bookmaker.
Regarding the true winning probabilities, these might change throughout the betting
period since they evolve according to the flow of information, public and private, as
5A formal proof can be found in the appendix.
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this information is revealed through the flow of bets. However, in the absence of insid-
ers and under the assumption that the flow of public information during the betting




= Pj(0). The expected profit
of the bookmaker is:









Setting φj(0) = 11+θj(0) , where the notation φj(0) is used to denote opening prices (OP),
we obtain:











Pj(0) = 1 then, for the bookmaker to have a zero expected profit, it is





Therefore, if only outsiders exist in the market and, as assumed earlier, the book-
maker can accurately predict their expectations then, for the latter to have zero ex-
pected profit on each horse, it is sufficient that opening prices are set equal to the
expectation of the bookmaker about the proportion of money bet on each horse i.e.,
φj(0) = pij, where pij =
wn,j
Wn is the winning probability of horse j as perceived by out-
siders. Considering that pij actually reflects outsiders’ beliefs as those are shaped by
public information, risk attitudes and behavioral biases then, under the assumption
that the flow of public information is small, there is no reason for the opening prices
to change during the betting period.
Suppose now that insiders also exist in the market. Obviously, the final distribu-
tion of bets will depend upon both the expectations of outsiders and insiders. The
bookmaker can predict with accuracy the expectations of outsiders but not those of
insiders, since the latter are shaped according to the private information they receive;
moreover, this information is revealed to the bookmaker only after an inside trade has
taken place.
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Assume again that the bookmaker gives at time zero (opening) prices φj(0) for each
one of the horses and that the betting period is again T periods of time. It is assumed
that only part of outsiders will bet at OP, ωOPn =
WOPn
Wn , while the other part will bet
at later stages after they have observed insider behavior. A risk-neutral insider will
wager on horse k only if she expects a positive return. The expected return of the in-






is greater, since the insider bets only if −1+ P̂k
φk(0)
> 0⇔ P̂k > φk(0).
Under the above assumptions, the bookmaker is always expected to lose from trad-
ing with insiders. In particular, the bookmaker’s expected loss to an insider at time











It holds that P̂k = Pk(t∗) 6= Pk(0) , where Pk(t∗) is the true winning probability of horse
k at the time the insiders place their bet (which is now revealed to the bookmaker).
The expected profit of the bookmaker is therefore:
























where wOPi,j is the amount of money bet by insiders at OP on horse j. Note that
now that insiders also exist in the market, the bookmaker cannot know what the true
wining probability will be at the end of the betting period. However, as explained in
the previous section, the bookmaker is assumed to know the expected value of the




at any time t.
The expression above is complicated by the fact that t∗ cannot be known a priori to
the bookmaker and hence it should be treated as stochastic. In order to simplify this,
we assume that private information that may alter the true winning probability of a
given horse may arrive only once for each horse. Then, we can safely state that P̂k =
Pk(t∗) = Pk(T), where Pk(T) is the value of the true winning probability at the closing
of betting since as we said earlier private information regarding a certain horse may
arrive in the marketplace only once. Of course, one might argue that the true winning
17
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probability of horse k may be lowered if at a later time new (positive) information
regarding a second horse r hits the market, implying, P̂r > Pr(0). Obviously, this
would always be true in a race of two horses only. However, in a race of many horses,
one could accept the supposition that this new information would reduce the true
winning probabilities of all other horses (for which no inside information has hit the
market) except for horse k.
Given that wOPi,j =
1
N Wi, for the bookmaker to have zero expected profit, the fol-






































































= 1, for the above equation to hold, it is sufficient that the






















] = 1 (2.8)





























The left hand side of the above equation is the expected bookmaker gain from
trading with outsiders while the right-hand side is his expected loss to insiders. The
optimal price is the one that equalizes the gain from outsiders to the loss to insiders.
It can be found by solving the above equation through trial and error, given the pro-
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portion of outsiders who bet at OP, ωOPj =
WOPn




, the bookmaker’s expectation about the true winning probability at the




, the number of runners in a race, N, and, of course, the
degree of insider trading (as perceived by the bookmaker) defined as the ratio of total
insider money to total outsider money, WiWn .
Note that the left-hand side of this equation should be greater or equal to zero since
the right-hand side is always non-negative. Therefore, if insiders exist in the market
then, in order for the bookmaker to have zero expected profit, prices should be set





To summarize, our model suggests that since any private information is conveyed
to the bookmaker only after an informed trade takes place, the latter should include
a premium in the OP to compensate him for this risk. Moreover, this premium is
related to the cost of trading with insiders, which in turn is a function of the degree
of insider trading ( WiWn ) and the potential value of private information that may be










considerations, the sum of OP would always be greater than one.
Suppose now that at a later point in time, time τ (stage 2), after the bookmaker
has observed insider trading, he will set new prices (called MP). For those horses
on which insider trading has taken place, say m horses, prices will be set equal to the
horses’ new true winning probabilities (in the absence of any bookmaker margin). The
reason is that insiders pose no further risk to the bookmaker since they can only bet at
either OP or MP on a given horse but not both.6 For the rest of the horses (N−m), the
bookmaker will set prices as above. Therefore, at the second stage the total amount
of money available by insiders is Wi − mN Wi ≤ Wi. Thus, the bookmaker will quote
MP as if 1N−m
(
Wi − mN Wi
)
= 1N Wi would be wagered by insiders on each one of the
remaining N −m horses should the opportunity arise. Therefore, we have:
6If they bet at OP then prices will exhibit a plunge and therefore betting at MP would be worthless. This
is is true under the assumption that information regarding a certain horse can be revealed only once.
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where the term piMPj =
wMPn,j
WMPn
captures outsiders’ new subjective probabilities as these
have been shaped after observing the insider trading pattern at stage 1 and ωMPj =
WMPn
Wn is the proportion of outsiders that bets at this second stage.
Price updating effectively continues until the last stage at which starting prices (SP)
are determined as the equilibrium prices observed in the market at the end of betting.
Under the assumption of zero bookmaker profit, the sum of SP would be equal to one.
Then, following our model, in the presence of insiders the sum of OP should always
be greater in any race than the sum of SP. In reality, the sum of OP is always greater
in any race than the sum of SP even in the apparent absence of insider trading.7 The
reason is that opening prices tend to have a “cartel” level of profit built in since they
are recommended to individual bookmakers by the bookmakers’ association. Once
betting begins, there is competition among bookmakers and thus the sum of prices will
tend to decrease. This practically means that the estimates of insider trading obtained
when applying our model may overestimate its true extent if the premium included in
OP is largely due to this “cartel” profit rather than to the risk that bookmakers face in
the presence of insiders. On the other hand, it may be that the expected profit margins
built into OP are designed just to compensate the bookmakers for inside trades.
2.3.2 The option analogy
The commitment made by bookmakers to sell at fixed prices, the quoted odds,
can be analyzed as a call option. Specifically, the bookmaker gives an insider a call
option on horse j, i.e., the right to bet at a fixed price. Obviously, the underlying asset
whose value changes stochastically is horse’s j true winning probability. Apparently,
only insiders are entitled to the option. The reason is that while an insider has perfect
7Races in which there are no plunges visible in the data (odds at no point fall for any horse during the
betting) are races in which inside trades are not observed. Of course, it could be that an insider has
placed a discreet bet with a single bookmaker and that this bet cannot be discerned in the average odds
that rule in the market and are published. The greater the extent of this phenomenon, the more will our
estimates of insider trading underestimate its true extent.
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information (both public and private) and therefore knows her horse’s true winning
probability, outsiders form their expectations, at least partially, according to the public
component of information and based on that they assign subjective probabilities. The
insider will exercise her option to bet at her horse at the opening prices only if she
expects a positive return, i.e. if the true probability at the time the insider places her
bet, t∗, is greater than the opening price.
One could assume that insiders would be better off exercising their option at the
last minute, i.e. at the closing of betting. The reason is that since a plunge reduces
the prices of other horses, each group of insiders has an incentive to wait for the other
groups to plunge first. However, since the insider information concerning any given
horse is likely known to more than one person, the longer insiders wait, the greater
the risk that the information will leak to a third party. The recipient of the leak will
then plunge the horse and the group of insiders - except perhaps the one responsible
for the leak - may be left with odds at which betting is no longer worthwhile. This
timing dilemma is similar to the problem of the optimal exercise time faced by the
holder of an American option on a dividend-paying stock. In the betting market, the
dividend equivalent is the potential value leakage as a result of competition among
insiders. However, for simplicity we ignore competitive interactions among insiders.
We assume instead that insiders place their bet once they observe mispricing.
Assuming that the bookmaker is risk-neutral then today’s option price (time zero)
can be determined by discounting the expected value of the terminal option price by
the riskless rate of interest. Therefore, neglecting the time-value of money, the value
of the call option is:





















The value of the option can be derived by assuming a stochastic process for the true
winning probability and performing Monte Carlo simulations (see Section 4).
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2.3.3 The favorite-longshot bias
In this section we show that the optimal prices set by the bookmaker using Equa-
tion 2.9 will exhibit the favorite-longshot bias.













] > 0 (2.14)
Denoting f j(0) =
E0[Pj(T)]
φj























(−1+ f j(T)) , 0}
(2.15)




















































We focus on the denominator first. The first term is always positive. The second term
is positive too since the partial derivative
∂E0{max(−1+ f j(T)),0}
∂ f j(0)
is always positive. Note





is equivalent to a lower quoted price for the
same level of expected true probability. Therefore, the potential profit of insiders, as
captured by the term E0
{
max
(−1+ f j(T)) , 0}, should increase since a lower quoted
price makes underpricing more likely. In the terminology of options this is equivalent
to saying that a lower strike price increases the value of a call option.
We turn our attention now to the nominator. For the nominator to be positive, it is








is positive. This obviously depends on the
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partial derivative of the outsiders’ subjective probability with respect to the expected
true winning probability. Suppose that outsiders tend to overestimate the winning
















































































































Therefore, we have proved that when the bookmaker sets optimal prices following
our model, expected returns will exhibit the favorite-longshot bias provided that ei-
ther outsiders have no biases in their expectations and therefore their subjective prob-
abilities reflect the publicly available information or that they tend to overestimate the
winning chances of longshots relative to those of favorites.
2.4 Empirical model
2.4.1 Option-pricing specifications of the model
The challenge faced here is that the assumed specification must be a realistic de-
scription of probability dynamics. In particular, we want to model the true winning
probability such that the following requirements are met: Firstly, said probability is
concentrated on [0, 1). A probability of a certain horse winning equal to one implies
that the probabilities of all other horses are zero. In practice this is never the case. For
this reason, we set as an upper boundary for the true winning probabilities the value
pmax < 1. In particular, pmax could be the highest single probability in our sample,
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which is found to be 0.7197. Secondly, the sum of probabilities is equal to one at all
times. Thirdly, it may exhibit positive and/or negative jumps throughout the betting
period following the release of new private information. Finally, in the long-run it
reverts to a mean equal to the reciprocal of the number of runners in a race. This as-
sumes that over a long period of time all horses have equal chances of winning. Note
that the behavior of this process in the absence of mean reversion is problematic since
in this case the boundaries become absorbing.










where h is the speed of mean reversion, µ is the long-run mean (equal to 1N ), J is the
jump size which is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation σj and dq describes a time-homogeneous Poisson jump process such that
dq = 1 with probability λdt and dq = 0 with probability (1− λdt). Parameter λ is
known as intensity or arrival rate and is the expected number of “events” or “arrivals”




, which multiplies the jump
component Jdq, is employed in order to ensure that the probability will remain inside
the boundaries of zero and pmax. Furthermore, given that the jump size has a mean of










Note that when the speed of mean reversion is very small, as assumed in this chapter,




, tends to the initial value Pj(0). This is important
since the theoretical model described previously in this chapter relied heavily on this
assumption.
There is one final concern with respect to the specification for the true winning
probability, which, as mentioned earlier, refers to the fact that the sum of probabilities
must be equal to one at all times. Suppose that the probability of horse k follows the






















ej(t) + JkPk(t) (pmax − Pk(t)) dq = 0 (2.20)




Pj(t) = 1, we can find a
condition under which this holds. Thus the above specification is indeed a realistic
description of probability dynamics. We now need to estimate the parameters that
appear in the stochastic process followed by the true winning probability. For the
purpose of this estimation we will ignore the mean-reverting component, assuming
instead that the speed of mean reversion is very close to zero. Thus, we only have to
estimate the parameters of the jump process and in particular, the standard deviation
σj of the jump size and the intensity λ of the Poisson process. The intensity parameter
tells us how often the true winning probability experiences a sudden jump, while the
parameter of jump volatility measures the size of these jumps. We calculate these



























= 3σ4j λ∆t (2.22)
where Y = ∆PP(1−P) .
Those two moments completely identify the jump components. Moreover, they can
be derived from the bookmakers’ odds as following: As the dataset includes prices at
three points in time (OP, MP and SP), prices are available roughly every 15 minutes.
The fifteen-minute moments may thus be calculated for each race:
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2M : m2 =
1
s− 1 (u1 − u2)
2 (2.23)
4M : m4 =
1
s− 1 (u1 − u2)
4 (2.24)







Obviously, the one-minute moments can be calculated from the fifteen-minute mo-
ments by dividing with fifteen. Using Equations 2.21 and 2.22 for ∆t = 1 minute and
the estimated values for the one-minute moments, we determine the jump compo-










Finally, we calculate the average values of σj and λ for our sample, which then are used
in the options calculations. Note that these are “one-minute” values. For example
λ = 0.1 implies that we have a jump every 10 minutes. The results are presented
below.
2.4.2 A measure of insider trading
We focus now on the task of estimating the degree of insider trading, i.e. the param-
eter WiWn . To this end, we assume that in practice bookmakers set their prices according
to the methodology described above. Thus, using the actual prices, we can infer the
degree of insider trading by using Equation 2.6 to directly solve for WiWn . However, the
theoretical model was built under the assumptions of zero expected profit and zero
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transaction costs. This may yield estimates of insider trading that are biased upward.






























By multiplying with W
OP
n















































for each race. The superscript OP indicates
that these values refer to the first stage at which the opening prices are set. This is
the basic equation for our empirical analysis. Obviously this expression refers only
to OP. However, as we said, we assume that trading takes place in two stages. At
stage 1 (t1 = 0), a proportion of the outsiders bet in the market at the OP set by the
bookmaker. At any subsequent point in time, t1 + ∆t ≤ T all insiders may bet should
the opportunity arise. The bookmaker observes the insider trading pattern and at
time, t2, t1 < t2 ≤ T updates his prices. At stage 2, the rest of the outsiders bet at
the new set of updated prices, denoted by MP. Again, at any subsequent point in
time, t2 + ∆t ≤ T all insiders may bet should the opportunity arise. The bookmaker
observes the insider trading pattern and at time T sets new updated prices denoted by
SP (starting prices).























We can use Equations 2.30 and 2.31 to calculate the proportion of outsiders that bet
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Then we can use Equations 2.30 and 2.32 to calculate q. In order to do so we still have
to explain how to calculate the option values at both OP and MP, COPj and C
MP
j , as
well as the quantities DOP and DMP for each race.
We begin with betting at OP. The option values COPj can be estimated via Monte
Carlo simulation. The required inputs to perform the simulations are Pj(0), OPj, T and
the specifications of the stochastic process followed by the true winning probability.
OPj is the observed opening price quoted by the bookmaker. T is assumed to be equal
to 30 minutes. With respect to the specifications of the stochastic process followed by
the true winning probability, we need to know the speed of mean reversion, h, the
long-run mean, µ, which is set equal to 1N , the standard deviation of the jump size, σj,
given that J ∼ N (0, σj) and the intensity λ of the Poisson process. A way to derive
those parameters has been shown in the previous section of the chapter. The speed of
mean reversion is assumed to be very small since we are dealing with a betting period
of no more than 30 minutes, and is therefore set at 0.001. The true winning proba-
bility, Pj(t), is derived via a conditional logit regression on a dummy win, ensuring
that the sum of probabilities in each race equals 1. The subjective probabilities piOPj
are calculated by simply normalizing OP as suggested by Dowie (1976), although this
yields estimates with a favorite-longshot bias. The true winning probability is simu-
lated in 1000 steps using the stochastic process in Equation 2.17. When the simulated
true winning probability after 1000 steps is larger than the true winning probability
in time t = 0, the option value is this difference, otherwise the option value is zero.
Each horse is subject to 1000 repetitions. The option value for the horse is the averaged
value over all repetitions. A similar procedure is followed to calculate CMPj , using as
inputs Pj(τ), MPj and T − τ, where τ is assumed to be equal to 15 minutes. We use
the same specifications for the stochastic process as above.
We still need to calculate DOP and DMP for each race. The expected true winning
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, are assumed to be equal to




= Pj(0). This is derived from
Equation 2.18 if we assume that the speed of mean reversion is very small. This way
we assume that mean reversion has almost no effect on the true winning probabilities
in the very short betting period of 30 minutes, while any deviations from the initial
value are due to the effect of jumps that come as surprises.
Next, we use Equation 2.32 to calculate ωOP = W
OP
n
Wn . The extent of insider trading











As we said, our model is built from the viewpoint of the bookmaker and the approach
we have followed so far effectively supposes that bookmakers know the probability of
insider trading in advance. Or, more reasonably, such a measure is of the bookmakers’
expectations regarding insider trading. However, we have access to ex-post plunging
information which the bookmaker cannot know until after insider activity has taken
place. We will use this (ex-post) plunging information in order to get closer to the true
probability of insider trading for a given horse that got plunged.
In order to calculate the probability of insider trading per horse, we use both an
unweighted and a weighted average of q. The weight is derived as the absolute size of
the plunge called PW: max(MP−OP, 0) +max(SP−MP, 0). Using the unweighted
and weighted average, the probability of insider trading for each horse in a given race
in the sample is calculated. Note that when we weight absolute plunges sizes, we are
weighting on those horses where insiders were observed to have bet more heavily in
accordance with plunge size. Using these weights, the weighted average probability
of insider trading for each of the races in the sample is calculated. The simple average
of these values is the probability of insider trading in the dataset.
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Log Likelihood -8,259.18 -8,238.81
Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
2.5 Results
We use the above model to derive a measure of the extent of insider trading. Our
measure is applied to a dataset of the 1998 Australian Horse Racing season, covering
4,017 races with 45,296 runners.8 The dataset includes for each horse prices at three
moments (OP, MP and SP). The time period during which betting takes place is set
at 30 minutes, meaning that prices are available roughly every 15 minutes. Given that
there were some cases in which the sum of OP, MP or SP in a race is less than one,
these races are dropped from the sample. This leaves us with 3,995 races out of the
initial sample of 4,017 races.
The true winning probabilities at OP and MP, necessary for the measure, are de-
rived by running a conditional logit regression, the results of which are displayed in
Table 2.1.
Table 2.2 displays descriptive statistics for OP, MP, SP; the subjective winning
probabilities at OP and MP; the true winning probabilities flowing from Table 2.1;
and the sum of OP, MP and SP per race.
The table shows clearly that the average sum of prices decreases between OP and
SP. At the opening of betting this margin is 43 percent, but by the start of the race the
margin has decreased to 24 percent. The decrease in the margin indicates competition
among bookmakers, forcing them to decrease prices and leading to lower profits. Since
the OP are above the competitive level, this could deter insiders from trading at these




Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Min Max St. Dev
OP 0.1255 0.0019 0.8889 0.1017
MP 0.1107 0.0013 0.867 0.0946
SP 0.1092 0.001 0.8462 0.0972
pij(OP) 0.0883 0.0014 0.7197 0.0731
pij(MP) 0.0883 0.0011 0.7165 0.0768
Pj(OP) 0.0883 0.0026 0.9657 0.097












SP 1.2487 1.0122 1.7646 0.0921
Table 2.3: Option statistics
Variable N Mean Max St. Dev
COPj 40082 0.00454 0.20610 0.01385
CMPj 38460 0.00723 0.25498 0.02087
prices, leading to a lower degree of insider trading.
The option values are generated via Monte Carlo simulation as explained in the
previous section. The average 1 minute values for λ and σ in the dataset are 0.37 and
0.11 respectively. On average, there seems to be a jump every 3 minutes, or 10 times per
a 30 minute betting period, indicating there is quite some inflow of private information
into the prices. Table 2.3 shows the values of the non-zero options generated at OP and
MP.
There were 5,184 horses for which a zero option was generated at OP and 6,806
horses for which the option value was zero at MP. Moreover, we can see from Table 2.3
that the options generated at MP have a higher value, indicating more profitable trad-
ing opportunities for insiders. This should not come as a surprise as we already saw
in Table 2.2 that the MP are lower, leading to a lower strike price for the insiders and
a higher profit.
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Figure 2.1: Density plots
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One last thing is required to calculate the degree of insider trading, namely ωOP,
the part of outsiders that bet at opening prices. Using the data from Tables 2.2 and 2.3,
the average ωOP in the dataset is calculated to be 0.41. On average 41% of outsider
trading occurs at OP and 59% at MP, although there are races in which almost no
outsider betting is found to occur at OP. The ratio of insider betting to outsider betting,
which is expected by the zero profit bookmaker is found to have a mean of roughly 25,
or an average probability of insider trading of around 95%. The density plot is shown
in Figure 2.1a.
This seems very high but there are a few considerations to take into account. First,
the insider in our model is assumed to know only the true winning probability of
one horse k and does not know the winning probabilities of any other horses. When
compared to the insider by Shin (1991, 1992, 1993), our insider does not know which
horse will win but just has a better understanding of the true winning probabilities
compared to the probabilities as quoted by the bookmaker. Second, the definition of
insider trading is the amount of money being bet by insiders compared to outsiders.
The fact that 95% of the total money is bet by insiders, does not mean that they place
more bets, but could mean that they wager more money per bet. The bulk of the bets
placed could still be made by outsiders, but the amount that insiders bet compared
to outsiders is just much higher, i.e. for every Australian dollar bet by outsiders 25 is
bet by insiders. Third, the assumption underlying the measure is that the bookmaker
set his expected profit to zero, as would be the case under perfect competition. This
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is, of course, a very strict assumption to make and may not suit the reality all that
well. A solution would be to assume that the bookmaker sets prices that guarantee
him a certain level of profit. This level could be assumed to be equal to the profit the
bookmaker would make in a market with no insiders. However, the prices that the
bookmaker would set in this market are unobservable by definition. By looking at
Equation 2.5, keeping everything else constant and assuming the bookmaker sets his
prices to have a positive expected profit, it becomes obvious that we are estimating the
degree of insider trading with an upward bias.
Finally, the measure that is generated is the bookmaker’s expectation regarding
insider trading. To have a zero expected profit, the bookmaker expects the probability
of insider trading to be 95%. However, as mentioned in Section 4, we will use ex-
post plunging information to get closer to the true probability of insider trading in the
dataset. The weight that we use is based on the absolute size of the plunge: PW =
max(MP − OP, 0) + max(SP − MP, 0). We use PW to weigh the extent of insider
trading, q, per race. By defining a plunge as an upward movement in the price, we
find that there have been 13,852 plunges in the dataset, mainly occurring between MP
and SP. The 13,852 horses account for 30% of the total observations in the dataset.
An additional benefit is that PW weights horses that have experienced a more severe
plunge higher. However, a downside is that the estimate will be too high if part of
the plunging is actually due to herding. The mean of the weighted extent of insider
trading qPW for the dataset is 2.20 and the average probability of insider trading aPW is
59%. Figure 2.1b displays the distribution of the ex-post probability of insider trading.
We can see that there are around 611 races in which no plunges occur and hence
no insider trading is observed. When insider trading does take place, the average
probability is around 60%, although there is plenty of dispersion around the mean.
One final remark should be made with respect to the ex-post probability of insider
trading. It should be noted that the value depends on the bookmaker’s expectation
of the degree of insiders compared to outsiders. If we allow for a higher than zero
expected profit, his expectation will be lower and we would find values of insider
trading closer to the 20%-30% range that Schnytzer, Lamers & Makropoulou (2010a)
find.
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter we model a fixed odds horse betting market from a bookmaker’s
point of view under uncertainty. We rely upon a model by Makropoulou and Markel-
los (2011) and Schnytzer, Lamers & Makropoulou (2010a) which conceptualizes fixed
odds betting markets as option markets. Starting from a profit function, we show that
a bookmaker offers an implicit call option to insiders when setting prices. The insiders
in this chapter are assumed to know only the true winning probability of their horse,
not the identity of the winning horse. Moreover, insiders only bet if their expected
profit is positive. In the case in which both outsiders and insiders exist in the market,
the bookmaker will set prices in such a way that his expected loss from dealing with
insiders equals the expected gain from dealing with outsiders. When the bookmaker
set his prices in this way, the latter will exhibit a favorite-longshot bias.
By allowing for betting in multiple time periods and making an assumption on
how the insider money will arrive, the zero profit condition of Schnytzer, Lamers &
Makropoulou (2010a) has to hold only for the race and not for each individual horse.
From this model it becomes possible to measure the expectations of the bookmaker
regarding the ratio of insider money to outsider money. Using Monte Carlo simula-
tions, we generate the implicit option values as quoted by the bookmaker and find
that a zero expected profit bookmaker expects 95% of the money bet to be placed by
insiders. However, these estimates are biased in the sense that we do not allow the
bookmaker to make a positive profit. By keeping his expected profit equal to zero,
we overestimate the expected degree of insider trading. When we use ex-post plung-
ing information, we conclude that the probability of insider trading in our dataset lies
around 59%. Or to put it differently, for every Australian dollar bet by outsiders, the




Suppose first that only outsiders exist in the market and that their demand is in-
elastic, i.e. ∂Wn∂OPj = 0. A monopolistic bookmaker will set prices that maximize her
expected profit:
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Since infinite prices do not make any sense, this leads to the conclusion that outsiders’




















































maxjCj −Wi ∂Ci∂OPj = 0
In the above equation all terms except for the first one are positive. Specifically, ∂Wi∂OPj is
negative given that insider demand drops as the price increases and ∂Ci∂OPj is negative
since the option price decreases as the strike price increases (or equivalently as the




The Impact of Insider Trading on
Forecasting in a Bookmakers’ Horse
Betting Market?
3.1 Introduction
The successful forecasting of horse race outcomes requires the forecaster to have a
clear understanding of the variables at his disposal. The most common, and arguably
the most important, variables in a horse betting market are the odds on the horses in a
race. Where bookmakers operate in such a market, it seems reasonable to suppose that
the fixed odds they provide would be reasonably unbiased estimators of the horses’
winning probabilities, and yet there is a considerable body of literature suggesting that
this is not so (see, for example Schnytzer and Shilony, 2003; Shin, 1991, 1992, 1993). It
is agreed that the extent of insider trading in the market is what makes bookmakers’
odds deviate from winning probabilities, even though different authors characterize
both the mechanism underlying the concomitant distortion and its extent differently.
?This chapter is based on Schnytzer, Lamers & Makropoulou (2010b), published in the International Jour-
nal of Forecasting.
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Accordingly, the forecasting of race outcomes should take into account an estimate
of both the extent of insider trading for each horse, and the way in which this extent of
insider trading in a bookmakers’ horse betting market may be measured. Schnytzer,
Lamers & Makropoulou (2010a), SLM hereafter developed a model for measuring the
extent of insider trading in horse betting markets with bookmakers.1 They develop a
theoretical framework that examines the optimal price setting by bookmakers in the
racetrack betting market, and then use it to measure the extent of insider trading in the
market. Bookmakers are faced with the risk that insiders will account for information
they might have after the opening odds (which may be assumed to contain most public
information) have been set, and will thus exploit any mis-pricing by the bookmaker by
betting on horses whose prices present an expected profit for the insider. The model is
an extension of that developed by Makropoulou and Markellos (2011) and applied to
the European soccer betting market. The basic intuition underlying the model is that
the fixed odds2 offered by bookmakers at the track are examples of call options, and
that, while bookmakers hope to offer only net of premium out-of-the-money options,
when they err by underestimating a particular horse’s true winning probability, they
are liable to offer a net in-the-money option, which the insider (who is assumed to
know her horse’s true winning probability) will be glad to snap up.
Throughout this chapter, we use the working assumption that the insider knows
her horse’s true winning probability, and this requires some elaboration. Indeed, it is
difficult to come up with a precise definition of an insider trade for which data may
ever be available. Thus, in reality, an insider is one who is more familiar with her
horse than others, and therefore has an informational edge over outsiders, and, ceteris
paribus, is in a better position to evaluate the horse’s winning probability. However,
ceteris is not paribus! There are optimistic and pessimistic insiders, just as there are
different kinds of outsiders. Some people know more about forecasting and some less,
and these kinds of differences are never measurable in the kinds of data sets that are
available from horse betting markets. This is why we make the assumptions we do
about insiders, while, with respect to outsiders, we assume that they bet according to
1Theirs is not the first such method. Shin (1993) developed a similar method using a very different
model.
2For the purpose of this chapter, by odds, we mean that odds of, say, 5 to 1 represent a net profit of $5
for every $1 bet on the winning horse.
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the opening odds set by bookmakers, these being the best available estimate of public
information prior to the start of betting at the track.
As described in Chapter 2, a bet by insiders involves a plunge, where several agents
of the insider approach different bookmakers simultaneously and back the same horse
at the best odds available. For our purposes, any fall in odds (increase in price) is taken
as evidence of a plunge, and we use this information as well as the SLM measures as
a predictor for the outcome of the race.
We proceed as follows: in Section 3.2, the data are described and we provide a
brief discussion of our forecasting method. The results are presented in Section 3.3,
where it is shown that forecasting on the basis of opening prices only-the prices are
readily available around 30 min before the race-yields moderate losses. The extent of
these losses is reduced when the variable measuring insider trading is added, but the
method employed here would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement in practice.
Finally, some conclusions are offered in Section 3.4.
3.2 Data and methodology
The data set used in this chapter contains the 45,296 horses who ran in 4,017 races
during the 1997-1998 Australian horse racing season. The data include opening prices
(hereafter OP), as set by bookmakers at the start of betting (around 30 min before each
race), and middle prices (hereafter MP), which are prices usually, but not always, set
when there is a change in the direction of the horses’ odds between OP and the odds
at the end of the betting. Finally, we have starting prices (SP), the ruling prices at the
end of betting. The data set contains all races for which MP are provided. The data
were obtained from the CD version of the Australasian Racing Encyclopedia ’98.
SLM estimated several alternative measures of the extent of insider trading in this
market, and we use three of the estimates for our forecasting purposes. However, in
order to facilitate an understanding of these measures and the differences between
them, a summary of the SLM estimation procedure is in order. Bookmakers’ odds, as
initially set (i.e. OP), may be viewed as call options which end in-the-money if the
horse wins the race and out-of-the-money otherwise. As inside information enters the
market, the odds change and the values of the call options change. As the betting
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continues, the horses’ winning probabilities (as implied by the odds) become more
and more accurate until all inside information has entered the market and the betting
comes to an end. Assuming that the inside information enters the market randomly
from the point of view of the bookmakers, the dynamics underlying the changing
implied winning probabilities may be modeled as a standard Wiener process.
Using a Monte Carlo simulation, we are able to derive the option value for each
horse. The true winning probability for each horse is simulated in 1,000 time steps
using a standard Wiener process. When the simulated probability is larger than the
strike price at the 1,000th and final step, the option value is this positive difference;
otherwise, the option value is zero. For each horse, the option value is calculated as
the average value out of 1000 repetitions. In order to calculate the extent of insider
trading, the following three weightings are used to provide us with our estimates of
insider trading for the purpose of this chapter.
The first weight used for each horse is the estimated initial winning probability, as
implied by OP, P(0). The remaining two weights are based on the plunge behavior3
in the market, and are calculated as follows. The first is the relative size of the plunge,
called PW : max((MP−OP)/OP, 0) + max((SP−MP)/MP, 0). The second weight
is the absolute size of the plunge, called PW2 : max(MP−OP, 0) +max(SP−MP, 0).
Using these weights, the weighted average degree of insider trading for each of the
races in the sample is calculated. The simple average of these values is the extent of
insider trading in the dataset.
Table 3.1 displays the extent of plunges in the data set, where an early plunge is
defined as a positive percentage price change from OP to MP and a late plunge is
defined as a positive percentage price change from MP to SP. A sustained plunge is
where the horse in question is subject to both early and late plunges; the extent of the
sustained plunge is then the percentage change from OP to SP. It can be seen from Ta-
ble 1 that the majority of the 13,852 plunges in the dataset are late plunges, suggesting
insider trading at MP. However, the average extent of early plunges exceeds that of
late plunges.
3A horse is said to have been plunged when its odds suddenly decrease meaningfully owing to large
bets having been placed on the same horse with different bookmakers simultaneously. Schnytzer and
Shilony (1995) show that plunges contain inside information.
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Table 3.1: The extent of plunges in the dataset
Plunges Number Average extent (%)
Early plunge 1,281 21.25
Late plunge 9,783 15.72
Sustained plunge 2,788 26.33
All 13,852 18.37
An early plunge is defined as a positive percentage change from OP to MP. A late plunge is defined as
a positive percentage change from MP to SP. When there are both early and late plunges, this is known
as a sustained plunge.
Table 3.2: Measures of the degree of insider trading for each specification




P(0) − OP is the true winning probability at time 0. PW is [max((MP − OP)/OP, 0) + max((SP −
MP)/MP, 0)]. PW2 is [max(MP−OP, 0) +max(SP−MP, 0)].
The simple average of these values is a variable that measures the extent of in-
sider trading as estimated by SLM, and is shown in Table 3.2. Armed with opening
prices and various measures related to the extent of insider trading for each horse,
we proceed to forecast the winners of each race in the data set. We use the generally
preferred method of forecasting in the betting literature, namely the conditional logit
model (hereafter CL) of McFadden (1974). We estimate several CL models. The first
estimates the probability of horse i winning race j based solely on the information










where i = 1, 2, . . . , nj, OPij is the OP of horse i in race j, nj is the number of runners
in race j, and a1 indicates the contribution which OP makes to the horse’s chance of
winning race j. We then run four more regressions, adding different predictors to
OP in turn. These variables are as follows. First, the option value for each horse, as
estimated by SLM. This variable is zero for most horses in the sample and positive
for one or two in each race. Optionvalueij is positive if horse i’s winning probability
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in race j is estimated, via a Monte Carlo simulation, to be greater than the winning
probability implied by OP, and is measured as the difference between the two. In this













where i = 1, 2, . . . , nj. The coefficients a1, a2 and b1 in regressions (3.1) and (3.2) are
measured by maximizing the joint probability of observing the winners of all of the
races in the sample. Next, we add EarlyPlungeij, which is equal to the difference
between MP and OP when this difference is positive, and zero otherwise.4 Our fourth
predictor is the extent of insider trading on horse i in race j, as measured by SLM
(Insidertradingij). Finally, we add TotalPlungeij, which measures the total extent of
early and late plunges on horse i in race j. We expect, a priori, that all variables should,
by themselves, add to a horse’s winning probability, and thus should receive positive
coefficients.
3.3 Results
Table 3.3 shows the results of our five regressions. It is clear from these results that
OP is by far the most important predictor of winning probabilities, in terms of both co-
efficient size and statistical significance. Given the bookmakers’ stake in the outcome
of the betting, it is clear that OP will reflect as much useful information as possible, un-
less bookmakers deliberately distort prices as a defense mechanism against insiders.5
With the exception of Optionvalue, all of the variables have positive coefficients which
are statistically significant in at least one of the regressions. When Optionvalue is used
as the sole predictor of winning probabilities, it has a positive and highly significant
coefficient,6 leading us to conclude that the unexpected results here are the result of
multicollinearity.
4The winning probabilities when this and subsequent variables are added may be estimated by models
that follow trivially from Eqs. (3.1) and (3.2), and thus are not noted explicitly.
5See SLM, Schnytzer and Shilony (2003) and Shin (1991) and Shin (1992) for more discussion on this
point.
6Full results are available upon request.
42
3.3. Results
Table 3.3: Predicting horses’ winning probabilities
Specification 1 2 3 4 5
Dependent variable Win Win Win Win Win
OP 6.7117 (50.58)* 6.6583 (47.09)* 6.5204 (45.73)* 6.4404 (44.91)* 6.3347 (43.88)*
Optionvalue 2.1108 (1.09) 1.5214 (0.78) -2.7790 (-1.32) -13.7064 (-5.63)*
EarlyPlunge 10.824 (6.79)* 10.1933 (6.39)*
Insidertrading 0.2741 (5.80)* 0.2079 (4.32)*
TotalPlunge 9.3020 (9.62)*
N 45,296 45,296 45,296 45,296 45,296
Pseudo-R2 0.1389 0.1390 0.1412 0.143 0.1456
* Indicates significance at the 1% significance level. Optionvalue are the option values generated by
SLM. EarlyPlunge is the extent of early plunges as measured by max(MP−OP, 0). Insidertrading is
the incidence of insider trading on a specific horse, as generated by SLM. TotalPlunge is the occurrence
of early and late plunges together, as measured by max(MP−OP, 0) +max(SP−MP, 0).
Table 3.4 shows the results of betting $1 on each predicted favorite in every race in
our sample, on the basis of the five regressions shown in Table 3.3. The results obtained
are in line with what the regression results in Table 3.3 led us to expect. Thus, insider
trading seems to influence profits (or in this case, losses) in an upward direction, al-
though the tone is clearly set by OP, and betting on the basis of it alone leads to a loss
of 10.2%. The best performance is achieved by adding option values, early plunges
and the extent of insider trading to OP, but this only adds a little over 3% to the loss
reduction. However, since SLM rely exclusively on price data in their simulations,
these results show that this market is, in practice, weak-form efficient. Furthermore,
even if the results are calculated as if betting takes place at the best odds available
during the betting (as we would expect insiders to bet), rather than at SP, returns are
better but remain negative throughout.7 Finally, it may seem strange that the losses in-
curred in simulation 5, when all plunges are taken into account in addition to the other
variables, should exceed those in simulation 4, when only early plunges are added to
the model. The reason for this would appear to be the herding on late plunges in this
market.8
7Full results are available upon request.
8See Schnytzer and Snir (2008).
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Table 3.4: Betting simulations
Betting based on the favorite predicted by specification
1 2 3 4 5
Number of races and bets 4017 4017 4017 4017 4017
Profit ($) -409.83 -379.40 -360.20 -285.00 -301.50
Rate of return (%) -10.20 -9.44 -8.97 -7.09 -7.51
Betting takes place in all races, since each race has a favorite, as measured by the highest win probability
predicted after each regression specification. Betting takes place at SP, the last quoted price before the
race starts.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we have shown that variables which measure insider trading, as
measured by SLM, have only a moderate impact on the forecasting results. Adding
various different measures relating to insider trading by horse to a conditional logit
model which uses only opening prices to predict winning probabilities, reduces the
losses but does not generate positive profits. Therefore, the relevance of insider trading
in this market, in principle, cannot be refuted. However, it should be pointed out that
even the small gains in forecasting demonstrated here may be difficult to implement
in practice.
It is unlikely that the simulations used by SLM could be carried out in the short
time available before each race. Thus, a knowledge of price changes is critical, and
if the latest prices used in the simulation were to be those ruling in the market five
minutes or so before the start of the race, that would leave less than five minutes
for the estimations. Since the simulations carried out by SLM required several days to
run, a system based on our estimates could be applied only on a computer which is far
more powerful than is generally available today outside the Pentagon! Furthermore,
given the merely moderate gains generated by the addition of these variables to the
basic model, it may be wondered whether it would be worthwhile to struggle for a
solution to the computing problem.
So why has the extent of inside information not contributed more dramatically
to the forecasts? To the extent that the SLM model provides a reasonable measure
of the extent of insider trading, it must be concluded that the reliance on price data
alone in forecasting horse races in a bookmakers’ market is doomed to failure. On
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the other hand, perhaps the basic weakness of regression models in forecasting is that
they provide predictions on the basis of “on average” results, whereas insiders bet on
particular horses in particular races when as many relevant factors as possible which




FDI, Terrorism and U.S. Investors before
and after 9/11?
4.1 Introduction
In today’s globalized world, the largest and most productive companies have ex-
panded their activities around the globe (see e.g. Melitz, 2003; Helpman, 2006). While
this increased internationalization can enhance productivity and create shareholder
value (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Javorcik, 2004), it also
exposes firms to new sources of geopolitical risk that threaten to destroy part of this
value. The recent increase in terrorist attacks in Africa, the Middle East and parts of
Asia raises the question how multinationals with investments in these regions are af-
fected. Since investors seem remarkably apt at identifying and valuing different forms
of FDI (Doukas and Travlos, 1988; Chen et al., 2000), the stock market is a potential
channel through which this risk can affect the multinational.
Recently, Dube et al. (2011) and Berger and Bouwman (2013) have explored this
channel using unexpected and (initially) covert CIA interventions abroad. They found
?This chapter is based on joint work with Jaap W.B. Bos (Maastricht University) and Michael Frömmel
(Ghent University).
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that the interventions resulted in increased exports and positive abnormal returns for
U.S. multinational firms. While these interventions were generally regarded as posi-
tive for the firms involved, in this chapter we investigate whether multinationals can
also see downsides as a result of geopolitical risk. We focus specifically on terrorist
attacks, as the costs associated with attacks like 9/11 can range from 55 billion dollars
in direct property losses, to a total estimated loss between 60 and 125 billion dollars
in GDP (see e.g. Thompson Jr, 2002; Blomberg and Hess, 2009). We analyze how acts
of terrorism abroad affect share prices of U.S. multinational firms that have invested
in the area. According to the stock market channel, companies with investments in a
region that experiences a terrorist attack see a more severe stock market reaction com-
pared to companies that invest less in the region, or those that do not invest there at
all.
Previous literature has documented that acts of terror can be transmitted through
stock markets. For example, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) find that stocks of Span-
ish firms with large parts of their business in the Basque country outperformed their
counterparts during a truce period, only to underperform when the truce ended. An-
other example is Drakos (2010a), who has found that countries with a strong trade
relation with Spain and the United Kingdom experienced more pronounced abnor-
mal stock market losses during the attacks in Madrid and London. In this chapter, we
look at this relationship on a larger scale, taking into account many more instances of
terrorism and their connection with FDI in Western Europe, the rest of Europe, Latin
America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia.
We show that for the past several years, equity prices indeed drop after a large
terrorist attack, and that the drop is related to the capital stock built by U.S. firms in
the region where the attack takes place. Exploiting the fact that the 9/11 attacks take
place during our sample period, we find that the relationship between large terrorist
attacks, the stock of FDI built up by U.S. firms in the region and their share prices is
only significant, both statistically and economically, after the tragic events of 9/11.
In the remainder of the chapter we look at possible explanations for this change
in investor behavior, discussing both rational and behavioral factors. Based on these
factors, we formulate and test several hypotheses. A first possible explanation is that
terrorism in the post-9/11 world has become more frequent and violent, however we
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find that the total number of terrorist attacks and their severity did not change materi-
ally after the attacks. Since risk perception has been shown to be mainly attributable to
acts of terrorism (Drakos and Müller, 2014), this potentially also rules out changes to
the anticipation of new attacks occurring and affecting prices. The second possibility
is increased media coverage, which has been shown to play an important role in the
way financial markets react (Melnick and Eldor, 2010). We find that while media cov-
erage of attacks on foreign soil initially increased after 9/11, it has since leveled out,
seemingly ruling out exaggerated risk perceptions of investors as a result of media
coverage (Sunstein, 2003). Third, we briefly discuss the impact of terrorism insurance
in the wake of the attacks, as stock prices should theoretically not react to attacks when
firms are insured against them. A short review of the literature indicates that the costs
of insurance against terrorism have fallen after 9/11, and that the share of companies
using terrorism insurance as guaranteed by the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (2002)
has continued to rise. Based on this information, we would expect to see a diminished
relationship as time goes on. Nonetheless, the relationship between terrorist attacks,
FDI and share prices is only significant after 9/11. Taken together, the evidence sug-
gests disaster myopia of U.S. investors prior to 9/11, consistent with the availability
heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) and the concept of local thinking (Gennaioli
and Shleifer, 2010), and that the attacks served as a wake-up call, creating awareness
among investors about the potential impact of terrorism. These findings are in line
with Malmendier and Nagel (2011), who show that extreme events are easily remem-
bered and can have a longlasting effect on investors.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a brief literature review,
while Sections 4.3 and 4.4 describe our data and methodology respectively. In Sec-
tion 4.5 we present the results of the analysis before concluding briefly in Section 4.6.
4.2 Stock prices, terrorist attacks and FDI stocks
The tragic events on September 11, 2001 were the worst attacks on U.S. soil in 70
years and hit the United States in its financial and political center. The loss of lives and
material damage sustained during the attacks displayed the economic consequences
of terror, and the ensuing shock waves were felt around the world.
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Stock market data, due to their forward looking nature and high frequency, have
often been used to assess the economic impact of terrorism. Following 9/11, financial
markets in America and around the world showed heavy losses as they incorporated
the news of these attacks. Previous research has shown that stock markets in countries
suffering from terrorism exhibit negative abnormal returns as a result of large isolated
attacks like the 9/11, Madrid or London attacks (see e.g. Drakos, 2004; Carter and
Simkins, 2004; Maillet and Michel, 2005). However, liquid and well diversified mar-
kets can absorb these shocks well, such that the impact of the effect is instantaneous or
in some cases hardly noticeable (Johnston and Nedelescu, 2006; Mende, 2006). When
taking into account a larger set of attacks, negative abnormal returns are also found
(Drakos, 2010b), accompanied by an increase in stock market variance (Peren Arin
et al., 2008). In an increasingly interconnected world, what remains unclear is how
terrorism in different geopolitical regions can spill over to U.S. markets.
Terrorist attacks on foreign soil can affect U.S. stock prices in a number of ways
relating to the discounted expected future cash flows. First, if investors experience
higher risk aversion as a result of a terrorist attack, this increases the rate at which
they discount future cash flows. In this case we expect to see a uniform price shock
occurring across assets/sectors that share a common discount factor. However, there
is ample evidence that sectors in the same country (or similar sectors across countries)
exhibit different reactions to the same attack (see amongst others Chen and Siems,
2004; Straetmans et al., 2008; Berrebi and Klor, 2010; Chesney et al., 2011), making it
unlikely that discount rate changes explain the price shocks we observe after terrorist
attacks.
Second, an attack can influence expected future cash flows, either via an increase in
expected costs or a decrease in expected revenues. Increases in expected costs can, for
instance, come from increases in insurance premia or damage to the physical capital
present, while decreased consumption and grown in the country where the attack took
place can lead to a decrease in expected revenues (see e.g. Blomberg et al., 2004; Eck-
stein and Tsiddon, 2004). In both cases, the loss in cash flows depends mainly on the
location of an attack, the amount of capital goods present in the location and the level
of damage to these productive assets.1 The damage, in turn, is determined by the mag-
1These assets can be both physical capital and human capital, although share prices react more to attacks
on the latter (Karolyi and Martell, 2010).
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nitude of an attack and specific factors such as population density, building codes or
the quality of infrastructure. Moreover, the expected loss as a result of a terrorist attack
also depends on the assessment of investors regarding the probability of attacks and
their corresponding losses. Important for this assessment is how investors generate
expectations. For instance, the availability heuristic can make it difficult for investors
to properly incorporate all possible outcomes (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973).
Third, multinationals can also move their operations to another country as a con-
sequence of terrorist activities. For instance, Abadie and Gardeazabal (2008) find that,
in an open economy, country-specific terrorism risk can lead to movements in capital
(FDI) to other countries. Enders et al. (2006), however, establish empirically that this
effect is economically small and we therefore focus on the first two ways.
4.3 Data
To analyze how terrorism on foreign soil affects U.S. stock prices, we combine data
from three different sources. We first describe the database on terrorist attacks, fol-
lowed by data on FDI stocks and stock market data of U.S. multinational companies.
4.3.1 Terrorist attacks
We collect data on terrorist attacks from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), de-
veloped and maintained by the University of Maryland. The GTD contains informa-
tion on over 98,000 international attacks between 1970 and 2010.2 For an event to be
incorporated in the GTD, it has to be intentional, violent and carried out by non-state
actors.3 We further limit our sample by only including successful attacks that were
considered to be terrorism beyond any doubt by the GTD.4 Information on these ad-
2For more information on the GTD see LaFree and Dugan (2007).
3According to the GTD, terrorist attacks have to be aimed at ‘attaining a political, economic, religious, or
social goal,’ there must be ‘evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message
to a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims,’ and the event must be ‘outside the
context of legitimate warfare activities’ (Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START), 2011).
Montalvo (2011), for instance, documents how attacks indeed can attain political and religious goals by
studying the outcome of the Spanish elections following the Madrid bombings, while Gassebner et al.
(2011) find that terrorism shortens cabinet duration.
4Users of the GTD can further govern the parameters of their search results by employing an additional
filter. The existence of a ‘Doubt Terrorism Proper?’ field records reservation, in the eyes of GTD an-
alysts, that the incident in question is truly terrorism. Such uncertainty, however, was not deemed to
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ditional filters is only available from 1998 onwards, leaving us with 16,287 attacks
that take place in 144 countries on 4,009 days between 1998 and 2010. Although the
number of attacks seems high, it includes both incidents of national and transnational
terrorism and is in line with other papers (e.g., Piazza, 2008). Attacks that occur dur-
ing weekends and holidays are placed on the next available day that the U.S. stock
market can react to the attack. Out of a total 3,270 trading days in our sample, there
are 2,868 during which information on terrorism can enter the market. We discuss the
consequences of this high frequency of events for our analysis in Section 4.4.
In order to differentiate between the magnitude and geographical location of an act
of terror, we construct a daily terrorism intensity index (Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004;
Peren Arin et al., 2008), such that
TERi,t = ln(1+ # attacksi,t + # fatalitiesi,t + # injuredi,t), (4.1)
where i represents the region in which the attack took place, t is the day on which the
attack took place, and the number of attacks, fatalities and injuries are reported by the
GTD.5 The regions closely follow the grouping of outward FDI at our disposal and are
Western Europe (comprising the European Union, Norway and Switzerland), the Rest
of Europe, Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and Asia and the Pacific.
The terrorism index TERi,t has several attractive features. A trading day on which
no terrorist attack occurs has a TER score of 0. Once attacks occur, the TER score
is additive in both the number of fatalities/injuries and the number of attacks. For
example, 1 attack with 10 injuries will not have the same TER score as 10 separate
attacks with 1 injured person each. Whereas the former has a TER score of 2.6, the
latter has a score of 3.
One downside of using the number of fatalities and injuries is that these numbers
are often not known on the day of the attack itself, but can take weeks or even months
to be confirmed. Even though estimated and official death tolls can differ, we assume
be sufficient to disqualify the incident from inclusion into the GTD. Furthermore, such a determination
of doubt is subsequently coded by GTD analysts as conforming to one of four possible alternative des-
ignations: 1) Insurgency/Guerilla Action; 2) Internecine Conflict Action; 3) Mass Murder; or 4) Purely
Criminal Act. Note that the ‘Doubt Terrorism Proper’ determination was only made for incidents that
occurred after 1997.
5For the purpose of this chapter, including the intensity of media coverage in the U.S. is also a possibility,
although unfortunately the GTD reports at most their top 3 sources for the information on the attack.
52
4.3. Data
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of terrorism
A. TER-scores B. Attacks
Trading days Average Average
Region Mean Std. Dev. Max. with attack deaths wounded
Western Europe 0.23 0.58 7.60 640 0.43 3.90
Rest of Europe 0.42 0.93 6.98 762 2.43 5.80
Latin America 0.26 0.73 5.73 500 2.44 3.36
Africa 0.74 1.22 8.37 1,101 5.34 7.11
Middle East 1.31 1.72 6.90 1,522 4.66 11.05
Asia & the Pacific 1.74 1.63 7.57 2,086 2.77 6.16
The table displays summary statistics of attacks in different global regions selected from the Global Ter-
rorism Database over the period 1998–2010, spanning a total of 3,270 trading days. Panel A shows the
statistics of the TER scores calculated from these attacks, where ‘Trading days with attacks’ counts the
number of days in the sample where a terrorist attack took place. Panel B shows the average number of
fatalities and wounded per attack using the raw data from the Global Terrorism Database. For instance,
the Madrid bombings are included as four separate attacks having injured 450 people each.
that the estimated death tolls are at least of a similar magnitude as the official death
toll. By using the log transformation, we limit overestimation of the intensity score.6
Panel A in Table 4.1 shows summary statistics of the terrorism intensity in each of
the six regions. Asia and the Pacific have experienced the highest intensity of terror-
ism, with an act of terrorism occurring on 2,086 out of 3,270 trading days in the sample
period. This is followed by the Middle East and Africa, which experienced acts of ter-
rorism on 1,522 and 1,101 trading days, respectively. On the contrary, these numbers
are much lower for Western Europe and Latin America, where attacks only occur on
640 and 500 trading days respectively. Panel B summarizes the average number of fa-
talities and wounded per attack, showing that terrorism was most lethal in Africa and
the Middle East. By comparison, attacks in Western Europe were the least lethal.
4.3.2 FDI stocks and stock market data
For the purpose of our analysis, we require accurate information on the FDI stock
built by U.S. firms in different parts of the world. For reasons of confidentiality, such
information is typically not available at the firm level. What is available from the U.S.
6For example, in the weeks after the 9/11 attacks the death toll had been estimated to be 6,000 over 4
attacks. This would have lead to a TER score of ln(1+ 4+ 6, 000) = 8.7. The official death toll recorded
in the GTD is 2,996 (including 19 terrorists), which leads to a TER score of ln(1+ 4+ 2, 996) = 8.0.
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Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA), is the yearly stock of outward U.S. FDI per region
and per industry, published in the ‘Survey of Current Business’. The BEA covers most
industries and countries, although not all combinations are reported if the amounts
are negligible or if they would threaten to disclose data of individual companies. We
use data for the period 1998 to 2010.
Industries are classified by the BEA using either the Standard Industry Classifica-
tion (SIC) or the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS). In order to
link these FDI data to stock market data, we obtain prices of the S&P500 and its sub-
sector indices from Datastream. Since the latter are classified using the Global Industry
Classification Standard (GICS), we need a mapping from SIC/NAICS to GICS, which
to the best of our knowledge does not yet exist. Therefore, we obtain a list of all current
and historic S&P500 companies with their SIC/NAICS and GICS codes from Compu-
stat in order to make a conversion table. More details on the data and the conversion
are provided in Appendix 4.B. In our analysis, sectors are defined according to the
two-digit GICS codes and consist of Energy, Materials, Industrials, Consumer Discre-
tionary, Consumer Staples, Health Care, Financials, Information Technology, Telecom-
munication Services and Utilities. For the Utilities sector, data on outward FDI were
not available after 2002 and it is therefore excluded from the analysis.
Figure 4.1 shows per sector the average share of U.S. outward FDI that each re-
gion received from firms in that sector during the sample period 1998-2010. We see
that Western Europe, Latin America and Asia and the Pacific all received large shares
of U.S. investments. The main beneficiary of U.S. outward FDI was Western Europe,
whose countries received between 50 and 70 percent of all U.S. investments made
abroad. The share of Western Europe was lowest in the Energy sector, where invest-
ments were more equally distributed between the Middle East, Latin America and
Asia and the Pacific. Asian and Pacific countries received their highest investment
share from the IT and Industrial sectors. Moreover, outside the Energy sector, the
shares of Africa and the Rest of Europe were generally quite low and averaged 0.6
percent and 1.5 percent, respectively.
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The figure shows the geographical distribution in outward FDI of nine S&P500 sectors. To calculate
shares, data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis are transformed from NAICS/SIC to GICS
sectors (see Appendix 4.B) and averaged over the sample period 1998–2010.
4.4 Methodology
Our analysis consists of three steps. In the first step, we propose a solution for the
fact that terrorist attacks occur so often that we cannot make use of a standard event
study methodology, since it is very difficult to construct a proper event window. In
the second step, we relate share prices to terrorist attacks, allowing for the fact that
investors’ response may be highly non-linear, as they may only respond to attacks
that are severe enough to possibly cause (future) cash flow drops. For that reason, we
limit ourselves to investors’ ‘pure’ response to terrorism in this step, and do not yet
incorporate the role of FDI stocks. After all, an average attack may not have much of an
effect, regardless of the FDI stock present. Finally, in the third step, we relate investor
responses to large attacks with FDI stocks in different regions, taking into account the
fact that this relationship may vary for reasons other than the share of total FDI each
region receives.
4.4.1 First step: jumps in the price process
To identify the effect of an event like a terrorist attack, we need to separate the
normal behavior of returns from abnormal behavior. The abundance of terrorist events
around the globe makes it nearly impossible to find enough estimation windows with
(presumably) normal returns. As this is likely to lead to biased estimates of abnormal
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returns when using standard event study techniques (see e.g., Craig MacKinlay, 1997),
we resort to a different method.
Since terrorist attacks are typically construed to be unexpected events, we expect
them to cause jumps in the price process.7 For this reason, we rely on a jump-diffusion
model to distinguish between attacks that have an impact (i.e., where a jump occurred)
compared to those that do not (i.e., no jump observed). Jump-diffusion models hail
back to Merton (1976), but while most of them combine a standard Brownian motion
with a jump process (see e.g. Naik, 1993), we rely on a simplified GARCH-jump model
proposed by Maheu and McCurdy (2004). The main advantage of this approach is that
we can capture volatility clusters in a GARCH framework, something that a constant
variance Brownian motion cannot do. As a result, large price changes that occur due
to volatility clustering are not erroneously classified as a jump. By using this method-
ology, we assume implicitly that terrorism abroad will directly impact the share price
in the U.S., disregarding any possible contagion effects from foreign markets to home
markets (see e.g. Dungey et al., 2005; Bekaert et al., 2011). However, since we deal
with many terrorist events, which tend to be absorbed quickly in liquid markets like
the U.S. (Johnston and Nedelescu, 2006; Mende, 2006), we choose to look only at event
days instead of possible contagion following attacks.
In order to measure jumps, we first define the standard return process. Next, we
define jumps and apply a filtering procedure to separate standard price movements
from jumps using a maximum likelihood estimator. Finally, we extract the probability
of a jump as well as its (expected) impact on the price.
We start by describing the return process, which is defined as:
rt = µ+ φrt−1 + et (4.2a)
et = e1,t + e2,t, (4.2b)
where rt is the stock return, µ is a constant mean and φ an autoregressive component.8
7This at least holds for most of the market participants. Insider trading as reported by Poteshman (2006)
should not play an important role.
8Adding more variables to the mean equation is possible, however our explanatory variables are indices
and thus already quite broad. For example, it would not make sense to estimate a market model in this
case. We have performed robustness tests where the Fama-French HML and SMB (Fama and French,
1992, 1993) factors have been included in the mean equation, but this does not change the results of the
analysis. Results are available upon request.
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The composite error term, et, consists of e1,t and e2,t, innovations by the GARCH and
the jump process respectively. What allows us to separate e1,t from e2,t is the fact each
has a different distribution, as a result of which we can decompose et.
We begin with e1,t, which follows a standard GARCH(1,1) process:
e1,t ∼ N(0, σ2t ) (4.3a)





In contrast, e2,t represents the impact of jumps in the returns, which is assumed to
arrive via a Poisson process with time-varying intensity:
e2,t = Jt − E[Jt|Φt−1], (4.4)
where Jt is the actual jump contribution and E[Jt|Φt−1] is its expectation conditional
on the previous days’ returns, Φt−1 = {r1, . . . , rt−1}. The jump contribution Jt is the
sum of the stochastic number of jumps, nt, where the size of each jump Yt,k is assumed





Yt,k, Yt,k ∼ N(θ, δ2). (4.5)
Finally, the probability that nt = j jumps take place on day t given the history of
returns Φt−1 is:





where λt is the jump intensity. Maheu and McCurdy (2004) suggest to let the jump
intensity follow an AR(1) process, where the expected number of jumps today depend
on yesterday’s expected number of jumps and the jump intensity residual ξt−1 (the
deviation of the number of jumps from its expectation):
λt = E[nt|Φt−1] = λ0 + ρE[nt−1|Φt−2] + γξt−1 (4.7)
We use the filter procedure proposed by Maheu and McCurdy (2004) and obtain the
probability that at least one jump occurred based on the ex post estimation of the
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics of jumps
A. Jump probability (in %) B. Jump contribution (in %)
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
S&P500 36.9 36.7 0.0 100 -0.7 1.2 -10.0 0.0
C. Discretionary 33.8 34.3 0.0 100 -0.7 1.2 -11.2 0.0
C. Staples 28.7 28.2 1.9 100 -0.2 0.3 -3.3 0.0
Energy 19.2 27.3 0.0 100 -0.5 1.1 -14.3 0.0
Financials 30.2 34.3 0.0 100 -0.7 1.3 -10.8 0.0
Health Care 35.1 29.9 2.8 100 -0.3 0.4 -3.6 0.0
Industrials 28.9 34.3 0.0 100 -0.7 1.3 -11.6 0.0
IT 28.5 34.0 0.0 100 -0.9 1.6 -12.5 0.0
Materials 28.8 28.0 2.3 100 -0.3 0.5 -5.1 0.0
Telecom 27.4 27.8 1.2 100 -0.2 0.3 -2.5 0.0
Utilities 13.5 24.1 0.0 100 -0.3 0.7 -11.6 0.0
The table displays summary statistics of the output from the GARCH-Jump model for the S&P500 and
its sectors. Panel A shows the probability that at least one jump occurred on a trading day, P(nt ≥ 1|Φt).
Panel B displays the jump contributions, calculated as the expected number of jumps on day t, E[nt|Φt],
multiplied with the average jump size θ.
number of jumps:
P(nt ≥ 1|Φt) = 1− P(nt = 0|Φt) (4.8)





jP(nt = j|Φt) (4.9)
Since the jump sizes are i.i.d and thus unconditional, multiplying the expected number
of jumps with the average jump size yields the ex-post expected jump contribution
E[Jt|Φt] = θE[nt|Φt]. Together, these two elements tell us both how likely it is a jump
occurred, as well as its size. Table 4.2 shows summary statistics for these two variables,
based on the estimations in Table 4.A.1 in Appendix 4.A.
The sectors with the highest average jump probabilities are Health Care (35.1 per-
cent), Consumer Discretionary (33.8 percent) and Financials (30.2 percent). In contrast,
sectors with the lowest average jump probabilities are Utilities (13.5 percent) and En-
ergy (19.2 percent). Panel B summarizes the jump contributions, and shows that while
Health Care has the highest average jump probability, its largest jump contribution
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was only -3.6 percent.9 The largest contribution of jumps to the Financials sector was
-10 percent on August 31st, 1998, the 7th largest one-day loss on the S&P500. Sectors
that have experienced both high jump probabilities and high jump contributions are
Consumer Discretionary, IT and Financials.
Now that we have a measure for the likelihood and magnitude of jumps, the next
question is to what extent terrorist attacks are responsible for these jumps. To in-
vestigate the relationship between terrorism, jumps and FDI, we opt for a two-stage
analysis. In the first stage, we estimate per sector the relationship between the TER
index and the likelihood and size of jumps. Using this estimation, we obtain the aver-
age reaction to a large attack in each of the regions. In a second stage, we regress the
predicted jump probabilities and sizes on the share of outward U.S. FDI that regions
received.
While we sacrifice some efficiency in our estimations by opting for this two-stage
analysis, there are three important benefits to our approach. First, we consider the
possibility that only the largest attacks evoke a reaction on financial markets. A single-
stage analysis, with an interaction between the TER measure and FDI, would at best
capture the effects of an average attack, conditional on the average FDI stock, and may
thus fail to capture the conditions under which we expect to see a reaction. Moreover,
since the regions experience different ‘average’ attacks, a two-stage analysis further
allows us to obtain reactions to attacks of the same magnitude.
Second, in a single stage estimation we may fail to properly estimate the impact
of terrorism conditional on FDI stock if the latter is endogenous. Indeed, Abadie and
Gardeazabal (2008) find evidence that FDI can flow out of a country as a result of
terrorism although empirically the effects are relatively small (Enders et al., 2006). By
identifying the relationship between terrorism, FDI stocks and share prices in two
steps, we are able to avoid this problem of endogeneity.
The final reason is related to the measure of outward FDI. The data obtained from
the U.S. BEA are recorded in dollar amounts on a historical cost basis, and thus rise
on average every year. When FDI in regions grows at more or less the same rate, only
the dollar amount invested will be higher, even though the amount invested in each
region remains proportionally the same. Should large attacks occur later in the sample
9This occurred on October 15th, 2008 when the S&P500 lost 9.5 percent for its second biggest one-day
loss ever.
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period, we might (falsely) conclude that more FDI in a region leads to a higher reaction
by using these dollar amounts. To counter this problem, we propose to instead to use
shares of outward FDI per region. Unfortunately, regardless of this transformation,
a one-step analysis will suffer from severe multicollinearity when using either dollar
amounts or relative shares. For instance, when dollar amounts grow every year this
implies a positive correlation between the regional outward FDI measures, whereas
the correlation between FDI shares is negative by design: if one region receives a larger
share, other regions will lose some of theirs. Splitting up the identification strategy in
two steps avoids this problem. We choose to work with relative shares in FDI, since
they are more stable over time than the dollar amounts, acknowledging that they still
exhibit some variability over time. For example 12 percent of the investments made
by the Telecom sector in 1998 were located in Asia and the Pacific, while this increased
to 26 percent by 2010. Investments made by the Energy sector in Western Europe were
46 percent of the total FDI in 1998, but fell to 22 percent by 2010.
4.4.2 Second step: nonlinear reactions to terrorist attacks
To assess the impact of terrorist attacks on jump probabilities and jump sizes, we
start by estimating:


















β2,kTER2k,t + γMonth+ τDoW+ νt
(4.10b)
where P(nt ≥ 1|Φt) and E[Jt|Φt] are the jump probability and jump contribution re-
spectively, TERk,t is the daily terrorism intensity score in each of the k defined regions
and Month and DoW are controls for month and day-of-the-week effects. In order to
obtain yearly estimates of the jump probability and jump size due to terrorism, we run
this regression separately for each sector i in each year.
Since P(nt ≥ 1|Φt) is a probability and has values in the set [0, 1], we estimate














β2,kTER2k,t + γMonth+ τDoW
)
, (4.11)
where Λ is the logistic function and Equation (4.11) is estimated using a Bernoulli
log-likelihood function. Fitted probabilities of jumps associated with large terrorist
attacks, ηi,k,t, will now lie in the [0, 1] range.
Furthermore, as E[Jt|Φt] is always negative, with values ranging between (−∞, 0],
we estimate Equation (4.10b) using a Tobit model with a censoring from above at 0:
E[Jt|Φt] =
E[Jt|Φt]
∗ if E[Jt|Φt]∗ < 0
0 if E[Jt|Φt]∗ ≥ 0
. (4.12)
Fitted values for the jump size will therefore fall in the range (−∞, 0].
Of course, our objective in the end is to identify investors’ reactions to events that
may affect (future) cash flows. As a result, we are particularly interested in large at-
tacks that take place in regions where a considerable FDI stock has been built up.
However, what constitutes a large attack, do all regions experience those and how do
investors react?
To answer these questions, we show graphically the relationship between the S&P500
jump probabilities and regional TER scores in Figure 4.2. Our aim is to find out
whether there is a threshold value beyond which attacks provoke jumps. As expected,
most of the patterns displayed in Figure 4.2 demonstrate a non-linear relationship,
where the probability of a jump increases disproportionately with the intensity of a
terrorist attack. An exception is the Middle East, where more severe attacks seem to
provoke smaller reactions. At first glance this may seem odd, however given the on-
going conflict between Israel and its occupied territories, combined with the invasion
and U.S. military presence in Iraq, it is possible that markets have become desensi-
tized to attacks in this region. Figure 4.A.1 in Appendix 4.A shows the relationship for
the Middle East when attacks in these countries are not used to calculate the terror-
ism intensity score. Compared to Figure 4.2(e), we see that the relationship between
terrorism and stock market sensitivity is less downward sloping and statistically in-
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The graphs show the relationship between the intensity of terrorism in different regions of the world
and probabilities that the S&P500 experienced a jump on these attack days. Fitted values and their 95
percent confidence intervals are presented, as well as the density of the TER scores.
significant without these areas.
From Table 4.1 and Figure 4.2, we observe two things. First, the average maximum
TER score per region is approximately 7.10 Second, although the confidence intervals
are quite wide due to a limited amount of large attacks, a magnitude 7 attack results
in a jump probability above 50 in 4 out of the 6 regions. We therefore use this as a
threshold value and condition the probability of a jump, in any given year, on the
occurrence of a hypothetical attack with magnitude 7, although we use other values
as a robustness check. In order to allow the reaction to this attack to vary over time,
we estimate Equations (4.10a) and (4.10b) year-by-year. Given each year’s and each
sector’s estimation, the share price reaction for each sector i to a large terrorist attacks
is then:
ηi,k,t = E [(P(nt ≥ 1|Φt) | TERk = 7] , for t = 1, . . . , T (4.13a)
ζi,k,t = E [E[Jt|Φt]∗ | E[Jt|Φt] < 0 , TERk = 7] , for t = 1, . . . , T (4.13b)
where ηi,k,t/ζi,k,t is the estimated probability/size of the jump in the share price of sec-
10This corresponds to one large attack with 1,100 injuries and fatalities or for example 10 attacks with an
average of 100 injuries and fatalities.
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tor i associated with a large terrorist attack in region k in year t. Of course, in years
without large attacks, the estimated relationship between terrorism and jump prob-
abilities/sizes is expected to be relatively flat, and predicting the conditional mean
given an attack outside of the observed range of actual attacks will likely yield a low
jump probability/size.
As a robustness test, we will also estimate Equations (4.10a) and (4.10b) on the
entire sample instead of yearly subsamples. Since every region suffers from at least
one large attack (as can be seen in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1), these estimations have an
improved fit. However, this comes at a cost as we have to use average shares of FDI
over the entire sample period in the next step, thereby ignoring year-to-year changes.
4.4.3 Third step: linking reactions to large attacks with FDI
Having established what constitute terrorism-effectuated jumps, the final step is to
analyze to what extent the likelihood and size of these jumps are related to the U.S.
FDI stock that has been built up in a region. We therefore estimate:
ηi,k,t = α+ βFDIi,k,t + µi + τt + υi,t (4.14a)
ζi,k,t = α+ βFDIi,k,t + µi + τt + νi,t, (4.14b)
where ηi,k,t and ζi,k,t are the predicted jump probability and size of sector i associated
with attacks in region k occurring in year t respectively, and FDIi,k,t is the share of the
total FDI stock of sector i that it has invested in region k in year t. Moreover, µi and
τt are sector and year fixed effects respectively, and are included to control for het-
erogeneity between sectors and years.11 If investors take into account the investment
position of firms in each sector, we expect β to be positive for ηi,k,t and negative for
ζi,k,t. In that case, a higher share of FDI in a region will lead to a higher probability of
a jump due to a large scale attack and a more negative movement in share prices.
Since ηi,k,t and ζi,k,t are predicted values of P(nt ≥ 1|Φt) and E[Jt|Φt], we again
need to take into account their supports. For Equation (4.14a), we include sector fixed
effects and again estimate a fractional logit.12 Estimating Equation (4.14b) using a Tobit
11We do not include region fixed effects as these will absorb the cross-variation of shares between regions
that we are interested in.
12Papke and Wooldridge (2008) caution adding fixed effects when T is small and N is large. The likelihood
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approach is less straightforward, as Greene (2004) cautions that adding fixed effects
biases the variance of the error term. To still account for unobserved heterogeneity
due to the panel nature of the data, we estimate Equation (4.14b) using a random
effects Tobit model with sector-specific random effects (see e.g. Maddala, 1987).
Given the data at our disposal, one side note is in order here. The identification
strategy we follow relies on the assumption that terrorism and sector level investment
are, more or less, evenly distributed across countries in the region. Since we lump
together the region’s investments, we allow prices to be influenced by attacks in other
countries to which a sector might not be exposed. In this case, we would not expect to
see a reaction on the share price as their FDI stock is not ‘at stake’ unless investors per-
ceive it as a sign of regional instability. In that scenario, the potential impact would be
underestimated, as we compute the average reaction to attacks in the region without
being able to make the distinction whether the sector is exposed to only one particular
country, or a little bit to all of them. Should we still see a reaction, even though we
aggregate on a region and sector level, it would be indicative of the relative strength
of these results.
4.5 Results
In this section, we retrace the steps we described above. We start by establishing
whether investors react to large terrorist attacks. Then we relate these reactions to FDI
stocks. Subsequently, we investigate whether investors’ reaction to terrorism on for-
eign soil is proportional to U.S. FDI stocks in the area where the attack takes place,
whether the reaction is different after 9/11, and if the information that investors re-
ceive has changed due to 9/11. We conclude this section with some robustness checks.
4.5.1 Are investors sensitive to large terrorist attacks on foreign soil?
Does a large terrorist attack on foreign soil increase the probability of a drop in U.S.
share prices? And how large is the expected drop in share prices? In order to answer
these questions, Table 4.3 contains the jump probabilities and jump sizes, conditional
ratio test however shows that the unobserved heterogeneity does not play a large role and the estimates
are similar to a pooled version of the model. Moreover, similar to Hausman and Leonard (1997), N is
fixed in our case, combined with T = 13 years.
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Table 4.3: Average reactions to a large terrorist attack
A. Jump probability ηi,k,t B. Jump size ζi,k,t
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Western Europe 49.90 40.99 0.00 100.00 -2.33 4.05 -16.64 0.00
Rest of Europe 30.45 33.39 0.00 100.00 -0.76 1.20 -4.83 0.00
Latin America 38.77 36.13 0.00 100.00 -1.00 1.44 -7.90 0.00
Africa 28.59 22.61 0.08 89.32 -0.48 0.58 -2.97 -0.01
Middle East 30.55 24.58 0.00 96.66 -0.73 1.43 -11.60 0.00
Asia & the Pacific 32.94 22.24 0.04 89.96 -0.67 0.84 -6.68 -0.01
Contribution TER (in %) 10.91 5.69 3.10 29.78 10.22 6.19 2.30 39.81
The table displays summary statistics for the predicted jump probabilities (Panel A) and predicted jump
sizes (Panel B) associated with a large attack in each of the regions. The probabilities and sizes are
averaged out over year and sector. A large terrorist attack is defined as having a TER score of 7, which
corresponds to 1,100 injuries and fatalities. The predictions are obtained by estimating Equations (4.11)
and (4.12) on a year and sector basis. A Shapley decomposition of McFadden’s pseudo-R2 is performed
to determine the contribution of the combined TER terms .
on a large attack, as defined by Equations (4.11) and (4.12).
We observe that, during the entire sample period, the region where large attacks
lead to the highest average predicted jump probability and jump size is Western Eu-
rope. On average, the probability that at least one jump occurred in one of the sectors
due to a large terrorist attack is 49.90 percent, and the average size of that jump is
-2.33 percent. Other regions where attacks lead to noticeable reactions on U.S. stock
markets are Latin America and Asia and the Pacific, where the average ηi,k,t are 38.77
percent and 32.94 percent respectively. The average predicted jump sizes are -1.00 per-
cent for Latin America and -0.76 percent for Asia and the Pacific respectively, and are
markedly lower than for Western Europe.
To analyze how much predictive power the TER terms add, we perform a Shapley
decomposition, which is based on the pseudo-R2 of each regression, and is shown in
Table 4.3. On average, around 10% of the predictive power in the regression comes
from the combined TER terms, although for certain year/sector combinations this is
as high as 29% for ηi,t,k and 39% for ζi,t,k.
Of course, since large terrorist attacks are still rare, share prices are not always
expected to jump. For instance, in 2006 our model predicts a jump probability for
Western Europe’s Industrials sector equal to 0 percent, whereas in 2009 the jump prob-
ability for the same sector was 12.5 percent, although the actual terrorist activity in the
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region in those years was low and quite similar.13
4.5.2 Is investors’ reaction to large attacks related to the FDI stock
that is ‘at stake’?
Now that we have established investors’ average reaction to large terrorist attacks,
the next question is whether this reaction depends on the FDI stock built up by U.S.
firms in the region where a large attack takes places. To answer that question, we
regress the jump probabilities and jump sizes on FDI stocks. We expect that jump
probabilities increase with larger FDI stocks, and we expect to see larger negative jumps
as FDI stocks increase.
Indeed, this is what we observe from Table 4.4. The coefficients on the share of
received FDI are significant and as expected: higher shares of outward U.S. FDI in a
region lead to higher jump probabilities and larger negative jump sizes in response to
high TER attacks.14
Since the interpretation of the magnitude of the coefficients in Table 4.4 is not
straightforward due to the nonlinear nature of the models, we plot the relationship
between FDI stocks and jump probabilities/sizes in Figure 4.3. We observe that the
probability of a jump increases from the unconditional expected value of 30 percent
when no investments take place, to 70 percent when a region receives all sector level
FDI. The size of the jump due to large terrorist attacks also increases with received FDI,
leading to a stock market reaction of -3 percent if a region receives all FDI from that
sector. The highest share a region received is found in 2006 when the Telecom sector
had 70 percent of its FDI stock invested in Western Europe. Using these estimates, a
large attack in that year would have led to a drop of -2.5 percent in its share price, with
a 60 percent probability of a jump.
These results show that the presence of U.S. firms in regions suffering from terror-
13The highest daily TER scores for Western Europe in 2006 and 2009 are 2.64 and 2.48, respectively.
14Year and sector fixed effects are included in the fractional logit case, and only year controls in the
random effects Tobit case. The sector fixed effects are found to be jointly insignificant in the fractional
logit estimation, meaning that the estimates are similar to a pooled version of the model. For the random
effects Tobit model, the unobserved heterogeneity in ζi,k,t does not play a large role as the random
sector effect contributes only 9 percent of total variance. However, a likelihood ratio test comparing the
random effects with a pooled version shows that the random effect is significantly different from zero.
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Table 4.4: Share price reactions and FDI stock










LR Test 1 48.88***
LR Test 2 1.59
The table shows panel regression results for Equations (4.14a) and (4.14b), where reactions of sectors to large terrorist attacks in
regions are regressed on the share of FDI they receive. ηi,k,t is estimated using fractional logit, whereas ζi,k,t is estimated using a
random effects Tobit model. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are robust for ηi,k,t . * significant at 10 percent; **
significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. L is the log likelihood value, ρ is the fraction of variance due to the unobserved





. LR Test 1 is a likelihood ratio test of σµ = 0 in ζi,k,t. LR Test 2 is a likelihood ratio test
for the joint significance of the sector fixed effects in ηi,k,t.
Figure 4.3: Are share price reactions proportional to FDI stock?
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The graphs show the jump probability and size in reaction to a large terrorist attack in a region, de-
pending on the share of FDI this region receives. Fitted values and their 95 percent confidence intervals
are shown over the response surface for the regressions in Equations (4.14a) and (4.14b), and Table 4.4.
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Table 4.5: The impact of 9/11 on investors’ reaction
A. Jump probability ηi,k,t B. Jump size ζi,k,t
Before 9/11 After 9/11 Before 9/11 After 9/11
1998 - 2001 2002 - 2006 2007 - 2010 1998 - 2001 2002 - 2006 2007 - 2010
mean 0.336 0.306 0.427 -0.742 -0.816 -1.489
(std. dev.) (0.273) (0.306) (0.354) (1.374) (2.072) (2.467)
α -0.966*** -1.625*** -1.296*** -0.666*** 0.120 -0.867**
(0.294) (0.343) (0.301) (0.257) (0.276) (0.411)
FDIi,k,t 0.537 1.439*** 3.532*** -0.356 -2.449*** -4.745***
(0.443) (0.428) (0.536) (0.428) (0.526) (0.688)
Year FE Included Included Included Included Included Included
Sector FE Included Included Included
N 210 270 216 210 270 216
L -99.31 -118.03 -99.77 -348.15 -536.27 -460.52
ρ 0.17 0.04 0.15
LR Test 1 22.51** 3.10*** 20.56***
LR Test 2 5.41 1.37 3.40
The table shows panel regression results of Equations (4.14a) and (4.14b) for different subsamples, where reactions of sectors to
large terrorist attacks in regions are regressed on the share of FDI they receive. ηi,k,t is estimated using fractional logit, whereas
ζi,k,t is estimated using a random effects Tobit model. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and are robust for ηi,k,t . *
significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. L is the log likelihood value, ρ is the fraction of





. LR Test 1 is a likelihood ratio test of σµ = 0 in ζi,k,t. LR
Test 2 is a likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of the sector fixed effects in ηi,k,t.
ism directly affects their share prices. The higher the proportion of investments made
in a region, the more the share prices of these sectors react to large terrorist attacks
taking place there. This suggests that investors do on average take into account the
investment positions of firms belonging to a sector and seem to adjust expectations on
cash flows when they are dealt with the negative exposure of terrorism.
4.5.3 Has 9/11 made investors more sensitive to attacks abroad?
Since 9/11 occurs in the middle of our sample, the question arises to what extent
our results so far reflect the post 9/11 state of the world. In order to find out, we split
our sample and compare the relationship between investors’ reaction and U.S. FDI
stock before and after 9/11, as well during the recent financial crisis.
Table 4.5 shows the results for each of these periods, relating jump probabilities and
jump sizes conditional on large terrorist attacks to FDI stocks.15 We observe that FDI
stocks had no relation to jumps prior to 9/11. After 9/11, higher FDI stocks resulted
in higher jump probabilities and more negative jumps.
15The jump probability estimates are, however, still based on the entire sample.
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Figure 4.4: Changes in sensitivity of investors after 9/11
Jump probability ηi,k,t
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Jump size ζi,k,t
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The graphs show for different subsamples the jump probability and size in reaction to a large terrorist
attack in a region, depending on the share of FDI this region receives. Fitted values and their 95 percent
confidence intervals are shown over the response surface for the regressions in Equations (4.14a) and
(4.14b) and Table 4.5.
Figure 4.4 plots the predictive margins, as the size of the coefficients can not be
properly interpreted due to the nonlinear nature of both models. We indeed see that
in the first subsample, investors were less wary of large attacks occurring in regions
receiving proportionally more FDI. The confidence intervals show that the effects are
not statistically significant. Between 2002 and 2006, the slope shifts and we see a grad-
ual increase in stock market reaction to attacks in high FDI regions. The role of FDI
becomes even more apparent in the last subsample. In both periods after 9/11, the
relationship is statistically significant. In the second subsample, a sector investing all
of its FDI in a region under attack experiences on average a jump of -3 percent with
a probability of 60 percent. In the last subsample, this same sector would see a near-
certain jump of -5.5 percent in its share price.
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4.5.4 Robustness
In the previous section we have provided evidence that a terrorist attack at home
can act as a wake up call to investors, making them aware of attacks elsewhere and
thereby changing the way they evaluate the frequency and probability of terrorist at-
tacks. Moreover, we have shown that the reaction of investors is related to the FDI
stock ‘at stake’. Here we examine the robustness of these results.
From Figure 4.4 we have seen that the relationship between stock market jumps
and large terrorist attacks in regions receiving more U.S. FDI has become economically
and statistically significant after 9/11. Following attacks in Western Europe, the largest
receiver of U.S. FDI, we find that the relationship intensifies even more and is strongest
during the last subsample. The fact that large jumps were more prevalent during the
financial crisis is controlled for using time fixed effects. Even so, estimating the last
subsample without the turbulent year 2008 does not change our results.16
Another question is to what extent our findings in Figure 4.4 are the result of the
fact that we estimate Equations (4.10a) and (4.10b) for each year, rather than for our
entire sample. In order to find out, we re-estimate them using the entire sample while
adding year fixed effects. As we already concluded from Table 4.1, all regions have
seen at least one large attack and by using these estimations we therefore avoid having
to predict the average reaction to large attacks when they do not occur in a given year.
The downside of this strategy is that we are forced to use average shares of outward
FDI, disregarding their yearly variability. In Appendix 4.A, Table 4.A.3 shows the
estimation results, while Figure 4.A.2 displays the impact of an increase in FDI stock
on the jump probabilities and jump sizes for the whole sample. In Figure 4.5 we show
the pooled estimation on each of the subsamples. The results are in line with what we
have found so far. In fact, if anything, we find that although the average jumps are
somewhat smaller, the changes in jump probabilities after 9/11 are more remarkable,
especially in the last subsample. It appears that the impact of 9/11 has indeed lasted
for a long time.
How relevant is the size of a terrorist attack? Is it the case that the large attacks
are what drives investors’ reactions? To find out, we check whether conditioning the
16See Table 4.A.2 in Appendix 4.A for the estimations. The coefficients are actually larger in size when
estimating without the year 2008.
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Figure 4.5: Reaction to terrorism and share of FDI - Pooled estimation - Split sample
Jump probability ηi,k,t
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The graphs show for a pooled version of the model, the jump probability and size in reaction to a large terrorist attack in a
region during different subsamples, depending on the share of FDI this region receives in this subsample. Fitted values and
their 95 percent confidence intervals are shown over the response surface for the regressions in Equations 4.14a and 4.14b, and
Table 4.A.3.
yearly jump forecasts on smaller attacks changes our conclusion. Table 4.A.4 in Ap-
pendix 4.A shows the regression results for levels of TER = 1, TER = 3, TER = 5,
baseline specification TER = 7 and TER = 9, while Figure 4.6 plots the jump prob-
abilities and jump sizes for increasingly large attacks. When terrorist attacks are of
a smaller magnitude, the sector indices do not move and the reaction is very small,
even if a sector would make its investments in one single region. As terrorist attacks
become increasingly large, the share prices react more to attacks in regions receiving
more FDI. For extreme terrorism of TER = 9, sectors investing all of their FDI in one
region would experience a jump of -5.2 percent with a probability of 72 percent. The
exercise shows that this relationship only exists for the largest of observed attacks. In
Table 4.1 we saw that the mean TER scores lie between 0.23 and 1.74. If we had esti-
mated using these mean values, we would have been unable to see the reaction both
in terms of jump probability and in jump size.
Finally, we check whether the results are driven by the large attacks in London
(2004) and Madrid (2005), as Western Europe received the bulk of U.S. outward FDI.
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Figure 4.6: Reaction to terrorism and share of FDI - Variable TER
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The graphs show the jump probability and size in reaction to different-sized attacks in each region,
depending on the share of FDI this region receives. Fitted values over the response surface of the
regressions in Equations (4.14a) and (4.14b), and Table 4.A.4 are shown.
Similarly, a country like China receives a lot of FDI, but there are only 21 attack days
recorded in the GTD during the sample period. We ran the analysis by excluding
the London and Madrid attacks, as well as a separate analysis without China. When
excluding these observations, the results are qualitatively similar. In both cases the
relationship between FDI and the reaction to large terrorist attacks is negative and
statistically significant.17
4.5.5 What can explain the change in investor behavior?
The analyses show that investors appear to place more emphasis on terrorist at-
tacks on foreign soil after 9/11, but it remains unclear what can explain this change.
The world has changed in more ways than one following 9/11. First, Straetmans et al.
(2008) find that stock markets have structurally changed after the 9/11 attacks, and
point out that this might be caused by the perceived risk of new attacks. Second, in the
period after 9/11, the U.S. commenced the War-on-Terror and invaded Afghanistan
and Iraq, as a response to which terrorists attacked public transportation in Madrid
(2004) and London (2005). These experiences showed that Western Europe, benefi-
ciary of the bulk of U.S. FDI, could also be subject to terrorist attacks. Finally, with
the developed world suffering from the declining U.S. housing market, more focus
was placed on emerging markets as a source of growth and profit. However, while
17Results are available on request.
72
4.5. Results
investors and companies shifted more of their investments to regions like Asia and
the Middle East, these regions also saw the bulk of terrorist attacks (see Table 4.1).18
Below, we develop and discuss several explanations for this change in investor
behavior. We first examine possible rational responses by investors, before positing a
behavioral counterpart.
Terrorism magnitude A first possibility is that acts of terrorism have occurred more
frequently after 9/11, or that they have increased in severity, thereby decreasing future
cash flows more compared to the pre-9/11 attacks. To test this possibility, we plot the
distribution of the terrorism index for each of the regions, before and after 9/11, in
Figure 4.7. Overall, the distributions have not changed significantly since 9/11. The
average value for the index is in fact lower in Western Europe, the Rest of Europe,
Latin America and Africa after 9/11. On the other hand, the average value of the
index is somewhat higher in the Middle East and Asia and the Pacific as there were
more and larger attacks. However, extreme attacks occur in all regions both before and
after 9/11. A similar pattern is visible when we only use U.S. casualties or injuries to
calculate the TER scores.19 Furthermore, both before and after 9/11, over 90% of the
attacks are classified as having only minor property damage for those limited number
of attacks where this data is available.20
Terrorism risk perception A second possibility is that the ex-ante terrorism risk per-
ception is higher after the 9/11 attacks, as alluded to by e.g. Straetmans et al. (2008), or
documented by Bozzoli and Müller (2011) using the London bombings. It is possible
that the 9/11 attacks have lead to an increase in the anticipation of new attacks and a
higher risk perception, which can have important implications for asset prices (see e.g.
Wachter, 2013). While we are not able to measure this risk perception directly, Drakos
and Müller (2014) use survey data to show that risk perception is mainly driven by
terrorism activity. For the purpose of our analysis, we have seen that this terrorism
activity has not changed dramatically after 9/11, which in concordance with Drakos
18The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) (2011) reports that in 2011 52
percent of the world FDI inflows occurred in Developing and Transition Economies, up from 33 percent
in 2007. Based on the UNCTAD database on FDI stock, the share of these markets in the total world FDI
stock increased from 29 percent in 2007 to 35 percent in 2010.
19Results are available upon request.
20Minor damage is defined as likely below $1.000.000. See LaFree and Dugan (2007) for more details.
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The graphs show the distribution (as a kernel density plot) of the terrorism index, before and after
the 9/11 attacks. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for differences in the distribution among days on which
attacks take place indicate that only for Africa and the Middle East there is a change after 9/11.
and Müller (2014) suggests that an increase in risk perception would not have played
a role throughout the entire post-9/11 part of our sample. Moreover, even if the risk
perception had increased after the 9/11 attacks, it is unlikely that it would have re-
mained as high throughout the remaining part of the sample during which our results
are the most significant.
Media A third possible explanation is that since the 9/11 attacks media coverage of
other acts of terrorism has increased, or has given investors more accurate informa-
tion regarding the damages that have taken place. For instance, Sunstein (2003) warns
for exaggerated risk perceptions due to the media, and (Melnick and Eldor, 2010) find
that the economic damage caused by terrorist attacks increases with the amount of re-
porting. Media coverage can therefore be an explanation why the change in investor
behavior documented in the previous section. While, unfortunately, we can not mea-
sure the informational content of the news provided, we can measure the amount of
reporting on terrorism during our sample. In Figure 4.8, we proxy the amount of re-
porting in the U.S. about terrorism on foreign soil by plotting the yearly number of
articles that appeared in the Wall Street Journal for searches on ‘terrorism’ or ‘terrorist’
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This graph shows the number of Wall Street Journal articles per year for a Boolean search on ‘(terrorism OR terrorist) AND
X’, where X is each of the regions. The search is conducted using the Lexis-Nexis newspaper database. Since the region ‘Rest of
Europe’ is not properly defined outside the context of this study, we group it together with ‘Western Europe’ in one large ‘Europe’
region.
in each of the regions identified in our analysis. As expected, we see a coverage spike
following the 9/11 attacks, driven mainly by articles relating to terrorism and the Eu-
rope, Asia and Middle East regions. Prior to 9/11 (1998-2000), there are an average of
3 articles a year on terrorism in these three regions, increasing to 65 articles in the 5
years following the attacks. However, the overall trend is downwards and, with the
exception of the Middle East, seems to be leveling out around 2006. These numbers
have to be interpreted with some care: the number of articles depend positively on the
occurrence of large attacks, and not every article could give investors accurate infor-
mation on the probability of a terrorist attack occurring. Nonetheless, based on these
figures, we infer that despite the media coverage of terrorism being lower compared
to the years following 9/11, the relationship between price jumps, terrorism and FDI
stocks remained significant and became stronger. This is also in line with Melnick and
Eldor (2010), who show that the economic impact of terrorist attacks attributable to
media coverage diminishes over time, indicating that the news-value for investors at
the end of the sample period is potentially lower than right after the attacks.
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act A fourth possibility is that it has become more costly
for U.S. firms to protect or insurance themselves against losses due to terrorism. For
instance, Brown et al. (2004) document a negative announcement effect of the events
leading up to the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 (TRIA). They explain their
finding by reduced market expectations of federal assistance following new acts of
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terrorism, as the Act obligated insurers to offer insurance specifically covering acts of
terrorism. If investors believe that attacks abroad will increase insurance premia for
the companies involved, share prices could drop when new attacks take place. How-
ever, it seems that the cost of terrorism insurance has come down by over 55% since
2004: in 2004 the cost to insure one million dollars was $57 (0.0057%), this decreased
to $25 per million (0.0025%) in 2009 (Marsh, 2005, 2010). Moreover, this type of insur-
ance has become more popular to the extent that recent studies estimate around 60%
of firms have signed up. One possible reason is that firms might want to avoid reputa-
tion costs (Marsh, 2010; Michel-Kerjan et al., 2011), something that could be especially
true for the companies we consider. Finally, while the cost of insurance might decrease
profitability, it also theoretically covers the downside when terrorist attacks do occur.
In that case, we should not be able to find the stock market reaction to large terrorist
attacks which we have documented.
Availability heuristic The ‘rational’ explanations above seem inadequate to fully ex-
plain the change in investor behavior we have documented. The question what could
have caused this shift is still unanswered, making a ‘behavioral’ explanation more
plausible. The evidence we have presented seem consistent with the possibility that
9/11 has served as a wake-up call, creating awareness among investors about the po-
tential impact of terrorist attacks. People tend to have quite visceral reactions to acts
of terror compared to other extreme events. For instance, Kip Viscusi (2009) points
out that individuals value prevention of terrorism more than prevention of natural
disasters or traffic deaths, even though the latter two lead to more fatalities per year.
Moreover, Johnson et al. (1993) documents that individuals valued insurance against
acts of terror higher than insurance covering all causes (including terrorism). Since the
9/11 attacks hit the U.S. right in the financial heart, it is possible that their behavior
afterwards is influenced by the availability heuristic (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973),
probability neglect (Sunstein, 2003) and local thinking (Gennaioli and Shleifer, 2010).
The availability heuristic states that events which are more salient, such as terrorism,
are more easily remembered and are judged to be more common than they in reality
are. This in turn can lead to biased expectations that an attack will occur. Probability
neglect can also lead to biased expectations, as individuals focus only on the possible
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bad outcome, without taking into account it is highly unlikely to materialize. Given
the evidence presented here, it is possible that when news of terrorist attacks abroad
reaches investors, they remember 9/11 and its (economic) consequences, leading them
to sell their shares of firms that are possibly exposed to this attack. This explanation
can give the appearance that after 9/11 investors overreact to terrorism. However,
Figure 4.4 shows that the stock market reaction to large attacks is proportional to the
share of investment after 9/11, but not before. It seems, therefore, that 9/11 has made
it easier for U.S. investors to bring to mind terrorist attacks, including those that take
place on foreign soil. Instead of overreacting in the post-9/11 period, investors appear
to have under-reacted in the period prior to 9/11, with 9/11 serving as a wake-up
call acknowledging the dangers of terrorism, even for attacks occurring abroad. This
explanation is in line with the experience hypothesis formulated by (Malmendier and
Nagel, 2011), who show that extreme events can have a longlasting effect on the be-
havior of households and investors. Given the discussion above, we consider this
explanation the most likely.
4.6 Conclusion
We have examined how terrorism in different geopolitical regions of the world has
spilled over to U.S. financial markets through the foreign presence of U.S. firms, and
how this relationship has changed after 9/11. We document that share prices react
negatively to large terrorist attacks on foreign soil, and that this reaction is related to
the FDI stock of U.S. firms on that soil. However, in order for investors to act this
way, the ‘message’ unfortunately has had to hit home first: the relationship is only
significant, both statistically and economically, after the tragic events of September 11,
2001, indicating disaster myopia consistent with the availability heuristic. However,
given that the frequency of attacks has not changed materially after 9/11, the relation-
ship between share prices, FDI and terrorist attacks abroad has stayed strong even as
the media coverage of these attacks has come down from its peak levels post-9/11.
Presented with this evidence, we conclude that 9/11 was the experience that created
awareness of the potential impact of terrorist attacks among investors, and, in line
with the experience hypothesis, explains the change in their behavior afterwards.
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The results in this chapter are in line with a growing literature (see e.g. Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2003; Drakos, 2010a) that finds that the (global) activity of firms and/or
sectors leads to sensitivity in their share prices as a reaction to acts of terrorism. In an
increasingly globalized world, this has an impact on both companies and investors.
On the one hand, investors need to take into account the geopolitical situation in re-
gions where firms locate their FDI before they invest in this company. On the other
hand, multinationals valuing the stability of their share price also need to take this
into account before investing in these regions. The documented relationship between
foreign presence of firms, terrorism and their share price is likely to become even more
important in the coming years: U.S. firms have increasingly built up their presence in
Asia and the Middle East, yet these regions have seen the bulk of terrorist attacks since
1998, and are likely to continue to pose a geopolitical risk in the near future. A bet-
ter understanding of sensitivity to terrorism, preferably using firm level investment
positions, is therefore a promising avenue for future research.
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Appendix 4.A Additional figures and tables
Estimates of the GARCH-Jump model for the S&P500 and sector indices are shown
in Table 4.A.1. The results show that the estimated average return, µ, is not signifi-
cantly different from zero and is in line with the actual average return in the sample
period. The main coefficients of interest are those that govern the jump dynamics. The
autoregressive coefficient in the jump intensity equation, ρ, is close to 1 for all indices,
indicating that the jump intensity and jump probabilities advance smoothly over time.
It also indicates that, like volatility, jumps exhibit clustering. A likelihood ratio test,
testing if ρ = γ = 0, shows that the null hypothesis that the jump intensity is time-
invariant can be rejected.21 The average jump size, θ, is negative and significant for
all indices ranging between -0.4 percent (Telecom) and -1.7 percent (Energy). Since we
multiply the expected number of jumps (E[nt|Φt]) with the average jump size (θ) to
obtain the expected jump contributions (E[Jt|Φt]), this means that the expected jump
contribution is always negative although the realized jump contribution can be pos-
itive. Similar to Maheu and McCurdy, we find that for some indices the impact of
jumps on the conditional mean tends to be centered around zero (more specifically in
Consumer Staples, Health Care, Materials and Telecom as indicated by the values of θ
and δ). The authors however show that even in the case that θ = 0, the jump dynamics
can still lead to tail realizations.
The unconditional expected level of jumps, Eλt, shows that jumps are more likely
to occur during our sample period compared to the more stable indices chosen by
Maheu and McCurdy. The difference is due to higher estimates of autoregression in
the jump intensity, ρ, and the jump intensity constant, λ0. One of the reasons we find a
higher expected jump intensity could be that Maheu and McCurdy use an estimation
window between 15 and 40 years up to the end of 2001, while our estimation period is
thirteen years in which there were three distinct crises (the 1998 crisis, the crash of the
internet bubble and the recent financial crisis). Finally, Maheu and McCurdy suggest
that the effect of jumps on returns is best measured by the unconditional variance
of jump innovations, which is reported in the last row of Table 4.A.1. This average
variance due to jumps is highest for the Financials, Energy and IT indices.
21The constraint is similar to λt = λ.
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4.A. Additional figures and tables
Figure 4.A.1: S&P500 reaction to terrorism in the Middle East - Excluding attacks in Iraq,
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The graph shows the relationship between the intensity of terrorism in the Middle-East – excluding
Iraq, Israel and the occupied territories – and probabilities that the S&P500 experiences a jump on these
attack days. Fitted values and their 95 percent confidence intervals are shown for a univariate quadratic
regression of the S&P500 jump probabilities on the TER score for days where attacks took place in this
region.
Figure 4.A.2: Reaction to terrorism and share of FDI - Pooled estimation
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The graphs show for a pooled version of the model, the jump probability and size in reaction to a large
terrorist attack in a region, depending on the share of FDI this region receives. Fitted values and their
95 percent confidence intervals are shown over the response surface for the regressions in Equations
(4.14a) and (4.14b) and Table 4.A.3.
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Table 4.A.2: Investors’ reaction conditional on FDI Stock in 2006-2010, excluding 2008
Jump probability ηi,k,t Jump size ζi,k,t
mean 0.365 -1.159








LR Test 1 3.53***
LR Test 2 1.45
The table shows the panel regression of Equations (4.14a) and (4.14b) without 2008. Reactions of sectors
to large terrorist attacks in regions are regressed on the share of FDI they receive. ηi,k,t is estimated
using fractional logit, whereas ζi,k,t is estimated using a random effects Tobit model. Standard errors
are reported in parentheses, and are robust for ηi,k,t . * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5
percent; *** significant at 1 percent. L is the log likelihood value, ρ is the fraction of variance due to the





. LR Test 1 is a likelihood ratio test of σµ = 0 in
ζi,k,t. LR Test 2 is a likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of the sector fixed effects in ηi,k,t.
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Table 4.A.3: Regression output - Pooled estimation
A. Jump probability η¯i,k B. Jump size ζ¯i,k
1998 - 2010 1998 - 2001 2002 - 2006 2007 - 2010 1998 - 2010 1998 - 2001 2002 - 2006 2007 - 2010
mean 0.342 0.365 0.277 0.438 -0.699 -0.662 -0.557 -1.556
(std. dev.) (0.153) (0.177) (0.193) (0.306) (0.436) (0.583) (0.494) (2.049)
α -0.931*** -0.796*** -1.152*** -0.988** -0.575*** -0.550*** -0.459*** -0.625*
(0.145) (0.220) (0.428) (0.430) (0.123) (0.151) (0.108) (0.365)
FDIi,k 2.622*** 1.305*** 2.524*** 5.138*** -0.744*** -0.675** -0.587** -5.587***
(0.240) (0.301) (0.349) (0.750) (0.136) (0.273) (0.278) (1.058)
Sector FE Included Included Included Included
N 54 54 54 54 54 54 54 54
L -22.31 -23.73 -21.55 -23.29 -2.76 -35.28 -33.46 -103.71
ρ 0.76 0.51 0.26 0.18
LR Test 1 50.48*** 20.40** 5.95** 3.18***
LR Test 2 0.18 1.53 0.49 0.00
The table shows the pooled regression of Equations (4.14a) and (4.14b) on different subsamples. Reac-
tions of sectors to large terrorist attacks in regions are regressed on the share of FDI they receive. η¯i,k is
estimated using fractional logit, whereas ζ¯i,k is estimated using a random effects Tobit model. Standard
errors are in parentheses, and are robust for η¯i,k. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; ***
significant at 1 percent. L is the log likelihood value, ρ is the fraction of variance due to the unobserved





. LR Test 1 is a likelihood ratio test of σµ = 0 in ζ¯i,k. LR Test 2 is
a likelihood ratio test for the joint significance of the sector fixed effects in η¯i,k.
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4.B. Industry classifications and Foreign Direct Investment
Appendix 4.B Industry classifications and Foreign Direct
Investment
The data on the investment position of U.S. sectors were obtained from the website
of the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis in the section ‘Position on a historical-cost
basis, country detail by selected industry’ and include all countries in which there is
direct investment.
Industries are classified using the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) prior to
1999 and according to the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS)
thereafter. The industries for which data are publicly available and their respective
SIC/NAICS codes are shown in Table 4.B.1.
Table 4.B.1: Industry classifications
Industry name SIC Industry name NAICS
Oil and gas extraction Mining 21
+ Petroleum and coal products 13 + 29 Utilities 22
Manufacturing, of which Manufacturing, of which:
Food and kindred products 20 Food 311
Chemicals and allied products 28 Chemical 325
Primary and fabricated metal industries 33-34 Primary and fabricated metal products 331-332
Industrial machinery and equipment 35 Machinery 333
Electronic and other electric equipment 36 Computers and electronic products 334
Transportation equipment 37 Electrical equipment, appliances, and components 335
Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 39 Transportation equipment 336
Miscellaneous 339
Wholesale trade 50-51 Wholesale trade 42
Information 51
Depository institutions 60 Depository institutions 60
Financial, insurance, and real estate industries 61-67 Finance and insurance 52
Services 70-89 Professional, scientific, and technical services 54
Holding companies (nonbank) 55
Other n.a. Other n.a.
The table displays the two industry classification available from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analy-
sis data on outward FDI of U.S. multinational firms. Prior to 1999, the data are classified using SIC,
afterwards they are recorded using NAICS.
The BEA also provides a category Other Industries, which combines all remain-
ing industries. Since this category can not be mapped into a series of SIC or NAICS
codes we are forced to exclude it. Another exclusion is the Utilities category, as it is
only available up until 2002. For regions where Miscellaneous Manufacturing is miss-
ing, we use the provided category Total Manufacturing and subtract all the available
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separate manufacturing categories.
To match the SIC/NAICS data on investments to the GICS-based stock market in-
dices, we download all current and historic S&P500 companies with their SIC/NAICS
and GICS codes from Compustat. We tabulate the SIC/NAICS classifications per 2
digit GICS code and obtain the mapping as shown in Table 4.B.2.
We observe from the mapping that the SIC/NAICS sectors do not correspond one-
to-one with their GICS counterparts. For example, firms that are classified as Whole-
sale Trade appears in Consumer Staples, Health Care and Materials. Another NAICS
sector that appears in multiple GICS sectors is Information, mapped into GICS coun-
terparts IT, Telecom and Consumer Discretionary.
Under the SIC classification, this sector was unavailable and therefore we were not
able to obtain an estimate of outward U.S. FDI for the Telecom sector in 1998.
Outside of Telecom in 1998 and the non-availability of the Utilities sector, other
GICS sectors do not suffer from this problem. Unfortunately however, we do not have
more disaggregate data at our disposal to map the SIC/NAICS sectors more accu-
rately to their GICS counterpart. The ‘Holding Companies (nonbank)’ and ‘Other’
categories do not lead to a clear SIC/NAICS mapping and therefore have to be ex-
cluded, although they account for 37 percent of yearly U.S. outward FDI on average.
The BEA data is available on region and country level, with the limitations that
some country/industry/year combinations are not shown to avoid disclosing data of
a specific firm. Since combinations of industry/region/year do not suffer from this
limitation, we use the BEA regions Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Asia &
the Pacific. The European Union is also reported and takes into account changes in
the number of member states. The Rest of Europe is then defined as the value of
Europe minus the European Union. Countries in the Rest of Europe are for example
Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Norway, Russia, Serbia
and Switzerland. Since Norway and Switzerland fit in better with E.U. countries, and
outward FDI data is always available for both countries, we place them together with
the E.U. countries.
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Table 4.B.2: Mapping SIC/NAICS to GICS
GICS 1998 (SIC) 1999-2010 (NAICS)
10. Energy Oil and gas extraction
+ Petroleum and coal products (13 + 29) Mining (21),
Industrial machinery and equipment (35) Machinery (333)
15. Materials Chemicals and allied products (28), Primary and fabricated metal products (331-332),
Primary and fabricated metal industries (33-34), Chemical (325),
Wholesale trade (50-51) Wholesale trade (42)
20. Industrials Primary and fabricated metal industries (33-34), Primary and fabricated metal products (331-332),
Industrial machinery and equipment (35), Machinery (333),
Electronic and other electric equipment (36), Computers and electronic products (334),
Transportation equipment (37) Electrical equipment, appliances and components (335),
Transportation equipment (336)
25. C. Discretionary Electronic and other electric equipment (36), Transportation equipment (336),
Transportation equipment (37), Miscellaneous (339),
Services (70-89) Information (51),
Professional, scientific, and technical services (54)
30. C. Staples Food and kindred products (20), Food (311),
Chemicals and allied products (28), Chemical (325),
Wholesale Trade (50-51) Wholesale Trade (42)
35. Health Care Chemicals and allied products (28), Chemical (325),
Electronic and other electric equipment (36), Computers and electronic products (334),
Wholesale trade (50-51) Miscellaneous (339),
Wholesale trade (42)
40. Financials Financial, insurance, and real estate industries (61-67), Finance and insurance (52),
Depository institutions (60) Depository institutions (60)
45. IT Industrial machinery and equipment (35), Computers and electronic products (334),
Electronic and other electric equipment (36), Information (51),
Services (70-89) Professional, scientific, and technical services (54)
50. Telecom Information (51)
The table displays the mapping of SIC/NAICS sectors to GICS sectors, based on classifications of cur-




Depositor Discipline and Bank Failures
in Local Markets During the Financial
Crisis
5.1 Introduction
Bank regulators have emphasized the role of market discipline in Pillar 3 of the
Basel II and III accords. Contrary to monitoring by the regulator, market discipline re-
lies on stakeholders such as depositors to monitor and, if necessary, prevent excessive
risk-taking by banks. However, following the crisis the question is whether market
discipline can still be used as a tool in bank supervision (see e.g. Acharya et al., 2014).
The events that transpired during the crisis have given depositors mixed signals re-
garding the status and safety of banks, as well as the need to monitor their riskiness.
On the one hand, increases in the deposit insurance limit and government inter-
ventions such as bailouts have weakened incentives for depositors to monitor banks.
In order to prevent bank runs, the U.S. government temporarily increased the level of
deposit insurance from $100,000 to $250,000 in 2008, an increase made permanent in
the Dodd-Frank act. However, even uninsured depositors have been compensated re-
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cently, with the FDIC assuming all deposits for most bank failures since the IndyMac
Bank failure.1 Moreover, regulators have shown that they are also willing to intervene
in the shadow banking market with the bailout of money market funds. Given these
interventions, depositors have little incentives ex-ante to engage in active monitoring
of their depository institutions, as they are likely to be bailed out no matter how risky
their banks are.
On the other hand, there have been over 400 commercial bank failures in the United
States since the beginning of the crisis. Previous studies have documented that expe-
riencing events such as bank failures can lead to a wake-up call among depositors (see
e.g. Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Karas et al., 2010, 2013; Iyer and Puri, 2012).
This finding is motivated by increased risk aversion of depositors, and is consistent
with an aggregate experience hypothesis documented by, e.g., Malmendier and Nagel
(2011). A wake-up call entails renewed discipline being exerted after bank failures, as
these events can make depositors of other banks aware that their deposits are poten-
tially also at risk. While some recent evidence supports the notion that government
interventions have weakened overall market discipline (Cubillas et al., 2012; Berger
and Turk-Ariss, 2014), it remains unclear whether depositors have woken up to the
risks posed by their banks. This chapter provides evidence that, despite government
interventions, depositors exerted discipline on their banks during the crisis and that
the aforementioned failures did wake them up.
Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) were the first to document a wake-up of de-
positors, by showing that they were more responsive to banks riskiness after periods
of crises in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. Interestingly, despite expansion of deposit
insurance coverage, both insured and uninsured depositors increased their monitor-
ing. Similarly, using data on Russian banks, Karas et al. (2010, 2013) find evidence of a
wake-up call for insured and uninsured depositors. Moreover, while the introduction
of deposit insurance weakens overall discipline, it does not completely eliminate the
wake-up call. Finally, using deposit account-level data of a bank in India, Iyer and
Puri (2012) document a bank run after the failure of an unrelated bank.
Most of the work documenting the effect of the recent crisis on market discipline
presents evidence of discipline on a subset of banks. For instance, Berger and Turk-
1Since the IndyMac Bank failed in 2008, the FDIC’s Failed Bank List and accompanying press releases
state that for most failures, the FDIC and eventual acquirer assumed all deposits.
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Ariss (2014) find that while overall discipline decreased in both the United States and
Europe, this can be chiefly attributed to decreased discipline for large and listed banks.
Their finding is consistent with moral hazard by depositors following government in-
terventions. For an international sample of banks, Bertay et al. (2013) find increased
discipline on systemically large banks consistent with a wake-up call. However, sim-
ilar to Berger and Turk-Ariss (2014) they document an absence of market discipline
on the systemically largest banks in the United States. It therefore seems that depos-
itors distinguish between risks posed by banks, and that they intentionally choose to
discipline some banks while ignoring the risks of others. Correa et al. (2012) support
this notion by documenting a bank run on U.S. branches of European banks during
the European sovereign debt crisis. Evidence on developing countries is provided by
e.g., Oliveira et al. (2014) who find an absence of discipline on Too-Big-To-Fail banks
in Brazil. Moreover, using banks in CEE countries, Hasan et al. (2013) do not find evi-
dence of an overall wake-up call, although there is increased discipline on affiliates of
Western-European banks.
This chapter investigates if the wake-up call has materialized for depositors in the
United States, and whether they discipline banks during the crisis despite a weaken-
ing of incentives. In doing so, it makes two contributions to the existing literature.
First, depositor behavior is analyzed in local banking markets. Previous studies on
market discipline have used the bank entity as their fundamental unit of analysis,
comparing banks on a national or even supra-national level. However, they overlook
that the relevant market for most banks and depositors alike is the local banking mar-
ket. While, increasingly, U.S. banks have nationwide activities, these are only few in
absolute numbers. Despite the trend of deregulation and consolidation in the U.S.,
banks and banking markets tend to be fragmented for well-known historical reasons.
Depositors, therefore, are generally more likely to have deposits at those banks that
are active within their local market. Even though online-banking has made it possible
to deposit at out-of-market banks, it is often seen as a complement, not a substitute,
to physical bank branches (see e.g. DeYoung and Hunter, 2002; DeYoung, 2005; DeY-
oung et al., 2007; Hernando and Nieto, 2007; Onay and Ozsoz, 2013). Discipline by
depositors can therefore be expected mainly on banks active in their local market, and
only relative to the other banks that are also present there. For this reason, depositor
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behavior is best analyzed in local banking markets.
Second, by analyzing these local markets, this chapter presents a cleaner identi-
fication of a possible wake-up call during the financial crisis compared to previous
studies. While those studies rely on changes in deposits between banks before and
after the crisis, this chapter exploits the fact that banks have branches in multiple mar-
kets. Even though bank riskiness is determined and evaluated at the level of the bank,
depositors can react differently to these risks across local markets. The same bank
with branches operating in multiple markets can thus be subject to a varying degree
of discipline in each market, depending on whether a failure occurs in the market.
The identification strategy employed in this chapter uses the branches of the bank in
markets without failure as a control, whereas the branches of the bank that operate in
a market with a failure are used as the treatment group. Hence, the wake-up call is
measured as the difference in depositor reaction across the markets in which the bank
is active, where some have experienced a failure while others have not. If experiencing
bank failures is indeed the channel through which a wake-up call is achieved, I expect
to find an increase in discipline for those markets where the failing banks operated a
branch compared to markets without a failure.
To perform this analysis, I use publicly available information on the level of de-
posits in bank branches in the U.S., obtained from the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits.
I show that depositor discipline was present at the level of the local market between
2007 and 2013. Moreover, a wake-up call indeed materializes in those markets wit-
nessing a bank failure, and this effect does not die out after 1 year but is long-lasting.
Finally, I find that depositors react differently to bank failures of banks that are con-
sidered mainly local, compared with failures of banks whose headquarters are located
out-of-market or even out-of-state. As such, this chapter offers implications for the reg-
ulatory and supervisory set-up following the crisis. For instance, the Net Stable Fund-
ing Ratio (NFSR) introduced in Basel III will force banks to hold a sufficient amount
of stable funding, which includes demand and other customer deposits. This chapter
shows that deposit funding of banks depends not only on the bank’s risk character-
istics, but also on what is happening to other banks in their market. Moreover, this
chapter also suggests that prompt action by the FDIC to close down failing banks in-
tended to stop bank runs can actually lead to more involved depositors and possibly
92
5.2. Data and methodology
a safer banking system.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 discusses the methodol-
ogy and data, followed by Section 5.3 which presents the results. Robustness tests are
performed in Section 5.4, after which I briefly conclude.
5.2 Data and methodology
5.2.1 Identification
Previous studies on market discipline of participants other than depositors have
investigated whether publicly available risk indicators are priced into bank funding,
signaling the perceived risk to banks. For example, they find that riskier banks have
higher bond yields/spreads (see e.g. Avery et al., 1988; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996;
Jagtiani et al., 1999; Jagtiani and Lemieux, 2001; Sironi, 2003; Ashcraft, 2008) and a
lower market value of equity (see e.g. Billett et al., 1998; Park and Peristiani, 2007;
Baele et al., 2014). Depositors, on the other hand, can discipline their banks in more
ways than one (Flannery, 1994). Similar to (subordinated) debt holders, depositors
can require a higher interest rate from riskier banks, thereby compensating them for
the risk of losing their deposits in the event the bank fails. Moreover, since deposits
are liquid, depositors can also withdraw them if they feel the bank is taking excessive
risks.
To measure market discipline the following equation is usually estimated:
∆ ln Di,t = β0 + β1Riski,t−1 + β2Controlsi,t−1 + βi + βt + ei,t (5.1)
where ∆ ln Di,t is the growth rate of deposits of bank i in year t, Riski,t−1 is a vector
of lagged indicators of bank risk, Controlsi,t−1 is a vector of control variables, and βi
and βt are bank and time fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. Market
discipline is present if depositors move their deposits to safer banks. Therefore, safer
banks are expected to have a higher growth rate in deposits compared to riskier banks.
In Equation (5.1), a negative β1 coefficient signals the presence of market discipline, as
safer banks see higher deposit growth compared to more risky peers. Risk and control
variables are lagged to avoid possible endogeneity, as, for instance, bank risk can be
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endogenous to depositor behavior. In the absence of a counterfactual, the wake-up call
is identified as the difference in behavior before or after crises, attributing all changes
in behavior to the crisis.
In this chapter, I propose to identify the wake-up call in a different manner. To
measure the wake-up call, a perfect counterfactual would entail the same bank being
exposed to a scenario with a crisis and one without. The difference in depositor be-
havior between scenarios would then directly identify the effect of a crisis, controlling
for unobserved characteristics which impact both the control and the treated group. In
the setting of depositor discipline, one would thus prefer to have the same bank in two
different markets, but with different realizations of depositor behavior due to certain
events. Previous literature suggests that the events leading to a wake-up call could be
bank failures, as these can make depositors aware that their deposits are possibly at
risk (see e.g. Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Karas et al., 2010, 2013).
While depositors can react differently across markets to this multi-market bank,
bank risk itself is determined and evaluated at the bank-level. The FDIC, for instance,
does not close down single branches but intervenes only in the bank entity. Identifi-
cation of the wake-up call then relies on multi-market banks, which share the same
bank risk across markets but experience different levels of discipline in markets with
failures. This is visualized in Figure 5.1, where a bank is active in 7 markets, 3 expe-
rienced bank failures.2 In light of the figure, the question is whether depositors were
more aware of the risks of the bank in the markets with failure.
Since bank risk is determined at the level of the bank, the differences in depositor
reaction between markets can only be due to the failures, using the markets without
failures as a control group. Empirically, this effect is obtained by performing the fol-
lowing regression:
∆ ln Di,m,t = β0 + β1Riski,t−1 + β2Controlsi,m,t−1 + β3Fm,t−k
+ β4Fm,t−kRiski,t−1 + β5Fm,t−kControlsi,m,t−1 + βi + βm + βt + ei,m,t (5.2)
where ∆ ln Di,m,t is the growth rate of deposits of bank i in market m at time t, Riski,t−1
2For the purpose of this chapter, a market is considered to experience a failure through the presence of
branches of banks that where closed down by the FDIC.
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is still a vector of lagged indicators of bank risk measured at the level of the bank,
Controlsi,m,t−1 is a vector of control variables that can differ between banks or markets,
and βi, βm and βt are bank, market and time fixed effects to control for unobserved het-
erogeneity. Moreover, Fm,t−k is a dummy variable indicating whether a bank failure
occurred in market m during the last k years and is interacted with the risk and con-
trol variables. In this setting, a negative and significant β4 now measures whether the
presence of a failed bank leads to excess market discipline, with the combined disci-
pline effect being β1 + β4Fm,t−k. Moreover, the length of the window k can be adjusted
to measure short-run (k = 1) or long-run (k > 1) effects. If bank failures do indeed lead
to a wake-up call, it follows that the change in behavior of depositors should be notice-
able in markets that experience them compared to those that do not. In Equation (5.2),
this effect is picked up by the β4 coefficient.
Control variables are included to control for market-specific characteristics, such
as the concentration and the number of branches present, or for bank-specific charac-
teristics. To control for the fact that depositors might move their deposits to a risky
bank as long as they are sufficiently rewarded with a higher interest rate, I include
the bank-specific (implicit) lagged deposit interest rate. Previous studies have indeed
found evidence that risk is priced priced into bank deposit rates (see e.g. Hannan and
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Hanweck, 1988; Ellis and Flannery, 1992; Brewer III and Mondschean, 1994; Cook and
Spellman, 1994), or that bank risk is priced into both the price and the quantity of de-
posits (see e.g. Park, 1995; Park and Peristiani, 1998; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga,
2004; Ioannidou and de Dreu, 2006; Karas et al., 2010, 2013; Bertay et al., 2013). Put
differently, riskier banks need to offer a higher interest rate to maintain or attract new
deposit funding. In most cases however, the interest rate employed is an implicit in-
terest rate, calculated as the total interest expense of a bank divided by total loans.
The downside of this approach is that it does not separate between interest rates paid
on insured or uninsured accounts, or between rates on existing accounts compared
to new ones. Moreover, and more importantly in the context of this chapter, the im-
plicit interest rate is bank-specific, making it difficult to investigate the presence of
price discipline in local markets. If the deposit rate is determined at the bank level,
price discipline in local markets would be incorrectly identified. This depends on
whether multi-market banks set their interest rates uniformly, or whether they differ
across markets, something on which there is no consensus as of yet. While Craig and
Dinger (2013) find that there is cross-market variation in deposit rates of multi-market
banks, this is not found by Radecki (1998), Heitfield (1999) and Park and Pennacchi
(2009).3 Since identification is potentially incorrect, I do not explicitly estimate a price
equation, but instead follow the estimation strategy employed by, e.g., Maechler and
McDill (2006), and use the lagged implicit interest rate to take into account that these
rates can influence the quantity of deposits.
Equation (5.2) is estimated using OLS. The high-dimensionality due to the extra
dimension m and the number of banks and markets involved means that many dif-
ferent types of fixed effects can be included. Besides the standard bank, market and
time fixed effects for instance, it is possible to control for other sources of unobserved
heterogeneity. For instance, besides market fixed effects to control for market-specific
changes in deposits, and year fixed effects to control for countrywide business cycle ef-
fects, market×year fixed effects pick up local market business cycle effects that could
be misinterpreted as depositor discipline. Similarly, bank×market fixed effects can
be employed to control for market-specific strategies, as banks might want to expand
3Unfortunately, the deposit rate that banks choose to offer to depositors in a given regional market at a
given time is not publicly available. A possible solution is to obtain the local price level from banks that
are only active in that market. However, the identification strategy employed in this chapter depends
on multi-market banks. A price level based on local banks would undermine this strategy.
96
5.2. Data and methodology
their market share in certain markets but not in others. To be able to include these
types of fixed effects, I implement a within estimator specifically designed for panel
data models with high dimensionality. This estimator is preferred over the LSDV es-
timator, since the LSDV estimator can be computationally difficult to estimate due to
the large number of dummy variables required. However, the unbalanced nature of
the dataset has to be taken into account. Mátyás and Balázsi (2012) show that applying
an analytical within-transformation developed for a balanced panel leads to a bias in
an unbalanced setting that does not drop out as N → ∞. Moreover, dynamic panel
models also suffer from this bias when dealing with an unbalanced setting. To esti-
mate unbalanced panel models with high-dimensional fixed effects, Guimarães and
Portugal (2010) therefore propose a feasible iterative approach based on demeaning
the (in)dependent variables over one dimension at a time, in order to minimize the
regression RMSE. While Guimarães and Portugal (2010) implement this iterative pro-
cedure for 2 fixed effect dimensions, it can easily be extended to 3 (Torres et al., 2013)
or even N fixed effects (Rios-Avila, 2013).
To obtain standard errors for the original model, Rios-Avila (2013) suggests to use
the algorithm proposed by Abowd et al. (2002), which is necessary to correct for the
degrees of freedom.4 The standard errors are clustered using the banking market as
cluster. As OLS standard errors could be too small for proper inference testing in the
case of within-cluster serial correlation, Bertrand et al. (2004) and Colin Cameron and
Miller (2014) suggest using cluster-robust standard errors to account for possible serial
correlation. Following the suggestion of Colin Cameron and Miller (2014), standard
errors are clustered over the local markets as these are the fewest in number and lead
to the highest standard errors.5
Next, I will describe the data used in this chapter, before proceeding with the pre-
sentation of the results and robustness checks.
5.2.2 Data
The data used in this analysis are obtained from multiple sources. The main source
is the FDIC’s Summary of Deposits (SOD), a publicly available annual survey re-
4I thank Fernando Rios-Avila for sharing his code.
5Robustness tests with clustering at the level of the bank were also performed and lead to smaller stan-
dard errors. Results are available upon request.
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porting branch-level deposits for all FDIC-insured institutions, including insured U.S.
branches of foreign banks. The FDIC requires all institutions with a main office and
one or more branches to file this survey. While banks can choose how to assign de-
posits to their offices (e.g. by proximity to the address of the account holder, the main
activity, or origination of the deposit account), it should be consistent with existing in-
ternal record-keeping practices (FDIC, 2014). All branches and banks in the SOD have
a unique identifier and are geo-coded, meaning that the deposits of a bank can easily
be allocated to each banking market where a branch office is located. Consistent with
previous literature, local markets are defined as Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs)
and non-MSA counties (see e.g. Prager and Hannan, 1998; Berger et al., 1999; Collen-
der and Shaffer, 2003; Adams et al., 2007), although robustness tests are performed
by estimating Equation (5.2) on each separate group and using the county as a local
market. If multiple branches of the same bank are present in a market, the deposits
located at these branches are consolidated to bank-market deposits. Since, as we will
see later, the bulk of the bank failures occurred from 2007 onwards, I obtain data for
the years 2007 - 2013.
Data used to calculate bank risk indicators are obtained from the Call Reports for
Income and Condition, and linked to the SOD data using the bank’s unique FDIC
assigned certificate number. Unit banks, or other banks that have not filed the SOD
survey, are subsequently dropped. Data on bank failures are obtained from the FDIC’s
Failed Bank List, which lists failed banks for which the FDIC is appointed as receiver,
the closing date and, if available, the acquiring entity. To construct a variable indi-
cating whether a failed bank operated a branch-office in a certain market, I combine
the Failed Bank List with the SOD in the year prior to the failure, as banks do not file
the SOD during the failure-year itself. To remove spurious increases in bank-market
deposits, I remove bank-market observations when the bank has merged or acquired
another bank that was active within the same market. Data on mergers and acquisi-
tions are obtained from the Failed Bank List and the bank merger database maintained
by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.6
Since the SOD is an annual survey, collected on June 30th, I use the second quarter
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subsequently defined as periods between the filing moments and failure years are
appropriately updated. For instance, a bank that failed on June 19th, 2008 is linked to
the 2007 SOD. However, a bank that failed on July 20th, 2008 is linked to the 2008 SOD
in order to determine where it was operating branches.
The SOD only reports total deposits and does not distinguish between insured and
uninsured deposits. Ex-ante, most discipline can be expected from uninsured deposits
as these better incentives to monitor the safety of their banks compared to insured de-
positors. However, previous research has shown that insured depositors are also capa-
ble of discipling banks, albeit to a lesser extent than uninsured depositors (see e.g. Park
and Peristiani, 1998; Martinez Peria and Schmukler, 2001; Karas et al., 2013). Moreover,
government interventions have blurred the lines between insured and uninsured de-
posits. First, the Dodd-Frank Act permanently increased the level of deposit insurance
coverage from $100,000 to $250,000, thereby effectively insuring previously uninsured
deposits.7 Second, after the failure of IndyMac bank in 2008, the FDIC has assumed all
deposits for most bank failures, effectively insuring the uninsured depositors. Third,
the government has also bailed out the money market mutual funds, which are part of
the shadow banking system and did not fall under deposit insurance in the first place.
Given these interventions, it is safe to assume that uninsured depositors can behave as
if they have insurance, since they are practically assured they will be compensated in
the case of a failure. As all depositors were technically insured, the analyses provides
a lower bound of the level of market discipline present in the local markets. Although
this implicit deposit insurance could lead to less market discipline, studies on the re-
cent financial crisis have shown that market discipline was not eliminated because of
these bailout guarantees (see e.g. Gropp et al., 2011).
The final dataset consists of 6,735 banks that are active in 2,328 distinct markets
(388 MSAs and 1,940 non-MSA counties) during a maximum of 7 years. The aver-
age number of markets served by banks in the sample is 3, although banks such as
Bank of America, Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank have branches in more than 400 mar-
kets. Moreover, on average there are 6 banks present in a banking market, although
some large MSAs like Minneapolis-St. Paul-Bloomington, Chicago-Naperville-Joliet,
7While the Act was only signed into federal law in July, 2010, Congress had approved a temporary
increase in the deposit insurance limit starting on October 3, 2008. The Dodd-Frank Act retroactively
increased the limit to also cover failures between January 1, 2008 and October 3, 2008.
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or Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington are served by more than 100 banks.
Summary statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables are reported in Ta-
ble 5.1. While most of the variables of interest are ratio’s, variables that are in levels are
deflated to 2007Q2 dollars. The dependent variable, ∆ ln Dimt, is the percentage change
in deposits of bank i in market m in year t. The average bank-market experienced an
increase in deposits of 1.73% per year during the sample period. Despite the disag-
gregation of the data across markets, the deposit growth mimics the values in Berger
and Turk-Ariss (2014), who use bank-level data. The most a single bank-market loses
in deposits from year-to-year is 29%, while the most deposits attracted represented a
58% gain. The main explanatory variables for bank risk are Equity (Equity/Total As-
sets), NPL (Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans), and ROA (Net Profit/Total Assets).
These variables cover different dimensions of risk, as the capital buffer indicates the
absorptive capacity of a bank to incur future losses, non-performing loans are a good
indicator how large those future losses can be, and ROA indicates how fast a bank can
rebuild the capital base when it retains earnings. F is a dummy variable indicating
whether a failed bank was operating a branch in the local market. In the analysis, this
variable is used to determine whether a failure has taken place in the market during
the last k years. Control variables include business model characteristics (Real Estate
Loans/Total Loans), efficiency estimates (Cost/Income), the ratio of liquid assets to
total assets, securities held for sale and investment to total assets, the implicit interest
rate calculated as the interest expense divided by total deposits, a dummy variable
indicating whether the bank is a savings banks or a member of a Bank Holding Com-
pany, and market level characteristics such as the HHI (based on the level of deposits)
and the number of branches present in the market. To remove outliers, the variables
∆ ln Dimt, Equity, NPL, ROA, Real Estate/Total Loans, Cost/Income, Liquid Assets
and Implicit Interest Rate are truncated at the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile. The summary
statistics presented here are based on bank-market observations, banks operating in
more markets are thus given a higher weight for those variables calculated at the level
of the bank.
Figure 5.2 shows the geographical distribution of failures occurring during the
sample period. From this figure, we see that most failures occur in and around large
metropolitan areas, although they are divided between both metropolitan areas and
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Table 5.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev Min Max
Dependent Variable
∆ ln Dimt 123615 0.0173 0.1370 -0.2949 0.5845
Main Explanatory Variables
Equity 133117 0.1072 0.0251 0.0631 0.1960
NPL 136667 0.0149 0.0139 0 0.0698
ROA 133238 0.0038 0.0038 -0.0137 0.0122
F 140170 0.1513 0.3583 0 1
Control Variables
Real Estate/Total Loans 132765 0.6917 0.1492 0.3131 0.9604
Cost/Income 133108 0.6892 0.1428 0.4355 1.2804
Liquid Assets (%) 133193 0.0802 0.0608 0.0148 0.3127
Securities for Sale and Investment 133172 0.1943 0.1060 0.0088 0.5185
Implicit Interest Rate 133156 0.0085 0.0057 0.0012 0.0228
Ln(Total Assets) 140170 14.079 3.0107 4.3474 21.201
Savings Banks 140170 0.0466 0.2108 0 1
BHC 140170 0.8799 0.3250 0 1
HHI 140170 0.2171 0.1398 0.0495 1
Ln(no. branches) 140170 0.8066 0.9322 0 6.9392
This table shows summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The dependent variable
∆ ln Dimt is the percentage change in deposits of bank i in market m in year t. The main explanatory
variables are Equity (Equity/Total Assets), NPL (Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans) and ROA (Net
Profit/Total Assets). F is a dummy variable indicating whether a local market has experienced a failing
bank. The control variables include business model characteristics (Real Estate Loans/Total Loans),
efficiency estimates (Cost/Income), the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, securities held for sale and
investment to total assets, the implicit interest rate calculated as the interest expense divided by total
deposits, a dummy variable indicating whether the bank is a savings banks or a member of a Bank
Holding Company, and market level characteristics such as the HHI (based on the level of deposits)
and the number of branches present in the market. For banks merging or acquiring other banks,
bank-market observations of the dependent variable are removed. Furthermore, the variables ∆ ln Dimt,
Equity, NPL, ROA, Real Estate/Total Loans, Cost/Income, Liquid Assets and Implicit Interest Rate are
truncated at the 2.5 and 97.5 percentile to exclude outliers. The data is deflated to 2007Q2 dollars.
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Figure 5.2: Location of bank failures 2007 - 2013
Failure
No Failure
This figure shows the location of all bank failures between 2007 and 2013 on a market-level.
Markets, defined as a MSA or non-MSA county, where failed banks operated branches are
highlighted. Source: FDIC Failed Bank List and Summary of Deposits.
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This figure shows the number of bank failures in the U.S. per year. Source: FDIC Failed Bank List.
rural counties. Furthermore, Figure 5.3 plots the timing of the bank failures. It shows
a clear peak in 2010 with over 150 banks failing, before steadily decreasing in the fol-
lowing years.
Table 5.2 shows summary statistics of failed and acquiring banks, and reports re-
sults of a t-test comparing the average differences. In total, there are 426 failing banks
and 403 acquiring banks that can be matched to the SOD and Call Reports. The num-
ber of failing banks is higher than the number of acquiring banks because not all banks
that were received by the FDIC were later sold, and because some banks acquired mul-
tiple failing banks. On average, acquiring banks were better capitalized, had a lower
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Table 5.2: Difference failed and acquiring banks
Failed Banks Acquiring Banks Difference Failed - Acquiring
Equity 0.039 0.121 −0.082***
Loans 0.719 0.669 0.050***
NPL 0.102 0.021 0.081***
Deposits 0.888 0.782 0.106***
Ln(Total Assets) 12.36 14.20 −1.840***
BHC 0.815 0.916 −0.101***
Savings 0.028 0.022 0.006
Number of Markets 7.525 183.8 −176.262***
N 426 403
This table shows differences in some key statistics between the failed banks and the banks that
acquired them. The variables are Equity (Equity/Total Assets), Loans (Loans/Total Assets) NPL
(Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans), Deposits (Deposits/Total Assets), Ln(Total Assets), variables
indicating whether the banks were part of a Bank Holding Company (BHC) or were a Savings bank
(Savings), and the average number of markets it had branches in. T-tests to compare the average were
performed and reported in the last column. The number of failed banks differs from the number of
acquiring banks because not all failed banks were acquired, and some banks acquired more than 1
failed bank.
share of non-performing loans, less loans overall, and were less reliant on deposits
for their funding. The failed banks were also significantly smaller, with their assets
totaling $233 million versus $1.4 billion for the acquiring banks. Moreover, acquiring
banks were more likely to be a member of a Bank Holding Company, while the num-
ber of savings banks that failed or acquired other banks was relatively low at around
2%. Finally, failed banks operated branches across on average 7 local markets, while
the acquiring ones were active in 183 markets. These numbers, however, are skewed
because of a few large failures and subsequent acquisition. Median values - 4 and
18 markets for failed and acquiring banks, respectively - also confirm that acquiring
banks were active in more markets.
Finally, Table 5.3 shows the characteristics of local markets with and without a fail-
ure. In general, when considering both MSAs and non-MSA counties, we can see that
markets with failures were characterized by a lower level of concentration and more
branches, deposits and banks. The year after failure, banks active in non-failed mar-
kets experienced higher deposit growth. The same conclusions hold when considering
only the largest markets (MSAs), albeit to a lesser extent. In general, as indicated by
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Table 5.3: Difference markets with and without a failure
Panel A: MSA and non-MSA counties
Market level Bank-level
Non-Failed Failed Difference Non-Failed Failed Difference
HHI 3484 2047 1437*** ∆ ln Di,m,t 0.020 0.002 0.018***
Ln(Number of Branches) 2.352 3.964 -1.612***
Ln(Total Deposits) 12.69 14.66 -1.973***
Ln(Number of Banks) 1.666 2.698 -1.033***
Panel B: MSA
Market level Bank-level
Non-Failed Failed Difference Non-Failed Failed Difference
HHI 1708 1526 182*** ∆ ln Di,m,t 0.033 0.006 0.028***
Ln(Number of Branches) 4.431 5.156 -0.725***
Ln(Total Deposits) 15.14 16.10 -0.954***
Ln(Number of Banks) 2.860 3.365 -0.505***
This table shows differences in some key statistics between markets with and without failed banks.
The market-level variables are the deposit-level Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, the number of branches
operating in the market, the total deposits available in the market and the total number of banks
operating in the market. The bank-level variable is the dependent variable, the change in the level of
deposits of bank i in market m at time t. This bank-level variable is measured the year after failure,
while the market-level characteristics are measured during the year of failure. Panel A shows the
statistics for both MSA and non-MSA counties, while Panel B does this for only MSAs.
Figure 5.2, bank failures occur in larger markets. To ensure that the results are not
driven by this, I perform robustness tests in Section 5.4 using only the larger markets.
5.3 Results
This section present the results of the analysis. First, I test for the existence of over-
all market discipline in local markets during the crisis by analyzing whether banks
with better risk profiles see a higher growth in their deposits. In a second step, I test
whether local market with a bank failure experience extra discipline from depositors.
Finally, I explore some outcomes of the underlying mechanism to provide additional
evidence, before concluding with several robustness tests.
5.3.1 Baseline specification
The results from the analysis of Equation (5.2) are presented in Table 5.4. I report
the coefficients for the main risk characteristics, and refer the reader to Table 5.A.1 for
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the full results. In all columns, the dependent variable is the change in deposits of
bank i in market m in year t, while the variables of interest are the lagged capital ratio
(Equity), the share of Non-Performing Loans (NPL) in the total loan portfolio, and
the Return-on-Assets (ROA). All specifications include bank, market and year fixed
effects.
In column (1), we can see that market discipline was present in local markets
throughout the sample, as the coefficients on the risk characteristics are statistically
significant and have the correct sign. Branches belonging to banks that reported higher
equity levels, a lower share of non-performing loans, and a higher return-on-assets in
the previous year see a higher growth of deposits compared to other banks active
within the market. When comparing banks at the 75th and 25th percentile across the
three risk variables, I find that the economic effect of an improvement in the capital
buffer is most important. A bank at the 75th percentile of the equity ratio distribution
experiences an extra deposit growth of 2.5% compared to a bank at the 25th percentile.
This value is -1.3% for the non-performing loans and 0.9% for an improvement in prof-
itability. These are relatively large effects considering that the average deposit growth
of banks in local markets is 1.7%.
In columns (2)-(4), the risk and control variables are interacted with Fm,t−k, a dummy
variable indicating whether a bank failure occurred in market m during the last k years.
Column (2) measures the excess discipline when a failure occurred in the preceding
year, column (3) does the same for 2 years since failure, and column (4) measures the
excess discipline if the time since failure is 3 or more years. Including the interactions
does not change the sign or significance of the main explanatory variables, but it does
show that excess discipline is exerted on banks in local market with failures. In the
first year after bank failure (column (2)), we can see that extra discipline is mainly di-
rected at the capital ratio of banks and at the share of non-performing loans. In the
years afterwards, discipline is mainly directed at the capital ratio of banks, although
the return-on-assets also becomes statistically significant. Regarding the economic sig-
nificance of these coefficients, the capital ratio is again by far the most significant. In
years 2 and 3+ after failure, the difference in deposit growth between a bank at the 75th
and 25th percentile of the capital ratio is 3%, while this is only 1.2% for the return-on-
assets.
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Table 5.4: Do failures lead to a wake-up effect?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt
Time since failure (k) 1 year 2 year 3+ year
Equity 0.853*** 0.801*** 0.790*** 0.784***
(0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
NPL −0.725*** −0.657*** −0.670*** −0.683***
(0.064) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068)
ROA 2.435*** 2.277*** 2.091*** 1.920***
(0.264) (0.286) (0.293) (0.298)
F −0.086*** −0.066*** −0.076***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.025)
F× Equity 0.266*** 0.206*** 0.196***
(0.065) (0.060) (0.058)
F× NPL −0.299** −0.166 −0.123
(0.120) (0.111) (0.108)
F× ROA 0.846 1.142** 1.433***
(0.550) (0.510) (0.488)
Control Variables Included Included Included Included
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Within R¯2 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.034
N 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131
This table shows the estimation results for Equation (5.2), regressing the percentage change in deposits
of bank i in local market m in year t on risk measures of bank i in year t − 1. Control variables are
as indicated in Table 5.1, every specification includes bank, market and time fixed effects to control
for demand effects. Column (2) measures the impact on market discipline 1 year after the failure has
occurred, column (3) measures the long-run effect 2 years after failure and column (4) measures the
long-run effect 3 or more years after bank failure. Full results are shown in Table 5.A.1. Standard errors




The results presented here suggest that depositor discipline was present in local
markets during the crisis, and that experiencing bank failures leads to a wake-up call
of depositors. However, interpreting the results in this manner can be misleading.
Between 2009 and 2011, the Deposit Insurance Fund essentially ran out of money as
evidenced by its negative reserve ratio (FDIC, 2012). To help the FDIC maintain its
credibility, Congress created an emergency borrowing line in March, 2009 of up to $100
billion, with a possibility to increase this emergency line to $500 billion conditional on
the approval from the Federal Reserve Board and the Treasury. Combined with the
fact that most failures occurred in 2010 and 2011 (see Figure 5.3), the result in Table 5.4
might actually be due to an aggregate change in depositor behavior and not to bank
failures. To explore this possibility, I split up the sample for the years 2008 - 2010 and
2011 - 2013, and estimate Equation (5.2) on these subsamples. The results are shown
in Table 5.5. Specification (1) estimates Equation (5.1) using the standard bank, market
and year fixed effects, and shows that general discipline is present during both crisis-
periods. Moreover, the coefficients are of the same magnitude, indicating no structural
break in behavior as the crisis progresses. The magnitude of the coefficients on NPL
and the implicit interest rate do change, but this can be attributed to the change in the
average of the variables. Whereas the average equity ratio and the average return-on-
assets remained stable around 10% and 0.37%, the NPL and the implicit interest rate
changed from 1.1% to 1.9%, and from 0.5% to 1.4% in the latter stages of the crisis,
respectively. Finally, note that since bank fixed effects are included, the identification
on the BHC and Savings Bank variables relies on banks becoming BHC members and
savings banks becoming commercial banks, or vice versa.
5.3.2 Do failures in all markets lead to extra discipline?
Having established that bank failures give an extra incentive to depositors to mon-
itor banks active in their local market, I explore several outcomes that can be the con-
sequence of this channel. The first is whether depositors receive different signals from
different bank failures. For instance, a failing bank with a high local presence is pre-
sumably a stronger signal to depositors than a bank with little local presence. Since
the former failure is likely due to a downturn in the local business cycle, depositors
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Table 5.5: Is there a difference during the crisis?
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt
2008 - 2010 2011 - 2013 2008 - 2010 2011 - 2013 2008 - 2010 2011 - 2013
Main Explanatory Variables
Equity 0.880*** 0.919*** 0.961*** 0.902*** 0.979*** 0.948***
(0.102) (0.126) (0.101) (0.126) (0.114) (0.140)
NPL −0.765*** −0.481*** −0.708*** −0.486*** −1.031*** −0.475***
(0.131) (0.106) (0.129) (0.103) (0.145) (0.117)
ROA 1.513*** 1.600*** 0.872* 1.688*** 2.231*** 1.603***
(0.475) (0.434) (0.477) (0.436) (0.532) (0.492)
Control Variables
Implicit Interest Rate 1.527*** 4.560*** 0.975* 5.226*** 0.205 3.862***
(0.537) (1.028) (0.531) (1.028) (0.623) (1.157)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.130*** −0.157*** −0.138*** −0.159*** −0.150*** −0.171***
(0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
BHC −0.027* −0.012 −0.024* −0.026* −0.031** −0.022
(0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.017)
Ln(Number of Branches) −0.013*** −0.006*** −0.028*** −0.030***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.011) (0.010)
HHI 0.064 0.010 0.067 0.011
(0.040) (0.029) (0.043) (0.029)
Cost/Income −0.006 0.037** −0.015 0.035** −0.014 0.033*
(0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.017)
Real Estate Loans −0.104*** −0.048* −0.092*** −0.049* −0.056* −0.051*
(0.030) (0.026) (0.030) (0.026) (0.032) (0.028)
Liquid Assets −0.591*** −0.361*** −0.580*** −0.361*** −0.533*** −0.351***
(0.034) (0.029) (0.033) (0.028) (0.037) (0.031)
Securities for Sale and Investment −0.264*** −0.288*** −0.247*** −0.286*** −0.260*** −0.292***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027)
Savings Bank 0.215** −0.100*** 0.207** −0.101*** 0.262** −0.097***
(0.100) (0.005) (0.098) (0.005) (0.107) (0.005)
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Bank×Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Market×Year Fixed Effects Included Included
Within R¯2 0.038 0.032 0.050 0.048 0.056 0.047
N 40,186 43,945 40,186 43,945 40,186 43,945
Failed 0.138 0.168 0.138 0.168 0.138 0.168
This table explores the difference in depositor reaction during two phases of the crisis using a subsample
analysis. Specification (1) shows the results for the years 2008 - 2010 and the years 2011 - 2013. Speci-
fications (2)-(3) repeat the analysis but add bank×market and market×year fixed effects, respectively.
Since ‘HHI’ and ‘Ln(Number of Branches)’ are market-level indicators and vary only over market and
time, they are dropped in specification (3). ‘Failed’ indicates the percentage of markets that experienced
a failure during the time period. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on market. * significant at 10
percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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might become more risk-averse after a local failure (analogous to Malmendier and
Nagel, 2011). If bank failures indeed lead to a wake-up call because of a downturn
in macro-economic conditions, local failures should give a stronger signal and incen-
tive to depositors to increase their monitoring. To investigate this possibility, I divide
the failures into banks with headquarters in-market and banks whose headquarters
are located out-of-market. The results are presented in Table 5.6, and show that for
both in-market and out-of-market failures depositors monitor the equity ratio in the
short and long run. Interestingly, and consistent with the experience hypothesis, de-
positors monitor the NPL of their banks for 3+ years after in-market failures but not
for out-of-market failures. Moreover, while the return-on-assets is significant in later
years after bank failures, this is only the case for out-of-market failures. These results
indicate that local bank failures indeed give a stronger signal than non-local bank fail-
ures. Since local bank failures are presumably caused by local business cycle effects,
I interpret this as extra evidence for the failure-induced wake-up call. Results for a
similar exercise, where I look at failed banks with their headquarters in the same state,
or headquarters in another state than the local market, are reported in Table 5.A.2. The
results are quantitatively similar and are therefore not discussed here.
Another question is whether depositors wake up to the same extent when they
have less choice to move their deposits within the same market. In markets with few
banks, or highly concentrated markets, where is the depositor going to run to? If de-
positors have no choice between banks, they are less likely to move their deposits,
in effect disciplining banks less. A bank failure is thus expected to lead to a lower
depositor reaction in concentrated markets compared to less concentrated markets. I
split up the markets according to their deposit-based HHI, following the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice guidelines to divide banking markets into concentrated markets (HHI
≥ 2500), moderately concentrated markets (1500 ≤ HHI < 2500) and markets with a
low level of concentration (HHI < 1500). The results are shown in Table 5.7. Gen-
eral discipline is present in all markets, but depositors react differently across markets
when faced with a bank failure. In markets with a high level of concentration, deposi-
tors focus mainly on the return-on-assets to decide where to move their deposits to. In
less concentrated markets, depositors tend to value the equity ratio, which is arguably
a better indicator of the risk of a bank than the return-on-assets. Depositors seem to
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Table 5.6: Is there a difference between in-market and out-of-market failures?
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt
Time since failure (k) 1 year 2 year 3+ year
Type of failure In-Market Out-of-Market In-Market Out-of-Market In-Market Out-of-Market
Main Explanatory Variables
Equity 0.815*** 0.815*** 0.800*** 0.805*** 0.797*** 0.792***
(0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
NPL −0.655*** −0.680*** −0.650*** −0.683*** −0.652*** −0.686***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065) (0.067)
ROA 2.378*** 2.330*** 2.290*** 2.166*** 2.189*** 2.056***
(0.269) (0.283) (0.271) (0.292) (0.273) (0.294)
Control Variables
Implicit Interest Rate 2.522*** 2.466*** 2.524*** 2.532*** 2.509*** 2.665***
(0.355) (0.356) (0.356) (0.359) (0.357) (0.364)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.055*** −0.054*** −0.056*** −0.055*** −0.057*** −0.057***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
BHC −0.019** −0.019** −0.019** −0.017* −0.018** −0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ln(Number of Branches) −0.010*** −0.010*** −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.012*** −0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HHI 0.028* 0.025 0.032* 0.022 0.036** 0.020
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Cost/Income 0.078*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.078*** 0.072*** 0.075***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Real Estate Loans −0.054*** −0.058*** −0.049*** −0.054*** −0.045*** −0.046***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Liquid Assets −0.327*** −0.319*** −0.331*** −0.323*** −0.332*** −0.325***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Securities for Sale and Investment −0.185*** −0.183*** −0.186*** −0.186*** −0.186*** −0.183***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Savings Bank 0.139** 0.141** 0.139** 0.138** 0.139** 0.138**
(0.066) (0.067) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
Interaction Main Explanatory Variables
F −0.115*** −0.092*** −0.094** −0.062** −0.102*** −0.061**
(0.039) (0.030) (0.038) (0.028) (0.036) (0.027)
F× Equity 0.272*** 0.290*** 0.296*** 0.210*** 0.255*** 0.210***
(0.083) (0.078) (0.076) (0.065) (0.074) (0.062)
F× NPL −0.521*** −0.274** −0.398*** −0.126 −0.348*** −0.118
(0.146) (0.137) (0.135) (0.120) (0.127) (0.116)
F× ROA 0.238 0.838 0.595 1.048** 1.023 1.104**
(0.760) (0.608) (0.703) (0.530) (0.663) (0.509)
Interaction Control Variables
F× Implicit Interest Rate 0.614 1.006 0.683 0.997* 0.710 0.534
(0.673) (0.650) (0.658) (0.585) (0.628) (0.570)
F× Ln(Total Assets) 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.004*** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F× BHC 0.010 −0.003 0.005 −0.004 0.005 −0.004
(0.008) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
F× Ln(Number of Branches) −0.000 0.004** 0.003 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
F× HHI 0.011 0.016 −0.010 0.028* −0.017 0.027*
(0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016)
F× Cost/Income 0.026 0.036** 0.020 0.012 0.027* 0.008
(0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
F× Real Estate Loans −0.038** −0.017 −0.053*** −0.038*** −0.051*** −0.041***
(0.017) (0.013) (0.016) (0.014) (0.017) (0.014)
F× Liquid Assets 0.125*** 0.018 0.149*** 0.067** 0.153*** 0.083***
(0.039) (0.031) (0.032) (0.028) (0.030) (0.027)
F× Securities for Sale and Investment 0.037** 0.012 0.040** 0.031** 0.042** 0.020
(0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
F× Savings Bank −0.005 −0.009 −0.008 −0.003 −0.009 −0.008
(0.012) (0.015) (0.010) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Within R¯2 0.032 0.031 0.033 0.032 0.034 0.033
N 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131
Failed 0.090 0.107 0.090 0.107 0.090 0.107
This table explores the difference in depositor reaction to bank failures whose headquarters is located in the local market, versus
bank failures whose headquarters are located out-of-market. ‘Failed’ indicates the percentage of markets that experienced a
failure during the time period. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on market. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5
percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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only exert discipline after failures when they have a choice between banks. While it
is appealing to interpret these results in this way, we have seen in Table 5.3 that fail-
ures occurred less in concentrated markets. The percentage of markets experiencing a
failure is much higher for low concentration markets compared to high concentration
markets, meaning that this conclusion might be driven by other market characteristics
than the degree of concentration. To take this possibility into account, I perform the
analysis on MSAs only in Section 5.4.
5.3.3 Is this a general crisis effect?
The results presented here show consistently that failures in local markets lead to
a wake-up call of depositors, and that this wake-up call is a long-run phenomenon.
However, they still do not rule out that depositor behavior may have changed as a
result of the crisis. Berger and Turk-Ariss (2014) indeed find that overall market dis-
cipline decreased during the crisis compared to the pre-crisis behavior of depositors.
Since the sample used in this chapter coincides with the beginning of the crisis, it is
possible that the results presented so far are caused by a general change in depositor
behavior due to the crisis. To test this possibility of a wake-up call due to a crisis effect,
I extend the dataset to include the pre-crisis years 2002 - 2006. As there are hardly any
failures occurring prior to the crisis, a true differences-in-differences model is unfor-
tunately not well-identified, and I therefore estimate the following regression model:
∆ ln Di,m,t = β0 + β1Riski,t−1 + β2Controlsi,m,t−1
+ β3C + β4CRiski,t−1 + β5CControlsi,m,t−1
+ β6CFm,t−k + β7CFm,t−kRiski,t−1 + β8CFm,t−kControlsi,m,t−1
+ βi + βm + βt + ei,m,t (5.3)
where C is a dummy variable taking the value 1 for the years 2007 through 2013 and
0 otherwise, and the rest of the covariates are the same as in Equation (5.2). The coef-
ficients of interest here are the crisis interaction with the vector of risk characteristics,
β4 × C × Riski,t−1, and the double interaction capturing the effect of risk when fail-
ures occur during the crisis, β7 × C × Fm,t−k × Riski,t−1. The results are presented in
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columns (1)-(4) in Table 5.8.
The table shows that there is a general wake-up effect during the crisis, as banks
are disciplined more in the crisis than in the years leading up to it. The positive coeffi-
cient on the Crisis×NPL indicates that depositors heavily monitored on this variable
prior to the crisis. The total effect of NPL is still negative, which is consistent with
market discipline. Disciplining on the other risk variables occurs as well. From the
double interaction with the crisis variable and the bank failure indicator, we can see
that excess discipline is exerted in those markets experiencing failures. Contrary to
the results of the baseline specification, the effect of capital and NPL die out 2 years
after bank failures. However, similar to the baseline specification, the disciplining ef-
fect of Return-on-Assets is present 3 or more years after failure. Overall, the results
indicate that, similar to Table 5.4, depositors exert extra discipline in banking mar-
kets where failures occurred. The next section explores the robustness of the results
presented so far.
5.4 Robustness tests
In this section, I present four robustness tests for the results in the previous section.
In the first test, I use the multidimensionality of the dataset to add extra controls for
possible unobserved heterogeneity. The second test investigates the choice of MSAs
and non-MSA counties as local markets, and explores some alternatives. The third
and fourth test address concerns regarding endogeneity, with the third test looking at
failures in neighboring markets as a way to control for local business cycle effects and
the fourth test excluding banks with a large local presence.
Unobserved heterogeneity The baseline specifications in Tables 5.4 and 5.A.1 include
bank, market and year fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity. However,
given the dimensions of the dataset, it is possible to add more than the standard fixed
effects to control for the heterogeneity. For instance, while the market fixed effects
can control for market-specific changes in deposits, and the year fixed effects pick up
the countrywide business cycle effects, market×year fixed effects can control for local
market business cycle effects. Similarly, bank×market fixed effects can be employed
113

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to control for market-specific strategies, as banks might want to expand their market
share in certain markets but not in others. Given the large dimensionality involved
in adding bank×market and market×year fixed effects, these estimations are only
feasible with the iterative within transformation employed so far. In Table 5.A.3, the
extra fixed effects are added, columns (1)-(4) show the result where the baseline spec-
ification is augmented with bank×market fixed effects and in columns (5)-(8) both
bank×market and market×year fixed effects are added. In the latter specification,
variables that vary only over market and time (‘HHI’ and ‘Ln(Number of Branches)’)
drop out due to perfect collinearity with the added fixed effects. Moreover, the vari-
able indicating whether a failure occurred in the previous year is also dropped for the
same reason. This problem does not occur with the dummy variables indicating if fail-
ures occurred in markets 2 or 3+ years ago. Overall, the results on the interaction with
the risk characteristics are robust to adding these additional fixed effects. Depositors
discipline mainly on the capital ratio, and this excess discipline is long-lasting as it is
significant even 3+ years after the failure occurred. Similar to the results in Table 5.4,
the return-on-assets becomes statistically significant in later years after failure.
I also add the extra fixed effects to regressions in Tables 5.5 and 5.8. Overall, the
results are very similar. Specifications (2) and (3) in Table 5.5 show that adding the
fixed effects does not change significance of the risk variables in the different stages of
the crisis. Moreover, columns (5)-(8) in Table 5.8 show that adding these fixed effects
does not change the result when considering a general crisis effect.
Definition of local market The second robustness test examines the definition of lo-
cal markets. Consistent with previous literature, local markets are defined as MSAs
and non-MSA counties. Given the research question at hand, this definition of a local
banking market might not be the most appropriate. This chapter tries to identify the
effect on depositors who have witnessed a bank failure in their local market, but there
is heterogeneity in the size of these markets. For instance, the New York-Newark-
Bridgeport MSA consists of 25 counties. If a bank that is only operating branches in a
few of these counties fails, the entire MSA is considered to have experienced a failure.
While depositors might experience a wake-up call in these counties, it is questionable
that this information could impact depositors in other counties belonging to the same
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MSA. Nonetheless, in MSAs news might spread faster due to a higher population
density and, e.g., a higher share of commuters. Non-MSA counties, on the other hand,
may be closer communities where a bank failure can have a stronger impact. Table 5.3
and Section 5.3.2 already provide some preliminary evidence, showing that failures
are more likely to occur in larger and less concentrated markets such as MSAs.
In total, the dataset covers banks active in 388 MSAs and 1,940 non-MSA counties.
Despite including market fixed effects, the baseline specification only considers the
average impact of failures on discipline over both types, and does not allow separate
slopes. To test the robustness of this assumption, I first look at counties only, after
which I analyze the difference in reactions to failures in MSAs and non-MSA counties
separately.
Table 5.A.4 shows the results when defining the county as a local banking market.
Columns (1)-(4) display the baseline specification with bank, market and year fixed
effects, while columns (5)-(12) add bank×market and market×year fixed effects. The
results indicate that general market discipline was present in the crisis, however it
seems that in none of the specifications significant excess discipline is being exerted by
depositors. While the point estimates have the correct sign and similar magnitude as in
Table 5.4, they are not statistically significant and therefore the results from Section 5.3
do not seem robust to the choice of local banking market.
This, of course, warrants a further investigation into the causes and the robust-
ness of the baseline specification. To do so, I revert to the original market definition
of MSAs and non-MSA counties. Instead of allowing for a shared slope across both
type of markets, like in Table 5.4, I now split up the markets and analyze the effect
of failures separately in Table 5.9. The table shows that overall market discipline was
present in both MSAs and non-MSA counties. Moreover, the table confirms the previ-
ous result that in non-MSA counties (columns (5)-(8)), there was no significant increase
in discipline after bank failures. In MSAs (columns (1)-(4)), however, there was extra
discipline based on the equity ratio of banks, and this effect is long-lasting. These
results seem to suggest that failures in non-MSA counties do not lead to a wake-up
effect. A possible explanation is that these markets are simply less populated and a
lot smaller, and therefore depositors are less exposed to failures. This explanation,
however, assumes that MSAs and non-MSA counties are subject to the same amount
116
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of bank failures. When looking at the data on bank failures in Table 5.3, it becomes
clear this assumption is not correct and that the bulk of the failures occur in MSAs:
of the local markets that have seen a failure during the sample, 57% are MSAs, while
they make up a much smaller share of the total number of markets. For instance, from
the markets that have not experienced a failure, only 14% is a MSA and the remaining
86% are non-MSA counties. The wake-up call thus seems more present in larger bank-
ing markets simply because failures have occurred there more often. The results from
Section 5.3 are thus still robust, but are driven mainly by the larger markets that have
experienced more failures.
Neighboring markets Another concern is that failures do not occur randomly. While
Figure 5.2 show that there is variation across markets and states, Table 5.3 and the pre-
vious section showed that larger markets suffered more failures. One way to control
for this potential endogeneity issue is to look at failures in neighboring markets. These
failures are likely due to the same local business cycle effects, but should not impact
depositors in the own market as they did not experience them. Moreover, neighboring
markets are expected to be similar in both observable and unobservable characteristics
(see e.g. Huang, 2008). If experiencing failures leads to extra discipline, I expect to find
that failures in neighboring markets would not lead to extra discipline, as depositors
in the own market should not be impacted. Table 5.10 shows the estimation output,
where F denotes the failure of a bank within the market the bank is active in, while Fn
denotes the failure in a neighboring market.
Overall, we can see that the results from the baseline specification hold when
adding the neighboring failures. Depositors still react to Equity and NPL, and this is a
long-lasting effect. Failures in neighboring markets do not seem to consistently lead to
extra discipline in the own market, even though banks on average have a lower growth
in deposits if banks in neighboring markets fail. In the specification with only bank,
market and year fixed effects, the effects on Equity and NPL of banks in the own mar-
ket are only significant 3 or more years after the neighboring failure. When adding
extra controls in bank×market and market×year fixed effects, it becomes clear that
neighboring failures do not consistently lead to extra discipline. However, the effect
of Equity after a failure within the own market is always significant and of the correct
117















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































5. DEPOSITOR BEHAVIOR AND EXTREME EVENTS
sign. It therefore seems that only experiencing failures in the own market leads to ex-
tra depositor discipline, and this channel is robust for local business cycle effects.
Local bank endogeneity A second source of potential endogeneity is the relationship
between changes in deposits and a bank’s risk characteristics. Even though Equa-
tion (5.2) tries to solve this by lagging the vector of bank risk characteristics, there
could potentially be a problem if a bank depends on most of its deposit funding from
the same market. If banks obtain deposit funding equally from multiple markets, there
is no mechanical link between the deposit growth of each bank in a certain market and
the bank-level risk characteristic. However, if banks rely mainly on funding from their
one single market, there is a potential link between the bank-market level change in
deposits and bank level risk characteristics. While this is partially dealt with in Equa-
tion (5.2) by lagging the risk characteristics, the source of the potential endogeneity
is removed in order to test the robustness. I classify banks that have at least 75% of
their deposits in the market as local banks, and remove these from the sample before
redoing the analysis. Table 5.11 shows the results, which are similar to the baseline
specification: extra discipline is mainly directed at the capital ratio of banks and the
share of non-performing loans the first year after bank failure. In the years afterwards,
discipline is again mainly directed at the capital ratio of banks, although similar to the
baseline specification the return-on-assets also becomes statistically significant.
5.5 Conclusion
This chapter has looked at whether depositor discipline was present during the
crisis, and whether the bank failures have indeed increased discipline by serving as
a ‘wake-up call’. In doing so, this chapter offers two contributions compared to the
existing literature. First, instead of measuring discipline at the level of the bank entity,
this chapter looks at depositor discipline in local markets. The focus on the local mar-
ket is motivated by the fact that depositors generally only choose to keep their savings
at banks that are active in their vicinity. By comparing banks at a national or even
supranational level, this fact is not taken into account and therefore offers a distorted
120
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Table 5.11: Do failures lead to a wake-up effect when removing local banks?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt
Time since failure (k) 1 year 2 year 3+ year
Equity 0.448*** 0.428*** 0.425*** 0.424***
(0.059) (0.059) (0.059) (0.060)
NPL −0.616*** −0.572*** −0.596*** −0.614***
(0.075) (0.078) (0.078) (0.080)
ROA 3.010*** 2.909*** 2.736*** 2.557***
(0.310) (0.329) (0.337) (0.342)
F −0.062* −0.047 −0.062**
(0.036) (0.032) (0.031)
F× Equity 0.163** 0.118* 0.109*
(0.072) (0.064) (0.062)
F× NPL −0.266* −0.046 −0.022
(0.157) (0.142) (0.134)
F× ROA 0.888 1.117* 1.403**
(0.708) (0.646) (0.616)
Control Variables Included Included Included Included
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Within R¯2 0.016 0.017 0.018 0.018
N 63,440 63,440 63,440 63,440
Failed 0.125 0.125 0.125 0.125
This table explores the robustness of the results when removing banks that are considered local (i.e.
that have at least 75% of their deposits in the market). As the changes in deposits might lead to a worse
risk profile in the next period, these banks are removed for possible endogeneity concerns. ‘Failed’
indicates the percentage of markets that experienced a failure during the time period. Standard errors
in parentheses, clustered on market. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant
at 1 percent.
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identification of depositor discipline. Second, by analyzing the behavior of depositors
in local markets, this chapter presents a cleaner identification of the wake-up call than
previous studies have managed, as not all local markets have seen bank failures and
therefore experienced the potential for a wake-up call.
I find that discipline was present in local markets between 2007 and 2013, and that
depositors mainly focused on the capital buffers of banks. Furthermore, discipline was
more severe in those local markets that saw a failure, and the analyses show that this
is a long-run phenomenon. Depositors were also able to distinguish between different
types of failures. Whereas they reacted more heavily to failures of banks with main
offices within their local market, out-of-market and out-of-state failures did not give
depositors the incentive to increase monitoring on the remaining banks. Finally, since
more failures occurred in larger banking markets, the effect seems to be mainly driven
by these markets.
The findings presented in this chapter have important implications for the regula-
tory and supervisory set-up following the crisis. Despite interventions such as bailouts
and increases in the level of deposit insurance, depositors still seem to monitor bank
riskiness and adjust their deposits holdings accordingly. Moreover, depositor disci-
pline is more present in markets in which the FDIC has let banks fail, even though
the depositors were often fully compensated. These failures, possibly serving as a
reminder regarding banks inherent riskiness, can actually lead to more involved de-
positors and potentially a safer banking system. Finally, the Net Stable Funding Ratio
(NFSR) introduced in Basel III will force banks to hold a sufficient amount of stable
funding, which includes demand and other customer deposits. This chapter shows
that deposit funding of banks depends not only on the bank’s risk characteristics, but
also on what is happening to other banks in their market.
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Appendix 5.A Additional figures and tables
Table 5.A.1: Do failures lead to a wake-up effect?
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt
Time since failure (k) 1 year 2 year 3+ year
Main Explanatory Variables
Equity 0.853*** 0.801*** 0.790*** 0.784***
(0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.059)
NPL −0.725*** −0.657*** −0.670*** −0.683***
(0.064) (0.067) (0.067) (0.068)
ROA 2.435*** 2.277*** 2.091*** 1.920***
(0.264) (0.286) (0.293) (0.298)
Control Variables
Implicit Interest Rate 2.347*** 2.580*** 2.629*** 2.709***
(0.346) (0.360) (0.361) (0.362)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.053*** −0.055*** −0.056*** −0.058***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
BHC −0.020** −0.018** −0.017* −0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ln(Number of Branches) −0.009*** −0.011*** −0.012*** −0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HHI 0.026 0.027 0.027 0.028
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Cost/Income 0.083*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.071***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Real Estate Loans −0.057*** −0.055*** −0.050*** −0.043***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Liquid Assets −0.319*** −0.324*** −0.329*** −0.330***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019)
Securities for Sale and Investment −0.181*** −0.184*** −0.187*** −0.185***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Savings Bank 0.140** 0.140** 0.137** 0.139**
(0.067) (0.067) (0.066) (0.068)
Interaction Main Explanatory Variables
F −0.086*** −0.066*** −0.076***
(0.028) (0.026) (0.025)
F× Equity 0.266*** 0.206*** 0.196***
(0.065) (0.060) (0.058)
F× NPL −0.299** −0.166 −0.123
(0.120) (0.111) (0.108)
F× ROA 0.846 1.142** 1.433***
(0.550) (0.510) (0.488)
Interaction Control Variables
F× Implicit Interest Rate 0.895 1.068** 0.994**
(0.548) (0.520) (0.489)
F× Ln(Total Assets) 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F× BHC −0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
F× Ln(Number of Branches) 0.004** 0.005*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
F× HHI 0.008 0.008 0.004
(0.015) (0.013) (0.015)
F× Cost/Income 0.027* 0.009 0.013
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
F× Real Estate Loans −0.027** −0.040*** −0.041***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012)
F× Liquid Assets 0.055* 0.088*** 0.095***
(0.029) (0.027) (0.026)
F× Securities for Sale and Investment 0.015 0.027** 0.023*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
F× Savings Bank −0.008 −0.007 −0.014
(0.011) (0.009) (0.008)
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Within R¯2 0.031 0.032 0.033 0.034
N 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131
This table shows the full estimation results for Equation (5.2), including control variables that were left out in Table 5.4 for reason
of brevity. Similar to Table 5.4, every specification includes bank, market and time fixed effects to control for demand effects.
Column 2 measures the impact on market discipline 1 year after the failure has occurred, column 3 measures the long-run effect
2 years after failure and column 4 measures the long-run effect 3 or more years after bank failure. Standard errors in parentheses,
clustered on market. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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Table 5.A.2: Is there a difference between in-state and out-of-state failures?
(1) (2) (3)
∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt
Time since failure (k) 1 year 2 year 3+ year
Type of failure In-State Out-of-State In-State Out-of-State In-State Out-of-State
Main Explanatory Variables
Equity 0.812*** 0.814*** 0.791*** 0.804*** 0.786*** 0.794***
(0.058) (0.059) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058)
NPL −0.676*** −0.668*** −0.666*** −0.656*** −0.667*** −0.675***
(0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066)
ROA 2.455*** 2.325*** 2.354*** 2.144*** 2.210*** 2.016***
(0.275) (0.279) (0.277) (0.289) (0.281) (0.292)
Control Variables
Implicit Interest Rate 2.466*** 2.526*** 2.525*** 2.559*** 2.566*** 2.658***
(0.354) (0.357) (0.357) (0.361) (0.360) (0.361)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.054*** −0.054*** −0.055*** −0.056*** −0.056*** −0.057***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
BHC −0.020** −0.019** −0.019** −0.017* −0.018** −0.016*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ln(Number of Branches) −0.010*** −0.011*** −0.010*** −0.012*** −0.011*** −0.012***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
HHI 0.028 0.026 0.029* 0.025 0.033* 0.026
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Cost/Income 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.073*** 0.073***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Real Estate Loans −0.058*** −0.056*** −0.053*** −0.052*** −0.047*** −0.045***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Liquid Assets −0.327*** −0.319*** −0.332*** −0.322*** −0.333*** −0.322***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Securities for Sale and Investment −0.185*** −0.185*** −0.186*** −0.185*** −0.185*** −0.184***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Savings Bank 0.139** 0.140** 0.136** 0.138** 0.137** 0.138**
(0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066) (0.066) (0.067)
Interaction Main Explanatory Variables
F −0.129*** −0.078*** −0.100*** −0.062** −0.106*** −0.070**
(0.034) (0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028)
F× Equity 0.380*** 0.240*** 0.360*** 0.200*** 0.320*** 0.201***
(0.078) (0.074) (0.072) (0.067) (0.067) (0.064)
F× NPL −0.368*** −0.316** −0.286** −0.230* −0.254** −0.137
(0.143) (0.130) (0.121) (0.126) (0.115) (0.124)
F× ROA −0.115 0.862 0.072 1.270** 0.530 1.466***
(0.660) (0.636) (0.626) (0.567) (0.587) (0.539)
Interaction Control Variables
F× Implicit Interest Rate 0.826 0.783 0.596 1.042* 0.509 0.831
(0.569) (0.614) (0.573) (0.601) (0.545) (0.571)
F× Ln(Total Assets) 0.004*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.004*** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F× BHC 0.008 0.001 0.007 −0.004 0.005 −0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
F× Ln(Number of Branches) 0.001 0.004** 0.001 0.007*** 0.003** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
F× HHI 0.004 0.018 0.001 0.025 −0.010 0.016
(0.020) (0.018) (0.015) (0.017) (0.018) (0.016)
F× Cost/Income 0.016 0.035** 0.002 0.019 0.011 0.018
(0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
F× Real Estate Loans −0.003 −0.037** −0.025* −0.048*** −0.028* −0.050***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014)
F× Liquid Assets 0.109*** 0.023 0.128*** 0.068** 0.133*** 0.081***
(0.034) (0.035) (0.030) (0.031) (0.028) (0.029)
F× Securities for Sale and Investment 0.030* 0.022 0.035** 0.031** 0.027* 0.028*
(0.016) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
F× Savings Bank −0.007 −0.008 −0.011 −0.002 −0.017** −0.010
(0.011) (0.013) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included
Within R¯2 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033
N 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131
Failed 0.094 0.110 0.094 0.110 0.094 0.110
This table explores the difference in depositor reaction to bank failures whose headquarters is located in the same state, versus
bank failures whose headquarters are located out-of-state. ‘Failed’ indicates the percentage of markets that experienced a failure
during the time period. Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on market. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent;
*** significant at 1 percent.
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Table 5.A.3: Do failures lead to a wake-up effect?
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt ∆ ln Dimt
Time since failure (k) 1 year 2 year 3+ year 1 year 2 year 3+ year
Main Explanatory Variables
Equity 0.916*** 0.868*** 0.858*** 0.850*** 0.943*** 0.891*** 0.876*** 0.869***
(0.063) (0.058) (0.058) (0.058) (0.070) (0.066) (0.066) (0.066)
NPL −0.681*** −0.624*** −0.634*** −0.650*** −0.718*** −0.681*** −0.707*** −0.735***
(0.064) (0.066) (0.067) (0.069) (0.073) (0.077) (0.078) (0.081)
ROA 2.268*** 2.148*** 1.977*** 1.795*** 2.668*** 2.671*** 2.442*** 2.210***
(0.270) (0.294) (0.303) (0.309) (0.299) (0.327) (0.340) (0.348)
Control Variables
Implicit Interest Rate 2.211*** 2.155*** 2.194*** 2.334*** 1.939*** 1.979*** 2.124*** 2.295***
(0.346) (0.354) (0.357) (0.361) (0.392) (0.403) (0.409) (0.412)
Ln(Total Assets) −0.044*** −0.044*** −0.046*** −0.047*** −0.055*** −0.055*** −0.056*** −0.058***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
BHC −0.021** −0.022** −0.021** −0.020** −0.019** −0.019** −0.019** −0.018*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Ln(Number of Branches) −0.039*** −0.038*** −0.038*** −0.038***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
HHI 0.032* 0.031* 0.032* 0.034*
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018)
Cost/Income 0.085*** 0.081*** 0.082*** 0.076*** 0.079*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.068***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Real Estate Loans −0.059*** −0.060*** −0.058*** −0.054*** −0.048*** −0.052*** −0.054*** −0.052***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Liquid Assets −0.319*** −0.317*** −0.326*** −0.338*** −0.316*** −0.317*** −0.330*** −0.345***
(0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.021)
Securities for Sale and Investment −0.180*** −0.183*** −0.187*** −0.187*** −0.190*** −0.197*** −0.207*** −0.207***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014)
Savings Bank 0.115* 0.116* 0.114* 0.116* 0.153** 0.153** 0.151** 0.153**
(0.060) (0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.075) (0.075) (0.075) (0.077)
Interaction Main Explanatory Variables
F −0.066** −0.063** −0.090*** −0.061 −0.101*
(0.028) (0.026) (0.026) (0.037) (0.053)
F× Equity 0.291*** 0.231*** 0.220*** 0.267*** 0.204*** 0.198***
(0.070) (0.069) (0.068) (0.073) (0.072) (0.071)
F× NPL −0.231* −0.105 −0.083 −0.112 −0.008 0.031
(0.128) (0.130) (0.131) (0.133) (0.136) (0.141)
F× ROA 0.562 1.121** 1.488*** −0.067 0.682 1.135*
(0.557) (0.522) (0.519) (0.615) (0.590) (0.586)
Interaction Control Variables
F× Implicit Interest Rate 0.310 0.681 0.549 −2.390*** −2.972*** −3.785***
(0.508) (0.508) (0.491) (0.766) (0.765) (0.769)
F× Ln(Total Assets) 0.000 0.001 0.002*** 0.000 0.001* 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
F× BHC 0.005 0.006 0.005 0.001 0.003 0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
F× Ln(Number of Branches) 0.001 0.003* 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
F× HHI −0.000 0.001 −0.004
(0.015) (0.013) (0.016)
F× Cost/Income 0.011 0.000 0.013 0.001 0.001 0.021
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
F× Real Estate Loans 0.013 −0.004 −0.008 0.031** 0.024 0.024
(0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017)
F× Liquid Assets 0.003 0.061** 0.109*** −0.004 0.056* 0.107***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034) (0.031) (0.032)
F× Securities for Sale and Investment 0.019 0.039** 0.036** 0.038** 0.064*** 0.058***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
F× Savings Bank −0.004 −0.004 −0.015 0.001 0.003 −0.006
(0.013) (0.010) (0.010) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012)
Bank Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Bank×Market Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Market×Year Fixed Effects Included Included Included Included
Within R¯2 0.036 0.036 0.037 0.037 0.036 0.037 0.038 0.039
N 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131 84,131
This table shows robustness analyses for the estimation results of Equation (5.2). Compared to Table 5.4, this table exploits
the multi-dimensionality of the dataset by adding bank×market fixed effects in columns 1-8 and market×year fixed effects
in columns 5-8. The bank×market fixed effects control for different depositor reaction in each bank-market pairing, and the
market×year fixed effects control for a different depositor reaction per market over time. Since ‘HHI’ and ‘Ln(Number of
Branches)’ are market-level indicators and vary only over market and time, they are dropped in columns 5-8. For the same
reason, F drops out in column 5, as it is measures failures in a market during the previous year only, and is therefore perfectly
correlated with the market×year fixed effects. The results in Table 5.4 are robust to adding these control variables. Standard
errors in parentheses, clustered on market. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.
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Carrying the (Paper) Burden: A Portfolio
View of Systemic Risk and Optimal Bank
Size?
6.1 Introduction
As a result of the financial crisis, the health and safety of the financial system is
at the heart of many policy agendas. Concerns regarding the financial system tend
to relate mostly to commercial banks and their parent holding companies. Policy dis-
cussions focus either on the riskiness of individual financial institutions, or on what is
broadly termed systemic risk. Regarding individual banks, the key question debated
is whether some banks are too big: too big to fail, too big with respect to their coun-
try’s GDP (Bertay et al., 2013; Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga, 2013), too big to produce
at minimum average costs (see e.g. Wheelock and Wilson, 2012; Hughes and Mester,
2013), or even too big to rescue. Systemic risk discussions are much broader, and may
consider the stability of the financial system itself, the macro effects of a shock to that
?This chapter is based on joint work with Jaap W.B. Bos (Maastricht University) and Victoria Purice
(Ghent University).
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system, or the optimal supervisory setup for dealing with and minimizing the likeli-
hood of such a shock.
In this chapter, we combine these two discussions and investigate whether the size
of the largest banks in the system has contributed to an increase in systemic risk. We
do so by engaging the reader in a thought experiment. We imagine a bank supervisor
as an investor holding a portfolio of banks. Each bank aims to maximize profits, but
thereby incurs a certain amount of risk. Given that banks’ profits are not all perfectly
correlated, the risk-return relationship of the portfolio that the supervisor holds is ex-
pected to be better than that of the riskiest banks in the system on their own. Taking the
long-term view, the bank supervisor not only wants to minimize risk but is certainly
also interested in return, as high charter values may boost the stability of individual
banks.
Although we consider our view of the bank supervisor a thought experiment, re-
cent events have shown that its experimental nature is closer to the reality of a crisis
than one may at first suspect. In theory, the bank supervisor mainly represents the
interests of deposit holders and deposit insurance guarantees those interests to a large
extent. However, during the recent crisis, most supervisors went above and beyond
that objective. In the U.S., the Trouble Asset Relief Program (TARP) initially provided
support in terms of bank equity share purchases valued at more than three times the
total amounts of deposits in the system, although much of these funds were later re-
claimed as shares were sold in the market. Moreover, many assets were purchased
well above their actual value, resulting in an implicit subsidy of the banking sector
(Office of the Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program, 2013).
Finally, the Safe, Accountable, Fair & Efficient (SAFE) Banking Act proposed in 2012
gives regulators additional powers to limit bank size in order to lower systemic risk.
Nevertheless, unlike the typical investor, the bank supervisor is seriously limited
in buying and selling assets in order to reach or remain at the optimal frontier as de-
picted in Figure 6.1. As the crisis has shown, even this highly constrained investor can
rebalance the weights of the banks in the portfolio, through orderly liquidation and
other interventions by the Financial Stability Board such as the capital surcharge for
Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFIs).
Using this scenario, we pose three questions, each related to the situation depicted
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in Figure 6.1. First, we ask whether large banks offer attractive investment opportuni-
ties for the bank supervisor or in other words, whether large banks are characterized
by a risk-return relationship superior to that of the other banks in the system. This
should establish whether the inclusion of large banks has brought the supervisory
portfolio closer to the efficient frontier, e.g., moving from C to B in Figure 6.1.
Second, we examine what would happen to the portfolio’s return if the bank su-
pervisor held the minimum variance portfolio. In light of the example in Figure 6.1,
would the return move from B to A, thereby requiring the supervisor to give up re-
turn in order to hold a less risky portfolio, or would it move from C to A, allowing the
choice of a less risky portfolio without sacrificing returns?
Third, we examine whether the bank supervisor should reduce investments in
large banks in order to achieve the minimum variance portfolio. In light of the ex-
ample in Figure 6.1, we ask whether the supervisor has to increase or reduce the share
of large banks (sL) in the portfolio by moving to A. We also examine whether the
differences in risk and return between the original portfolio held by the bank super-
visor and the new minimum variance portfolio merely reflect a change in the weights
of banks, or whether they are driven by high correlation of the returns of the largest
banks in the original portfolio.
To perform our experiment, we examine developments in the U.S. banking market
since 1984. Using quarterly data on banks’ assets and profits, we construct two types
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of bank supervisory portfolios. For each Federal Reserve District, we include all un-
consolidated commercial banks located within the district. For the U.S. as a whole, we
construct a portfolio comprising all Bank Holding Companies. In both cases, we are
interested in the design of the minimum variance portfolio and how it compares with
the actual portfolio.
Our findings indicate that the current portfolios are not located on the efficient fron-
tier, as risk can be reduced without sacrificing return in order to attain the minimum
variance portfolio. Moreover, we find that the largest banks in the Federal Reserve
portfolios consistently have a significantly lower weight in the hypothetical minimum
variance portfolio. In addition, the minimum variance portfolio does not allow for
large levels of concentration in the first place, with its weights being much more evenly
spread across banks. These results hold even after relaxing some assumptions and al-
lowing the correlation structure to change with the size of banks. In obtaining the
minimum variance portfolio, we assume that the supervisor is able to alter the relative
weights of the individual banks in the portfolio, along the lines of the Safe, Account-
able, Fair & Efficient (SAFE) Banking Act proposed in 2012. The Act was designed to
make banks small enough to fail without causing global panic, using regulatory caps.
We argue that our results provide important insights into the optimal design of a port-
folio of banks, held by a risk-averse supervisor who prefers to incur the least possible
amount of risk. The findings suggest reducing the size of the largest banks in the fi-
nancial system may not only make individual banks safer and easier to fail or rescue,
but can also contribute to a reduction in the riskiness of the system as a whole.
This chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 6.2 we discuss our methodology and
data, followed by Section 6.3 which contains our results. Extensions and policy impli-
cations are addressed in Section 6.4, after which we conclude.
6.2 Data and methodology
6.2.1 Methodology
We regard banks as assets having both a return and a risk component. By placing
the banks in this risk-return framework, we analyze not only the profitability of the
banks but also the risk inherent in profit maximization. When considering a portfo-
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lio of these assets and assuming that returns are not perfectly correlated, a supervisor
holding this portfolio can diversify and enjoy a better risk-return trade-off. The di-
versification opportunities of the supervisor are constrained by the variety of banks
available. Of course, banks themselves also individually diversify their loan portfo-
lios, business lines or geographical markets served. However, the dimensions along
which banks can diversify are correlated with their size, as larger banks can be as-
sumed to have greater geographical reach and a different mix of activities compared
with smaller banks. Moreover, if enough banks diversify along the same lines, the sys-
tem as a whole becomes more susceptible to common shocks, even though individual
banks themselves seem safer from a micro-prudential point of view. This observation
is not new, being noted for instance by Rajan (2005), Wagner (2008), Acharya (2009),
Ibragimov et al. (2011) and Allen et al. (2012), who also draw on Modern Portfolio
Theory (Markowitz, 1952, 1959) and the insight that portfolio risk can be reduced by
choosing assets that are not perfectly correlated with each other.
We contribute to this line of thinking by applying portfolio theory to the banking
system in order to investigate the role of large banks in determining systemic (port-
folio) risk. The supervisor in our case is able to change the portfolio’s risk-return
trade-off by altering the size of banks with respect to the system. Although this ability
goes beyond the existing mechanisms in place (such as ‘Cease and Desist’ orders and
other ‘Prompt Corrective Actions’), we argue that this thought experiment can, at the
very least, give us insights into the optimal design of a portfolio of banks. Applying
portfolio theory to the banking system is not however all that straightforward, due to
some of its strict assumptions. First, the return distribution is assumed to be fully char-
acterized by the first two moments and disregards any tail dependence, even though
financial market returns are found to be skewed and fat-tailed. To (partially) mitigate
this issue, we use lower-frequency quarterly returns. Second, market participants are
assumed to have no influence on prices and return structures of assets in their invest-
ment universe, regardless of the weight they are given. In reality, if a bank supervisor
were to reduce the size of a bank, its risk-return trade-off would be bound to change
as well, as would its correlation structure. Third, an investor is assumed to be able to
purchase assets in parcels of any size, meaning that bank sizes could fluctuate heavily
between the investor’s decision moments. Under a more realistic scenario, the super-
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visor would be able to change the size of a bank in a limited way, e.g. by only a certain
percentage of the bank’s assets. Although we initially proceed under the strict setup,
the last two assumptions are relaxed at a later stage.
In order to apply portfolio theory and build the regulator’s portfolio, we first need
to define the return and weight of the assets under consideration. Previous studies
have relied mainly on market-based measures when assessing systemic risk (see e.g.
De Jonghe, 2010; Adrian and Brunnermeier, 2011; Acharya, Engle and Richardson,
2012; Acharya, Pedersen, Philippon and Richardson, 2012; Bisias et al., 2012; Brown-
lees and Engle, 2012; Engle et al., 2014). Unlike these studies, we instead use the
return-on-assets from book data for the returns of the banks. We do so for several
reasons, the first being that the aggregated risk concerning the supervisor is not based
on the returns and risks of the shareholders of banks, but rather on those of the (pro-
ductive) assets that they hold. In the event that the regulator has to bail out a bank,
saving or guaranteeing its liabilities will be equivalent to saving or guaranteeing its
assets. Second, as shown by Allen and Carletti (2008), in financial crises market prices
tend to reflect the amount of available liquidity instead of future earnings. Since these
episodes are of particular interest to this analysis, market-based measures might not
be appropriate as they could capture liquidity risk instead of systemic risk. Third,
accounting data enable us to explore a more extensive sample since market data is
only available for a small subset of banks. While listed banks do account for a large
percentage of the total banking assets, small banks are potentially a source of (liquid-
ity) contagion through the interbank market (see e.g. Furfine, 1999, 2003; van Lelyveld
and Liedorp, 2006; Degryse and Nguyen, 2007). Finally, return-on-assets is a cleaner
measure of the underlying profitability, as return-on-equity incorporates management
choices with regards to leverage. While our baseline results are based on the book
value of the return-on-assets, they are robust to using market-based measures.
The weight that the regulator holds in each bank is calculated as the bank-level
total assets divided by the sum of all bank-level total assets available in the portfolio.
According to portfolio theory, the investor’s return and risk are calculated as:
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where wt is a column vector representing the weights of all banks in period t and µt
represents the expected return of the banks, usually defined as the average return of
the previous quarters. Furthermore, Σt represents the expected covariance matrix of
these returns and is often replaced by its sample equivalent. The average expected
return of the portfolio is given by rp,t, while the variance of this set of returns is given
by σ2p,t and represent the measure of portfolio (or in our case: systemic) risk at time t.
The supervisor is considered to be risk averse, and to prefer to hold the portfolio
with the least amount of risk according to the objective function in Equation 6.2. More-
over, the supervisor is able to influence systemic risk by changing the weights in the
portfolio, assuming that this does not impact the matrix Σt.1 Minimizing the objective
function allows us to compare the differences in portfolio design between the initially
realized and the hypothetical minimum variance portfolio.




s.t. wi,t ≥ 0
1′wt = 1
w′tµt ≥ 0
with the addition of several further constraints. First, the supervisor cannot go short
in a bank, i.e. no bank can have a negative weight. Second, the weights of banks
have to add up to 1 as the existing assets are merely reshuffled, without any being cre-
ated or destroyed. This is equivalent to assuming that the banks under consideration
constitute the entire investment universe of the supervisor. Finally, a supervisor is also
assumed to choose the weights such that the portfolio does not have negative returns.2
It follows from these non-linear constraints that no analytical solution is possible, and
we therefore rely on a numerical solution.
Using this approach, we investigate the following questions. First, we ask whether
systemic risk can be reduced and if so, by how much. To do this, we compare the
standard deviation of the initial portfolio with that of the MVP. Second, we investigate
1As the recent crisis has shown, it is not unusual for supervisors to intervene through liquidation, (hid-
den) bailouts or forcing banks to sell off assets to maintain a competitive environment.
2The inclusion of this constraint does impact our results as will be shown later.
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whether the supervisor would have to sacrifice returns in order to achieve a lower risk,
by comparing the average return of the initial portfolio with that of the MVP. Within
the framework described in the introduction, we therefore ask if, in order to reach the
MVP, the supervisor has to move along the efficient frontier or shift towards it. Third,
we compare the dispersion of weights within each of the two portfolios, by looking at
the share of the largest 5% of banks in the initial portfolio and in the MVP.3 Finally, we
ask whether the largest 5% of banks in the initial portfolio have retained their relative
importance in the MVP by comparing their initial share with the weight they receive
in the MVP.
6.2.2 Data
We perform our analysis on the U.S. banking system, which has several regulatory
bodies at different levels. Depending on location, membership status and type, a bank
can be regulated by the Federal Reserve System (FED), the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). While the
main supervisory task at district level is carried out by the 12 Federal Reserve Banks,
depicted in Figure 6.2, at the national level the main regulatory task is performed
by the Federal Reserve’s Board of Governors. As a consequence of this division, we
consider the regulatory portfolio both at national level and at district level.
3An alternative measure of concentration would be the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, although using the
portfolio weights of the largest banks is more intuitive in this setting. The 5% concentration measure
is preferred, since it allows for a better comparison in different-sized banking systems (see Alegria and
Schaeck, 2009).
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Bank data are obtained on a quarterly basis from the Call Reports for Income and
Condition provided by the Federal Reserve System. For the national (FED) portfo-
lio, we consider consolidated Bank Holding Companies (BHCs) as the assets in which
the regulator can invest. Data for the BHCs are obtained from the FR Y-9C Forms,
between 1986Q3 and 2012Q1. We select only Holding Companies and exclude In-
surance/Securities brokers, Utilities and other Non-Depository institutions. At the
Federal Reserve District (FRD) level, data on unconsolidated Commercial Banks are
retrieved from the FFIEC 031/041 Forms between 1984Q1 and 2010Q4, excluding Sav-
ings/Cooperative/Industrial banks as well as Non Deposit Trust companies.
We use balance sheet data instead of financial market data, allowing us to con-
sider all banks that are required to file reports and not only those that are listed on an
exchange. Moreover, lower frequency returns are preferred to daily or even weekly re-
turns, in order to comply with the assumption of normality of returns. We collect total
assets (bhck/rcfd2170) and net income (bhck/riad4340), deflate both to 2005Q1 dol-
lars using the Producer Price Index provided by the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank,
and filter out banks with return-on-assets exceeding +100% or -100%. This leaves us
with 4,694 BHCs across 154,577 bank-year observations and 19,225 commercial banks
over 1,132,425 bank-year observations.
Summary statistics for the BHCs and commercial banks are shown in Table 6.1. In
any quarter in our sample, there are between 964 and 2,333 holding companies active
in the United States. Due to inflation and a wave of consolidation, the total assets
reporting threshold for BHCs was raised from $150 million to $500 million in 2006,
causing a drop in the number of banks in the sample. Banks controlling less than $500
million in total assets prior to 2006 are kept in the dataset, since, as will be shown at a
later stage, their exit does not affect our results. Given that the distributions of assets
and returns are highly unequal, we report percentiles instead of means and standard
deviations. The median BHC controlled $500 million in total assets and reported a net
income of $1.3 million. The table shows the skewness in the distribution of total assets,
with the largest 5% of BHCs having total assets ranging between $14.5 billion and $2.1
trillion. While the net income of the median holding company is $1.3 million, again
there is a large disparity: the highest earning 5% of BHCs recorded profits ranging
from $44 million to $6.4 trillion. At the other end of the spectrum, losses are equally
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Table 6.1: Summary statistics
Panel A: Bank Holding Companies
Percentiles
Min. 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th Max.
Net Income (in $ million) -15132.20 -0.72 0.64 1.30 3.09 44.0 6414.61
Total Assets (in $ million ) 5.33 156.32 284.62 500.37 1184.04 14456.24 2115728.50
Return on Assets (in %) -39.29 -0.14 0.18 0.29 0.39 0.58 82.81
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of Banks 1502 387 964 2333
Panel B: Commercial Banks
Percentiles
Min. 5th 25th 50th 75th 95th Max.
Net Income (in million $) -11168.98 -0.20 0.08 0.24 0.58 2.94 4682.32
Total Assets (in million $) 0.14 15.91 39.48 79.39 171.95 896.35 1594746.30
Return on Assets (in %) -78.23 -0.34 0.19 0.33 0.46 0.72 90.85
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Number of Banks 10115 2655 6477 14474
The table presents summary statistics for Net Income (bhck/riad4340), Total Assets (bhck/rcfd2170)
and the Return-on-Assets of the banks in the analysis. Panel A displays these descriptives for Bank
Holding Companies between 1986Q3 and 2012Q1, while Panel B summarizes them for Commercial
Banks between 1984Q1 and 2010Q4. Due to the highly skewed distributions, we summarize the data
according to their percentiles as well as the minimum and maximum values.
large, partly due to the recent financial crisis, with one holding company reporting a
net loss of $15 trillion in the third quarter of 2008. Since the return-on-assets takes into
account the size of the BHC, its values are less extreme compared with those of returns
and assets separately, with the mean (0.257%), median (0.292%) and mode (0.325%)
lying in close proximity.
The number of reporting commercial banks lies between 6,477 and 14,474 over the
12 districts. Regarding net income and total assets, commercials banks follow a similar
pattern to that of Bank Holding Companies, although smaller on average. The total
assets disparity is even larger than at the national level, with some banks dwarfing
their competitors.
We proceed by placing every bank in its respective FRD portfolio, defining its
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weight as the total assets of the bank divided by the sum of total assets in the FRD. The
BHCs are analyzed at the national level in a similar manner: the weights are calculated
as the individual level of total assets divided by the sum of all total assets of the BHCs.
As we have quarterly data over a period of 25 years at our disposal, we perform the
analysis using a window of 8 consecutive quarters on which we calculate the expected
return and sample covariance matrix, thereby taking into account time-varying corre-
lation.4 As a consequence, assets need to have posted data in each consecutive quarter
of the window to be included in the analysis.
6.3 Results
In this section we present the results of our analysis. We first examine the risk-
return trade-off between the FED portfolio and the MVP. In a second step, we look at
the differences in portfolio allocation between the two systems before comparing their
other features. We present the results of the analysis at BHC level graphically, referring
the reader to the Appendix for the results on FRD level as they are quantitatively
similar, and conclude this section with several robustness tests.
6.3.1 Are large banks more risky?
However, before reporting the results we first need to establish the similarities in
the return structure between large and small banks. Should large banks have (co)variances
different from those of small banks, the assumption that the covariance matrix is in-
dependent of size means we would impose an unrealistic structure when large banks
are reduced in size, or small banks are made larger.5 In Figure 6.3, we show the two
dimensions of the covariance matrix by plotting the densities of the average 8 quarter
variance and average 8 quarter pairwise covariance for the largest 5% and the small-
est 95% of BHCs. From the Figure, it becomes clear that despite the differences in size,
there is ample common support in the individual and common riskiness of bank re-
turns as the distributions overlap almost entirely. These results hold for different time
4In Section 6.3.5 we show that our results are robust to a different window size.
5In this respect, our approach is similar to verifying whether the assumption of a ‘common support’
holds in propensity score matching (Heckman et al., 1998). If there is enough ‘common support’ be-
tween small and large banks, the assumption that the supervisor could change assets without having
these actions leading to a different return structure is more realistic.
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The figure shows density plots of the average 8 quarter variance of the return-on-assets and
average pairwise covariances of the smallest 95% and the largest 5% of Bank Holding Companies
between 1988Q2 and 2012Q1. Due to long tails for both large and small banks, the variance is
truncated at its 90th percentile as it is strictly positive, while the covariance is truncated at its 5st
and 95th percentile for graphical purposes.
samples, and for both BHCs and Commercial Banks.6
Of course, even if large and small banks share a common support in the covari-
ance matrix, it does not mean that a bank that changes size will maintain its return
structure. At a later stage, we therefore look at banks that have seen large increases or
decreases in size, and analyze how this changed the elements of the covariance matrix.
Using these average changes in turn allows us to alter the covariance matrix during
the numerical optimization, leading to a more realistic portfolio allocation. However,
since there are only a limited number of cases on which we can base this analysis, we
first proceed by assuming that changing a bank’s size does not influence the structure
or level of its returns, and later revisit this assumption.
6.3.2 What role does inequality play in the risk/return trade-off?
It is quite straightforward to obtain the risk, return and weight distributions for
the initial portfolios. By contrast, obtaining the respective MVPs is more cumbersome,
as a minimum of 964 and a maximum of 2,333 BHCs are present during the sample
period. The Chicago, Kansas City and Dallas portfolios typically contain well over
6Full results available upon request.
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1,800 banks. The solution is computationally intensive, but is nonetheless obtained
after a lengthy optimization process.
Figure 6.4 shows the results of the portfolio optimization based on BHC data: pan-
els 6.4a and 6.4b display the risk-return trade-off for the FED portfolio and the MVP.
They show that with different weights, portfolio risk is effectively eliminated in the
MVP. Whereas the standard deviation of the FED portfolio spikes during the Savings-
and-Loans and subprime mortgage crises, that of the MVP remains stable at around
zero. One would expect a portfolio with lower (minimized) risk to have a lower return
as well. However, this less risky system has positive returns throughout the sample
period with values that closely track the actual returns. Therefore, we conclude that
the initial portfolio does not lie on the efficient frontier, as risk is reduced while the
level of returns has been maintained. Panel 6.4c shows that the lower risk is achieved
in the MVP through a markedly lower concentration than in the FED portfolio. While
in reality the weight of the largest banks lies between 65% and 90%, the concentration
in the MVP is on average 13% and at most 52%. More interestingly, the largest banks
in the FED portfolio see their cumulative weight reduced to at most 15% of total assets
in the MVP.7
The same picture as for the BHC data emerges if we look at the separate FRD port-
folios, reported in the Appendix. Table 6.A.1 summarizes the differences in risk and
return between the FRD portfolios and their MVPs. Evidence of returns over the whole
period is mixed: some FRDs outperform their MVPs, whereas others exhibit lower re-
turns. One interesting fact is that in the boom period of 1994Q1 - 2006Q4, we find
that all FRDs outperform their MVP counterparts in terms of returns. Regarding size
disparity, Table 6.A.2 shows that the MVPs consistently have a much lower level of
concentration compared to their FRD portfolios, the difference ranging on average be-
tween 44% and 78% throughout the sample period.
Two further remarks are in order. First, the portfolio standard deviation in Fig-
ure 6.4 seems to be higher during the S&L crisis than in the subprime crisis. This result
can be explained by the fact that a standard deviation, unlike a correlation coefficient,
is not a dimensionless number and can only be interpreted as a function of its mean.
7Although not reported in the Figure, the Gini coefficient exhibits the same pattern, as the average coef-
ficient of the FED portfolio is 0.9 compared to 0.2 for the MVP.
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Figure 6.4: What role does inequality play in the risk/return trade-off?
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The figure shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP: panel 6.4a
and 6.4b display the difference in the risk and return of each portfolio. Panel 6.4c shows how
the weights are distributed in each portfolio by plotting their concentration ratios, as well as the
weights that the current largest banks have in the MVP. Panel 6.4d shows the demeaned risk mea-
sure from Panel 6.4a to allow for a comparison over time. Instead of using the standard deviation,
which is a reflection of the mean, we show the normalized range defined as (max-min)/median
and is independent of the mean return.
142
6.3. Results
Given that the returns of the FED portfolio and the MVP are of similar size throughout
the sample, we can compare their standard deviation in each quarter, but not between
quarters. To allow for comparison over time, we de-mean the risk measure, although
this leads to a loss in direct interpretation.8 Figure 6.4d displays the de-meaned risk
measure, and portfolio risk now shows a higher peak in the subprime crisis than in
the S&L crisis.
The second issue we want to address is the MVP’s high concentration during 2008
and 2009. This spike can be explained by the fact that up to 87% of BHCs reported
lower average returns than in the previous quarter and 40% of all BHCs recorded
losses. Given the number of banks involved, it is possible that concentration rose
because of this increase in correlation between average returns. However, it is also
possible that the MVP weights are chosen to avoid violating the no-loss constraint.
To test the latter possibility, we ran the analysis excluding the no-loss constraint but
still find the same spike, indicating that, indeed, higher weights are given to banks
that share a lower correlation. Since these are few in number, they therefore have to
receive a higher weight in order to minimize portfolio risk.
The results here suggest that inequality and concentration play an important role
in the risk-return trade-off with which a regulator is faced. In this simple exercise, re-
ducing inequality drives down risk without significantly affecting returns at both FED
and FRD level. These findings indicate that regardless of the regulatory level, super-
visors need to be concerned when looking at the optimal design of their portfolio not
only with a bank’s individual size but also its size relative to the system. Moreover,
the rebalancing of weights does not appear to be random. We find that in order to ob-
tain a less risky portfolio, a supervisor has to reduce holdings of the currently largest
banks and create a more equal system. In reality, the largest banks have had a much
higher share in the portfolio compared with that in the MVP, and even increased their
weight from 65% to 90% during the sample period. Moreover, the financial industry
as a whole has also grown in relation to GDP, to the extent that Carvalho and Gabaix
(2013) attribute the recent rise in macroeconomic volatility mainly to this growth in
combination with idiosyncratic shocks to the largest banks. Indeed, the share of the
8We do so by calculating the normalized range of returns. Since the portfolio standard deviation is the
standard deviation of the weighted average returns during the last 8 quarters, we define the normalized
range as the (maximum-minimum)/median of this set.
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largest banks in the current portfolio relative to GDP has increased from 35% at the
beginning to 75% at the end of the sample. Given the evidence presented here, com-
bined with the finding of Carvalho and Gabaix (2013), large banks do seem to play
an increasingly important role not only in the banking system, but also in the broader
economy and its volatility.
However, one important caveat needs to be acknowledged. In the methodology
section, we assumed that the banks under consideration represent the entire invest-
ment universe for the supervisor, mimicking the current regulatory set-up. Therefore,
we exclude financial institutions that fall outside of the regulator’s jurisdiction, such
as for instance investment banks and money market funds that played a big role in
the propagation of risk during the 2008 crisis. Similarly, while U.S. subsidiaries of
international banks have to file financial statements and are therefore included, their
international parents are not considered. While on a global scale their activities can
impact the profitability and risk of the banks under consideration, we are only able to
observe their indirect effect on the U.S. system. As a consequence, if the supervisor
would set his weights according to the minimum variance portfolio, he might force
banks to move their activities abroad or into the shadow banking realm where they
are unsupervised. Given the data at hand and our assumption that assets are redis-
tributed and not moved outside of the portfolio, we can not consider this outcome.
The results presented here and in the following sections therefore correspond only to
a partial equilibrium.
6.3.3 What are the other features of the Minimum Variance Portfo-
lio?
Given that we have seen that lower portfolio risk is achievable in a less concen-
trated banking system, this raises the question of what causes the largest banks in the
FED portfolio to have such consistently low weights in the MVP, and how they differ
from the largest banks in the MVP. The two components that determine the weighting
decision are on the one hand individual bank risk, as measured by the standard devi-
ation of the returns, and on the other hand the correlation between these returns.9 Fig-
ure 6.5a shows the average standard deviation of return-on-assets for the largest 5% of
9In this section, we show the correlation of returns instead of the covariance as it is easier to interpret.
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Figure 6.5: What are the other features of the Minimum Variance Portfolio?
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The figure shows the average bank level standard deviation of the return-on-assets, as well as the
average pairwise correlation between these returns for the largest 5% of banks in both MVP and
FED portfolio.
banks in the FED portfolio and MVP, while Figure 6.5b displays the average pairwise
correlation among the largest 5% of banks in their respective portfolios. We see that
the standard deviations of the returns of these largest banks are on average twice as
high in the MVP, yet the average correlation coefficient is much more stable compared
to the FED portfolio. In the two crisis periods, the FED portfolio pairwise correlation
spikes to average values of 0.6, almost three times larger than the MVP. Nonetheless,
even when the individual risk and correlation are lowest in the FED portfolio, its risk
is still higher than that of the MVP.
These observations add to the evidence that in this context, weight plays a signif-
icant role in determining the level of risk, as it magnifies the effect of increased cor-
relation and individual riskiness. When both components have low values, systemic
risk is low, even in a highly concentrated market. However, when they increase in cri-
sis periods, systemic risk increases dramatically if size inequality is high. As already
shown in Gabaix (2011), individual shocks to firms have the potential to lead to ag-
gregate volatility when the size distribution of an economy is heavy tailed, something
that also holds for the banking system (see e.g. Janicki and Prescott, 2006; Blank et al.,
2009). In terms of portfolio theory, the variances will dominate the covariances in crisis
periods due to the large disparity in weight. Since the movements in correlation can
be extremely volatile and difficult to control or even predict, the best tool for keeping
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systemic risk low in this context is to limit concentration.
We note, however, that these results do not necessarily imply a cap on the size of
banks. On the one hand, a system with only small banks is subject to the Too-Many-
To-Fail problem since they could herd, thereby acting as one large entity (Acharya and
Yorulmazer, 2007; Claeys and Schoors, 2007; Brown and Dinç, 2011). In this setting,
herding would be picked up via an increase in correlation of returns, posing a sys-
temic threat despite a lack in concentration. Our results, however, indicate that the
correlations of small banks are relatively stable over the sample period, and would
therefore not pose a systemic threat. On the other hand, the system can also be di-
versified by limiting activities that banks can undertake and/or markets it can serve,
provided they operate in their own (uncorrelated) niche. This point was also touched
on by Loutskina and Strahan (2011), who found that increased geographic diversifi-
cation went hand-in-hand with a decline in loan monitoring by lenders prior to the
financial crisis.
To determine the characteristics of banks which have been heavily reweighted, we
construct a crude industry level balance sheet for both the FED portfolio and the MVP.
We use the weights allocated to each bank to construct this weighted average balance
sheet, which is shown in Figure 6.6. The allocation of assets in the FED portfolio shows
the increasing importance of trading assets at the expense of loans, whereas this trend
is less evident in banks favored in the MVP. While the FED balance sheet has less than
40% of assets invested in loans at the end of the sample, that of the MVP remains
close to 50%. On the liabilities side, the FED portfolio is more reliant on non-deposit
funding than the MVP balance sheet. We observe that at the end of the sample, the FED
portfolio uses about 10% more of these non-deposit liabilities than the MVP, although
this difference was much more apparent before the recent crisis.
As a reflection of the industry asset composition, the non-interest income/total in-
come ratio for each portfolio is shown in Figure 6.6e. We observe that with exception
of the crisis years, there has been a significant increase in reliance on non-interest in-
come in the FED portfolio. On the other hand, banks favored in the MVP have a more
constant share of non-interest income throughout the sample period. Notwithstand-




Figure 6.6: What happens to the intermediary role of banks in a safer banking system?
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The figure compares the intermediary role of the FED portfolio and MVP, by showing weighted average industry level balance
sheets in panels 6.6a-6.6d and the different weighted non-interest income/total income ratios in panel 6.6e. To construct the
balance sheet we use the following data series: Loans (BHCK2122); Trading Assets up to 1994 (BHCK2146); Trading Assets after
1994 (BHCK3545); Liquid Assets up to 1994 (BHCK0081 + BHCK0395 + BHCK0397 + BHCK3365 + BHCK0390); Liquid Assets
after 1994 (BHCK0081 + BHCK0395 + BHCK0397 + BHCK3365 + BHCK1754 + BHCK1773); Fixed & Other Assets (BHCK2145
+ BHCK3163 + BHCK2160); Core Deposits (BHCB3187 + BHCB2389 + BHCB6648 + BHCB2210 + BHOD3187 + BHOD2389 +
BHOD6648); Large Time Deposits (BHCB2604 + BHOD2604); Non-Deposit Liabilities (BHCK2948 - Core Deposits - Large Time
Deposits); Equity (BHCK2948 + BHCK3210). Non-interest income (BHCK4079); Total income (BHCK4107).
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Given these results, we conclude that the fictitious banking industry in the MVP is
characterized by retail banking, as higher weights are given to banks that are mainly
funded by deposits, make loans, and therefore rely less on non-interest income. Since
banking activities are not a direct input in the minimization of the portfolio risk, it
is their influence on the behavior of the returns which drives these findings. Indeed,
this is in agreement with a growing literature emphasizing the role of income diver-
sification in financial instability. For instance, Stiroh (2004) and Stiroh and Rumble
(2006) find that non-interest income reduces aggregate profits while increasing risk.
More recent evidence by De Jonghe (2010) shows that systemic risk is exacerbated by
banks diversifying into activities other than lending, due to increasing correlations
between income streams. This finding was also corroborated by Adrian and Brunner-
meier (2011), Brunnermeier et al. (2012), DeYoung and Roland (2001) and DeYoung
and Torna (2013). Huang and Ratnovski (2011), meanwhile, argue that wholesale
lenders have lower incentives for costly monitoring, leading to large (and inefficient)
fluctuations of loans on negative public signals, a problem not encountered in rela-
tionship banks. Finally, Boot and Ratnovski (2012) find that although there are initial
benefits for banks from starting trading activities, beyond a critical point inefficiencies
dominate and trading becomes increasingly risky. On the funding side, Fahlenbrach
et al. (2012) emphasize that banks with increasing balance sheets through the use of
short term non-deposit liabilities performed poorly during the last crises.
6.3.4 How easily is the Minimum Variance Portfolio obtained?
In our baseline scenario, the supervisor is able to switch assets rapidly from one
bank to another on a quarterly basis to obtain the MVP. Although reweighting also
occurs naturally in the FED portfolio via mergers and acquisitions, bank entry and exit
or bailouts, the MVP would not be a realistic approximation if reweighting was much
higher than in reality. In order to assess how stable the MVP is over time compared
with the FED portfolio, we therefore calculate both of their turnovers. Turnover is
defined as the sum of absolute weight changes in the portfolio between period t− 1
and t, taking values ranging from zero (no change) to two (where all assets that were
held are sold, and all assets that were not held bought). Figure 6.7 plots the turnover
for both portfolios. We observe that the MVP turnover is on average 3 times as high
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The figure shows the difference in reweighting between the FED and the MVP by plotting the
turnover of each portfolio.
as that of the FED portfolio. The spike in turnover in 2006Q1 is due to changes in
the reporting threshold, as the banks that reported in 2005Q4 were considered to be
sold in 2006Q1 and proceeds reinvested in the other banks. The MVP can only achieve
low risk through a higher level of reweighting, especially in the crisis period. For
the district portfolios, the average MVP turnover is around 3 times higher than the
actual portfolio, ranging from 2 times for the least concentrated to 6 times for the most
concentrated districts. In Section 6.4, we therefore explore alternative MVPs where the
reweighting is restricted, in order to achieve a more realistic turnover.
6.3.5 Robustness
To find out how robust our results are, we test several of our assumptions. The
results of these tests are summarized in Table 6.3, where we evaluate how well risk
was reduced while limiting concentration. To this end, we define the ratio (σFED −
σMVP)/σFED, which measures the relative difference in portfolio risk between the ac-
tual and minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been
effectively eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements were possi-
ble. A test is regarded as successful when this ratio averages 0.9 or higher throughout
the sample period, and when the level of concentration of the largest 5% of banks in
the MVP is on average below 50%.
Covariance matrix – 1 We begin with the assumption that the covariance matrix is in-
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Table 6.2: Changes in the return and its covariance matrix
ROA Variance ROA Covariance ROA
Pre-Jump Post-Jump Pre-Jump Post-Jump Pre-Jump Post-Jump
Positive Jump Value 0.341 0.259 0.023 0.111 0.002 0.005
Average Difference -0.082 0.088 0.004
Percentage Difference -23.97% 379.70% 233.70%
P-value T-test 0.000 0.007 0.010
Negative Jump Value -0.142 0.213 0.281 3.249 0.007 -0.015
Average Difference 0.355 2.967 -0.022
Percentage Difference 249.52% 1054.64% -324.52%
P-value T-test 0.110 0.359 0.293
The table shows the average differences in ROA, its variance and its average pairwise covariance pre-
and post-jump for both negative jumps and positive jumps using the procedure described in the text
and the Appendix.
dependent of the size of banks. In Section 6.3.1 we showed that large and small banks
share a common support in the variance and average pairwise covariance. This how-
ever, does not imply that a bank which changes in size will maintain the same level of
returns or the same structure with regard to other banks. If we knew how the return
structure changes due to a change in size, we would be able to adjust the covariance
matrix in each iteration of the optimization. To this end, we have identified 15 cases in
which BHCs experience a negative jump in bank size, and 287 where they experience
a positive jump in bank size.10 A jump is defined as an increase/decrease of bank as-
sets of 25% or greater from one quarter to the next, provided that the preceding and
following 8 quarters did not show jumps larger than 10% in each of the quarters, nor
a cumulative change in the preceding and following 8 quarters of 25%. These last two
conditions are imposed to make sure that bank size before and after the jump was
relatively stable and that the change in the elements of the covariance matrix can be
chiefly attributed to the one-time jump. The banks receiving a negative shock lost 40%
of their total assets on average, while banks receiving a positive shock gained 60%.
The average changes in the return and covariance matrices are displayed in Table 6.2.
T-tests show that banks experiencing a positive jump in assets have a statistically sig-
nificant lower return-on-assets, which is likely due to the construction of the variable,
and a higher average variance and covariance of these returns. On the other hand,
banks experiencing a negative jump do not see changes in their average variance and
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covariance, and only see a marginally significant higher return-on-assets.
Using the statistically significant changes for positive and negative jumps, we incorpo-
rate the effect in the sample covariance matrix and the return matrix, such that these
matrices change dynamically with the weights of the banks.11 We perform two ad-
ditional robustness tests. In the first test, the vector of expected returns is adjusted
according to the changes in weight, and a new sample covariance matrix is estimated
with which portfolio risk will be minimized. In the second test, we adjust both the
return and covariance matrix based on the changes in weight. Changes in the return
and covariance matrices are interpolated if the proposed change in portfolio weight
lies between -40% and +60%. As there was no data on changes in assets larger than
these bounds, we use any proposed changes beyond them as if they were -40% or
+60%, i.e. while a bank can receive an increase in weight higher than +60%, its vari-
ance and covariance terms are adjusted as if the weight has only been increased by
+60%.12 In both cases, however, this adds more complexity to the optimization and
indeed we find that there are cases in which no improvement in portfolio risk is found.
Fortunately an improved solution is still possible in most of the sample period, as can
be seen in Figure 6.8. Interestingly, the findings in the baseline specification seem to
be robust and are not influenced by our original assumption. The concentration in
the MVP remains much lower than that of the FED portfolio, while simultaneously
maintaining a smaller portfolio risk and returns of a similar level.
Covariance matrix – 2 Another issue in our baseline setup is that optimization can be
quite unstable when using the sample covariance matrix: small changes in the return
structure can lead to large differences in the outcome of the portfolio choice. To counter
these unstable solutions, Brodie et al. (2009) use regularization of the optimal mean-
variance portfolio by including a penalty in the objective function. They show that
while introducing this penalty can lead to a sparse choice of weights, opting for a high
penalty is equivalent to a constraint that does not allow shorting. Since our supervisor
is already assumed not to be able to go short in any banks, we therefore consider the
10Full details on this identification can be found in the Appendix.
11As the change in return-on-assets for the banks experiencing a negative jump is marginally significant
at 11%, we also regard this change as significant.
12A scenario under which reweighting of each bank was limited to -40% and +60% yielded no improve-
ments over the actual portfolio. Results are available upon request.
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Figure 6.8: Can portfolio risk be minimized when taking into account a changing covari-
ance matrix due to weight changes?
How much is systemic risk reduced in the MVP?
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Do returns have to be sacrificed to achieve this lower risk?
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How unequal is the MVP compared to the FED portfolio?
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The figure presents two robustness tests, in which the return and/or covariance matrices are dy-
namically updated. In the first robustness test (Dynamic Return Matrix), we adjust only the return
matrix and then estimate a new sample covariance matrix. In the second test (Dynamic Covariance
Matrix), we adjust both the return matrix and the covariance matrix with which the portfolio risk
will be minimized. More information on how we perform these tests can be found in the Appendix.
Panel 6.8a and 6.8b display the difference in the risk of each portfolio, while panel 6.8c and 6.8d display
the difference in return. Panel 6.8e and 6.8f show how the weights are distributed in each portfolio by
plotting their concentration ratios, as well as the weights that the current largest banks have in the MVP.
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optimization problem stabilized. However, as Jobson and Korkie (1980) have pointed
out, a considerable amount of noise is introduced in a sample covariance matrix in a
small T and large N setting like ours. In response, Ledoit and Wolf (2003, 2004) pro-
posed a shrinkage based estimator of the covariance matrix to reduce this noise. We
use their proposed estimator of the covariance matrix instead of its sample equivalent
and re-run the analysis.13 The full results are reported in the Appendix and are similar
to the baseline specification. We find that the standard deviation of the MVP is now
higher compared with the baseline specification, although still lower than that of the
FED portfolio, while returns are at a similar level. The levels of concentration in the
MVP are basically unchanged, as the largest banks on average still have a weight of
10%, while the largest banks in the FED portfolio have a weight in the MVP of 5%.14
Starting values Third, we explore the optimization starting values and choice of the
length of the moving window. Given the fact that we are dealing with many banks, the
minimization of the portfolio risk is likely to be a complex, highly nonlinear problem
comprising multiple minima/solutions. The starting values, which are selected as the
weights in the original portfolio, can have a substantial impact on whether a global or
local minimum is found and in what direction the distribution of weights will move.
To account for this possible bias, we run two robustness tests. In the first, we choose
starting values based on an equally weighted portfolio. In the second, we run, for the
BHC data only, 100 repetitions per quarter using randomized starting values.15 Both
tests show that the results are almost identical to the baseline specification, and we
therefore refer the reader to the Appendix for the full results.
Length of rolling window Finally, we explore alternative lengths of the rolling win-
dow. So far we have taken an 8 quarter time frame to estimate the sample covariance
matrix. However, it could be argued that using more data to estimate it would be
less noisy and less prone to outliers. Taking this into account, we rerun the analyses
13The code for estimating the covariance matrix is obtained from:
http://www.ledoit.net/honey_abstract.htm
14As portfolio risk is not minimized by at least 90%, however, we do not consider this test to be successful
in Table 6.3.
15The random starting values are drawn from a half-normal distribution and then divided by its sum,
such that they add up to 1.
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Table 6.3: Robustness tests
Risk minimized without large banks?
Issue Robustness test BHC COMM
(1) Independence of covariance matrix Dynamic return matrix 3 n.a.
(2) Independence of covariance matrix Dynamic covariance matrix 3 n.a.
(3) Noise in sample covariance matrix Shrinkage estimator 7 0/12
(4) Multiple minima Equal starting weights 3 12/12
(5) Multiple minima Randomized starting weights 3 n.a.
(6) Length of rolling window Analysis on 16 quarters 3 12/12
The table presents a summary of the three robustness tests that were performed, indicating whether
portfolio risk was successfully minimized while keeping the levels of concentration of the largest 5%
of banks low. To see if a test is successful we define the ratio (σFED − σMVP)/σFED, which measures the
relative difference in portfolio risk between the actual and minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1
indicates that the risk has been effectively eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements
were possible. A test is regarded as successful when this ratio averages 0.9 or higher throughout the
sample period, and when the level of concentration of the largest 5% of banks in the MVP is below
50%. The second, fifth and sixth tests are only performed on BHC data due to their computationally
intensive nature.
using a 16 quarter window and report the full results in the Appendix. For both the
BHCs and commercial banks, results follow similar patterns to those using 8 quarter
windows: the largest banks are still shown to be consistently overweighted compared
with their MVP counterparts, where lower risk is achieved while keeping returns at
a comparable level. Table 6.3 summarizes the results of the robustness tests in this
section.
6.4 Extensions and Policy implications
As we have seen in Section 6.3.4, the amount of turnover needed to lower systemic
risk is three times higher in the MVP. In this section, we therefore explore some more
realistic scenarios, and discuss implications for policy resulting from the analysis. We
first look into several weighting alternatives. Besides analyzing these other weight-
ing methods, we repeat our analysis on a smaller and more realistic sample of banks.
Finally, we discuss whether optimization at district level also results in a lower coun-
trywide systemic risk. Similar to Section 6.3.5, we summarize all results in Table 6.4,
where we again define a test successful if the ratio (σFED − σMVP)/σFED averages 0.9
or higher throughout the sample period.
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Figure 6.9: What is the risk/return profile of an equally weighted portfolio?
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The figure presents results of the risk and return in an equally weighted portfolio, compared to
the MVP and FED portfolio.
6.4.1 Can portfolio risk be minimized while limiting portfolio turnover?
Equally weighted portfolio Given that the MVP seems to favor a more equal distri-
bution of assets, a natural course of action would be to analyze an equally weighted
portfolio. As noted by DeMiguel et al. (2009), equally weighted portfolios still out-
perform many optimizing portfolio choice models and have a very low turnover. The
turnover in our setup would indeed be lower than that of the FED portfolio, albeit not
zero as bank entry and exit would still take place. Figure 6.9 shows the risk-return
trade-off that the equally weighted portfolio (EWP) would have in comparison with
the other two. In terms of returns, the EWP performs similarly to the MVP and FED
portfolio, except for the last crisis period in which it records losses. Regarding risk, the
EWP has levels similar to that of the FED portfolio, albeit marginally lower. All in all,
this suggests that there is an optimal level of concentration, as neither a highly con-
centrated nor an equally weighted portfolio are able to significantly reduce systemic
risk in the same way as the MVP.
Limited reweighting – 1 Since a high turnover is costly for the supervisor and there-
fore not very desirable, we consider several alternatives involving limited reweighting
that could reduce turnover. We do this by setting lower and upper boundaries to the
weights banks can take, conditional on their true weights. First, we allow banks to
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grow/shrink by 10% and 20% of their initial weight. Second, we construct a measure
of asset growth in the previous quarter and allow changes equal to either the mean
or standard deviation of this growth measure. Whereas the first constraint is static in
nature, the second allows for business cycle effects to determine how much reweight-
ing can take place. To ensure the no-loss constraint does not influence the results, we
run the limited reweighting scenarios with and without this requirement. However,
regardless of the specification, the risk in the MVP is practically unchanged compared
with the FED portfolio in all time periods.16
Limited reweighting – 2 Another way of reducing turnover would be to keep the
largest 5% of banks at their current cumulative size, allowing unlimited reweighting
of the remaining banks while still adhering to the no-shorting and no-loss constraint.
The results of this exercise are shown in Figure 6.10, where we see that for most of
the sample period it was possible to decrease systemic risk significantly while main-
taining large banks. However, during the S&L and subprime crises periods, this MVP
variant has a risk which is barely below that of the initial portfolio. This finding can
be explained by the high correlation of returns for the largest banks, as seen in Fig-
ure 6.5b. During sudden increases in correlation between these largest banks, the high
concentration of assets in a few banks will inevitably affect risk. In terms of optimal
portfolio design, it seems to point to a trade-off between concentration and correla-
tion: if the supervisor wants to keep the large banks at their current size, it would
be necessary to ensure that correlation between them remains relatively low to avoid
the Too-Many-To-Fail problem. This could, for instance, be achieved by limiting the
geographical markets in which a bank can be active or the activities it can engage in,
as used to be the case prior to e.g. the Riegle-Neal and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley acts.
Repeating this analysis on the FRD portfolios shows that there are 3 districts which are
able to reduce systemic risk to a minimum in each of the three sub-samples.17 Interest-
16Since the standard deviation of asset growth was extraordinarily large in 1997Q4, this allowed the
optimization to apply larger changes to the banks and therefore managed to reduce risk. A dynamic
approach was also considered for the scenarios where banks are allowed to grow/shrink by 10% and
20% of their weights in the MVP in time t − 1; however, portfolio risk was not significantly reduced.
Full results can be found in the Appendix.
17Full results are shown in the Appendix.
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The figure displays how well the portfolio risk can be minimized while keeping the largest 5% of
banks at their actual size and reweighting the remaining 95%.
ingly, a common feature is that they have the lowest levels of concentration among all
districts. This relationship is shown in Figure 6.11, where we plot the average concen-
tration ratios against the extent to which they are able to reduce systemic risk in three
time periods. The horizontal axis represents the amount by which they reduce risk
and is again constructed such that 1 stands for a reduction of risk effectively to zero,
and 0 indicates that no improvements in risk are possible. The Figure clearly shows
the trend in consolidation, with most districts becoming more concentrated over time.
As they become more concentrated, they find themselves less able to achieve low risk
while maintaining their largest banks.
Limited reweighting – 3 Since the weight of the 5% largest banks in the three suc-
cessful districts never exceeds 60%, this leads us to a final test using limited reweight-
ing. Is it possible to reduce portfolio risk while maintaining the cumulative weight
of the largest 5% of banks between 50% and 60%? The results for the FED portfolio
are plotted in Figure 6.12. We observe that under this limited reweighting scheme, it
is possible to effectively eliminate risk while maintaining similar returns. Concerning
the concentration in the portfolio, the share of the largest banks always hits the lower
bound of 50%. Consequently, the level of concentration in the MVP also lies close to
50% except for 2008 and 2009, with similar results for the analysis at commercial bank
level as shown in the Appendix. As in the previous scenarios, the high concentration
in the MVP in 2008 and 2009 is likely due to increasing correlation of returns. To mini-
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Figure 6.11: Can inequality explain why some FRDs can reduce systemic risk while keep-
ing the largest banks at their actual size?
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The figure shows the relationship over time between the average weight of the largest 5% of
banks and the ability of the FRDs to reduce portfolio risk when the largest banks are allowed
to keep their initial weight. (σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD measures the relative difference in portfolio
risk between the actual and minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1 indicates that the risk has
been effectively eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements were possible. The
threshold for successfully minimizing portfolio risk is set at 0.9. The weights of the largest 5% of
banks are averaged over each time period.
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Figure 6.12: By how much is the risk minimized when the largest banks hold between 50%
and 60% of assets?
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The figure shows the risk and return characteristics of an MVP where the largest 5% of banks in
the FED portfolio are kept between 50% and 60% of assets, and how the weights in this MVP are
distributed.
mize portfolio risk, a small number of banks need to receive a higher weight, such that
their concentration approaches that of the FED portfolio.
We have shown in Section 6.3 that minimizing systemic risk requires an extremely
powerful and active regulator, who would have to intervene three times more than
is currently the case. In practice, this could only be achieved by increasing the regu-
lator’s discretionary power. Such a proactive position was also included in the pro-
posed SAFE Banking Act of 2012, under which a maximum bank size relative to the
system would be imposed. Notwithstanding a range of limited reweighting schemes,
our results indicate that in our setup, systemic risk could not be reduced while main-
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taining the current size of the largest banks. However, in terms of optimal portfolio
design, bringing their cumulative weight down from 90% to 50% yielded a significant
improvement in systemic risk.
6.4.2 Does the result hold for a system where only listed banks are
considered?
One assumption we have consistently made is that the regulator is able to move
substantial amounts of assets from large banks to very small ones. However, small
banks might not be able to sustain such an increase in assets in the first place. More-
over, previous research has shown that start-up banks only behave as mature banks
after their first nine years of existence (see e.g. DeYoung and Hasan, 1998). Because
these small banks might not be realistic investments for the supervisor, we select only
those BHCs which have publicly traded equity, using the CRSP-FRB link provided by
the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2013). We thereby also remove those banks
that do not file reports after 2006 due to the increase in the reporting threshold. The
selected banks are considered to be the entire portfolio in which the supervisor can
invest. The results in the Appendix show that removing these banks does not quanti-
tatively or qualitatively change our results: It is possible to minimize portfolio risk by
relocating assets from the largest listed banks to smaller listed ones. Moreover, in this
new MVP, the actual largest 5% of banks would still receive a very low weight.18
Next, we use the CRSP-FRB link to obtain the market valuation of assets for listed
BHCs by downloading equity prices as well as the number of outstanding shares from
CRSP, and match them to the Call Reports. The quarterly market valuation of assets is
obtained by adding the book value of the liabilities to the average market capitaliza-
tion during that quarter. Compared with book value, which gives information on the
past performance of a bank, the market valuation should indicate what market par-
ticipants believe to be the value of the bank going forward, notwithstanding liquidity
considerations during crises (Allen and Carletti, 2008). To perform our analysis on this
subsample, we define returns as the quarter-to-quarter percentage changes in the mar-
ket valuation of assets, and a banks’ weight as the relative share in the portfolio. As in
the baseline scenario, we obtain the MVP using an eight quarter moving window. If a
18A scenario in which the smallest 60% of banks were removed yielded similar results.
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Figure 6.13: What role does inequality play in the risk/return trade-off when taking into
account the market valuation of assets?




















1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1
MVP FED














1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1
MVP FED














1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1
MVP 5% FED 5% FED 5% in MVP
The figure shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP:
panel 6.13a and 6.13b display the difference in the risk and return of each portfolio. Panel 6.13c
shows how the weights are distributed in each portfolio by plotting their concentration ratios, as
well as the weights that the current largest banks have in the MVP.
merger takes place during this time, the assets of the acquired bank are added to the
acquiring bank before the merger takes place for the appropriate quarters, while the
acquired bank is removed from the investment universe.19 The results are reported in
Figure 6.13.
Figure 6.13 shows spikes in the portfolio risk of the FED portfolio at the beginning
of the 2000s and during the subprime crisis, whereas that of the MVP is essentially
zero. While the returns of the MVP are slightly higher prior to 2005, they are similar
19Similar to the analyses on book data, banks that report a return below -100% or above +100% are not
considered.
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Table 6.4: Extensions and policy implications tests
Risk minimized?
Issue Policy test BHC COMM
(1) High turnover Equally Weighted Portfolio 7 0/12
(2) High turnover Reweighting limited to 10% or 20% of assetsa 7 0/12
(3) High turnover Reweighting limited to mean/std. dev. of growtha 7 0/12
(4) High turnover Largest 5% keep their weighta 7 5/12
(5) High turnover Largest 5% are weighted between 50% and 60% 3 12/12
(6) Small/DeNovo banks Only BHCs with publicly traded equity – book value 3 n.a.
(7) Small/DeNovo banks Only BHCs with publicly traded equity – market value 3 n.a.
The table presents a summary of the seven policy tests that were performed and how well they worked
in reducing systemic risk on FED and FRD level. To see if a test is successful we define the ratio
(σFED − σMVP)/σFED, which measures the relative difference in portfolio risk between the actual and
minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been effectively eliminated, while
a score of 0 indicates that no improvements were possible. A test is regarded as successful when this
ratio averages 0.9 or higher throughout the sample period.
a To avoid the no portfolio loss constraint driving these results, we also performed the tests without
the no-loss constraint. The results however do not change.
to the FED portfolio thereafter. Regarding the weight distribution of both portfolios,
we again see a steady increase in the weights of the largest banks in the FED portfolio.
The MVP based on market valuation shows a higher concentration than before, as the
largest banks on average are assigned 33% of the assets compared with 13% in the
baseline scenario. Similar to the baseline scenario, concentration in the MVP peaks in
the subprime crisis when the largest banks have a weight of 69%. However, it appears
that the largest banks in the actual portfolio are still overweighted, as they see their
weight reduced to an average of 4.4% in the MVP. Table 6.4 summarizes the results of
all scenarios in this section.
6.5 Conclusion
The last two decades have seen a major wave of consolidation and concentration
of assets in the banking industry. In the same period, the sector has experienced two
major crises with a significant impact on the real economy, of which the subprime
crisis had global repercussions. As a consequence of recent bailouts and government-
forced sales, the sector is now even more concentrated than before the crises. In the
light of moral hazard and Too-Big-To-Fail banks, we have investigated how the high
concentration in the industry impacts systemic risk.
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In the absence of counterfactuals, we consider a thought experiment in which we
view the supervisor as a constrained investor in a portfolio of banks. As profit maxi-
mization by banks is inherently risky, but is not perfectly correlated with that of other
banks, the portfolio of the supervisor will have a better risk-return profile. By applying
elements of Modern Portfolio Theory, we derive a hypothetical distribution of weights
that the supervisor should have held to arrive at the minimum variance portfolio in
order to give us insights into the optimal design of the banking system.
Our results consistently show that the hypothetical minimum variance portfolio
had a lower risk than the actual portfolio, achieved by reducing the level of concen-
tration in the portfolio. Moreover, it was not necessary to sacrifice returns in order to
achieve this lower risk. The minimum variance portfolio favors more traditional banks
as measured by the non-interest income/total income ratio and balance sheet items
such as loans, trading assets and deposits. In contrast, an equally-weighted portfolio
would perform similarly to the actual, concentrated, system. These findings are robust
to different starting values, time windows, covariance matrices and the exclusion of
the smallest banks.
However, to achieve lower risk, the supervisor would have to adjust weights in
each quarter, leading to a portfolio turnover three times higher than that of the real
portfolio. Since this might not be possible or even desirable within the current regu-
latory framework, we tested several alternatives involving limited reweighting which
were largely unsuccessful. These findings indicate that in times of crisis, an increase
in systemic risk was unavoidable while keeping the concentration at current levels.
Nonetheless, our analysis did show - ceteris paribus - that when the weight of the
largest banks was kept at a sufficiently low level, systemic risk was reduced signifi-
cantly in the hypothetical minimum variance portfolio.
The policy implications flowing from these findings are that supervisors should
seriously consider the effects of concentration on systemic risk. A reduction in dis-
parity of size could create a more competitive environment, similar to provisions of
the proposed Safe, Accountable, Fair & Efficient (SAFE) Banking Act of 2012, which
would limit individual banks’ funding strategies to 10% of the total industry. Other
measures could include imposing higher equity capital demands for the large banks
as are currently being implemented, or separating investment from retail banking as
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proposed by Paul Volcker, and the Vickers and Liikanen reports in Europe. Forcing
large banks to hold more capital could lead to a relative reduction in their size only if
their assets are ‘redistributed’ to smaller banks in order to maintain a safer and more
competitive environment. Our findings show that we should not only consider the
size of each bank individually, but also consider each bank’s size with respect to the
whole system. However, given the data at hand which mirrors the current regulatory
set-up, the results presented here can only be interpreted as a partial equilibrium ef-
fect as we can not consider the shifting of bank activities abroad or into the shadow
banking realm.
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6.A. Extensive results: Baseline specification
This Appendix contains results that were omitted from the body of the paper for
brevity. In Section 6.A, we report the results of the baseline analysis for each of the sep-
arate Federal Reserve Districts (FRDs). Section 6.B shows results for several robustness
tests, while Section 6.C shows results for the extensions and policy implications tests.
Appendix 6.A Extensive results: Baseline specification
Tables 6.A.1 and 6.A.2 show the differences in the risk-return trade-off and distri-
bution of weights for the FRD portfolios and their respective MVPs. We show the re-
sults for the entire sample (1984Q4 - 2010Q4), as well as different subsamples (1984Q4
- 1993Q4, 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 and 2007Q1 - 2010Q4). The numbers reported are aver-
ages during the relevant time span and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to
see if the distributions in the FRDs and MVPs are different from each other. In the
second panel of Table 6.A.1, we report the relative difference in portfolio risk between
the MVPs and FRD portfolios. A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been effectively
eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements were possible.
The tables show mixed results for the differences in return over the whole sam-
ple: some FRDs outperform their MVPs, whereas others exhibit lower returns. One
interesting fact is that in the boom period of 1994Q1 - 2006Q4, we find that all FRDs
outperform their MVP counterparts in terms of returns. Regarding size disparity, the
MVPs constantly have a much lower level of concentration compared to their FRD
portfolios, their difference ranging on average between 44% and 78% throughout the
sample period.
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Table 6.A.1: Portfolio optimization baseline - Risk-return trade-off
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
rMVP − rFRD
Boston 0.032*** 0.131*** −0.037** 0.026
New York 0.044*** 0.167*** −0.016*** −0.045*
Philadelphia −0.105*** 0.036*** −0.271*** 0.107**
Cleveland 0.011*** 0.036*** −0.026*** 0.073**
Richmond −0.023*** 0.036*** −0.050*** −0.075*
Atlanta −0.028*** −0.042** −0.047*** 0.066***
Chicago 0.018*** 0.042*** −0.017** 0.079***
St. Louis −0.018*** −0.020*** −0.030*** 0.023
Minneapolis −0.123*** −0.091*** −0.150*** −0.113**
Kansas City −0.047*** −0.063*** −0.044*** −0.019
Dallas 0.012*** 0.070** −0.019*** −0.019
San Francisco −0.081*** −0.075** −0.102*** −0.030*
(σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD
Boston 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
New York 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Philadelphia 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Cleveland 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Richmond 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Atlanta 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Chicago 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
St. Louis 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Minneapolis 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Kansas City 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Dallas 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
San Francisco 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
This table shows the results of the baseline specification for the analysis on commercial bank level.
rMVP − rFRDmeasures the difference between returns of the actual portfolio and the returns of the mini-
mum variance portfolio. (σFRD− σMVP)/σFRD measures the relative difference in portfolio risk between
the actual and minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been effectively
eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements are possible. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
are performed to see if the distributions of the actual and minimum variance portfolio are different from
each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.A.2: Portfolio optimization baseline - Weights
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5%
Boston −68.8*** −59.7*** −74.0*** −73.3***
New York −76.1*** −75.3*** −80.4*** −64.2***
Philadelphia −58.0*** −45.2*** −60.6*** −79.3***
Cleveland −75.6*** −62.3*** −79.8*** −92.6***
Richmond −78.0*** −66.8*** −82.4*** −89.3***
Atlanta −64.5*** −59.8*** −67.2*** −66.3***
Chicago −62.2*** −55.1*** −67.5*** −61.7***
St. Louis −48.5*** −43.6*** −52.4*** −47.1***
Minneapolis −62.4*** −50.5*** −63.9*** −85.0***
Kansas City −43.8*** −38.3*** −47.3*** −45.2***
Dallas −52.3*** −51.3*** −54.0*** −49.1***
San Francisco −71.1*** −75.2*** −67.8*** −72.3***
MVP 5% - FRD 5%
Boston −54.2*** −42.2*** −63.4*** −52.0***
New York −65.7*** −61.4*** −73.5*** −49.9***
Philadelphia −48.5*** −32.5*** −55.1*** −64.1***
Cleveland −68.1*** −52.6*** −74.9*** −82.1***
Richmond −68.0*** −53.7*** −74.8*** −79.1***
Atlanta −55.3*** −48.0*** −62.2*** −49.3***
Chicago −55.8*** −48.2*** −62.4*** −52.0***
St. Louis −38.4*** −33.7*** −42.7*** −35.1***
Minneapolis −52.6*** −40.2*** −55.2*** −73.0***
Kansas City −35.4*** −31.9*** −37.9*** −35.7***
Dallas −44.0*** −42.3*** −46.9*** −38.5***
San Francisco −62.4*** −65.3*** −62.6*** −55.2***
This table shows the results of the baseline specification for the analysis on commercial bank level.
FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5% measures the average difference between weight of the top-5% in the actual
portfolio with the weight of the actual top-5% in the minimum variance portfolio. MVP 5% - FRD
5% measures the average difference between the weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the
weight of the new top-5% in the minimum variance portfolio. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed
to see if the distributions of the actual and minimum variance portfolio are different from each other.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix 6.B Extensive results: Robustness tests
In this section, we revisit several assumptions in the baseline specification and,
where possible, relax them. In section 6.B.1, we first explore the assumption that the
sample covariance matrix does not change when banks face a large increase/decrease
in total assets. Second, in section 6.B.2, we use an alternative estimator of the covari-
ance matrix which reduces the noise in a small T and large N setting employed in our
baseline specification. Third, section 6.B.3 examines whether the baseline findings are
a result of the starting weights, before confirming in section 6.B.4 that the results also
hold for a different length window on which the covariance matrix is estimated.
6.B.1 Identifying Jumps in Assets of BHCs for Portfolio Optimiza-
tion under a Dynamic Covariance and Return Matrix
In the baseline specification, the sample covariance matrix was assumed to be con-
stant, such that a large change in the size of the bank would not have changed its
return structure. Although we have shown that large and small banks share a com-
mon support in this structure, here we identify cases in which banks have seen a large
increase/decrease in their total assets and analyze how the elements of its covariance
matrix changed.
A jump is defined as an increase/decrease of bank assets of 25% or greater from
one quarter to the next, provided that the preceding and following 8 quarters did not
show jumps larger than 10% in each of the quarters, nor a cumulative change in the
preceding and following 8 quarters of 25%. These last two conditions are imposed
to make sure that bank size before and after the jump was relatively stable and that
the change in the elements of the covariance matrix can be chiefly attributed to the
one-time jump. We find 15 negative jumps and 287 positive jumps during the sam-
ple period. Figure 6.B.1 depicts the movement in assets before and after the jump,
where the total assets are normalized to 100 at the quarter prior to the jump. Banks
that experience a negative jump lose on average 40% of their assets, whereas banks
experiencing a positive jump gain on average 60%.
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The figure displays the average jump in total bank assets for the selected bank holding companies,
as well as its 95% confidence interval. The negative jump in assets is based on 15 BHCs, whereas
the positive jump is based on 287 BHCs. Jumps were defined as a decrease (increase) of bank
assets of 25% or greater from one quarter to next, provided that the preceding and following 8
quarters did not show jumps larger than 10% in each of the quarters, nor a cumulative change in
the preceding and following 8 quarters of 25%. Assets are normalized to 100 in the quarter before
the jump.
Table 6.B.1: Changes in the return and covariance matrices due to jumps
ROA Variance ROA Covariance ROA
Pre-Jump Post-Jump Pre-Jump Post-Jump Pre-Jump Post-Jump
Positive Jump Value 0.341 0.259 0.023 0.111 0.002 0.005
Average Difference -0.082 0.088 0.004
Percentage Difference -23.97% 379.70% 233.70%
P-value T-test 0.000 0.007 0.010
Negative Jump Value -0.142 0.213 0.281 3.249 0.007 -0.015
Average Difference 0.355 2.967 -0.022
Percentage Difference 249.52% 1054.64% -324.52%
P-value T-test 0.110 0.359 0.293
The table shows the average differences in ROA, its variance and its average pairwise covariance pre-
and post-jump for both negative jumps and positive jumps.
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The average changes to the return and covariance matrices are displayed in Ta-
ble 6.B.1. T-tests show that banks experiencing a positive jump in assets have a statis-
tically significant lower return-on-assets 8 quarters following the jump and a higher
average variance and covariance of these returns. On the other hand, banks expe-
riencing a negative jump do not see statistically significant changes in their average
variance and covariance, and only a marginally significant increase in their return-on-
assets after the jump.
Using the statistically significant changes for positive and negative shocks, we in-
terpolate the effect to the sample covariance matrix and the return matrix, such that
these matrices change dynamically with the weights received by the banks. As the
change in return-on-assets for the banks experiencing a negative jump is marginally
significant at 11%, we also regard this change as significant. During the iterative pro-
cess, the covariance matrix is updated based on the proposed weights and the ac-
tual weights. For example, if a bank has a weight of 5% and the outcome of the
iteration is that it should have a weight of 7.5%, i.e. an increase of 50%, its return-
on-assets would decrease by 0.500.60 × −23.97% = −19.975%, its variance would in-
crease by 0.500.60 × 379.70% = 316.416% and every covariance term would increase by
0.50
0.60 × 233.70% = 194.75%. If, based on the new return and covariance matrices, in the
second iteration the proposed weight is 4%, i.e. a 20% decrease from its original size,
only its return-on-assets would increase by 0.200.40 × 249.52% = 124.76%, while nothing
would happen to its original variance and covariance terms as these changes are not
statistically significant. Since we do not have data on jumps beyond -40% and +60%,
any proposed weight change beyond these thresholds will lead to an adjustment of
the return and covariance matrices as if they were -40% or +60%.
In the first robustness test, we adjust only the return matrix and then estimate a
new sample covariance matrix. In the second test, we adjust both the return matrix
and the covariance matrix with which the portfolio risk will be minimized. The results
are shown in the paper in Figure 8.
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6.B.2 Portfolio Optimization using the Ledoit and Wolf (2003, 2004)
Covariance Matrix
The sample covariance matrix with which portfolio optimization is applied, relies
on a large N and small T setting, which has been shown to introduce a considerable
amount of noise in this estimation. Ledoit and Wolf (2003, 2004) proposed a shrinkage
based estimator of the covariance matrix to reduce the noise. We use their proposed
estimator of the covariance matrix instead of its sample equivalent and re-run the anal-
ysis. Figure 6.B.2 show the results for the analysis on BHC level, and Tables 6.B.2
and 6.B.3 do the same for the analysis on commercial bank level.
Overall, we find that the standard deviation of the MVP is now higher compared to
the baseline specification, although still lower than that of the FED portfolio. The ratio
(σFED − σMVP)/σFED is on average only 0.54, indicating that 54% of the portfolio risk
was minimized. For the commercial banks, this ratio ranges between 0.40 and 0.88.
The portfolio returns, meanwhile, are at a similar level. The levels of concentration in
the MVP are basically unchanged, as the largest banks still have a weight of on average
10%, while the largest banks of the FED portfolio have a weight in the MVP of 5%. For
the FRD portfolios, on average 60% of portfolio risk is eliminated, and the return of
the MVPs is higher. The weight of the largest 5% of banks in the MVP is on average
47% lower than in the FRD portfolio, while the largest banks in the FRD are reduced
by 70%. Both of these results are similar to the baseline specification.
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Figure 6.B.2: Portfolio optimization using the Ledoit and Wolf (2003, 2004) covariance
matrix
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The figure shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP using the
Ledoit and Wolf (2003, 2004) shrinkage estimator of the covariance matrix: panel 6.B.2a and 6.B.2b
display the difference in the risk and return of each portfolio. Panel 6.B.2c shows how the weights
are distributed in each portfolio by plotting their concentration ratios, as well as the weights that
the current largest banks have in the MVP.
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Table 6.B.2: Portfolio optimization using the Ledoit and Wolf (2003, 2004) covariance ma-
trix - Risk-return trade-off
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
rMVP − rFRD
Boston 0.024*** 0.124*** −0.055*** 0.047*
New York 0.089*** 0.234*** 0.008*** 0.016**
Philadelphia −0.103*** 0.032*** −0.288*** 0.189**
Cleveland −0.016*** 0.060*** −0.079*** 0.017**
Richmond 0.020*** 0.090*** −0.028*** 0.012*
Atlanta 0.032*** 0.078*** −0.036*** 0.149***
Chicago 0.035*** 0.073*** −0.011* 0.098***
St. Louis 0.010*** 0.046*** −0.035*** 0.073***
Minneapolis −0.099*** −0.000*** −0.182*** −0.055*
Kansas City 0.022*** 0.083*** −0.023*** 0.029*
Dallas 0.100*** 0.262*** 0.006*** 0.031**
San Francisco −0.003*** 0.105*** −0.100*** 0.064***
(σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD
Boston 0.847*** 0.787*** 0.885*** 0.861***
New York 0.801*** 0.737*** 0.806*** 0.929***
Philadelphia 0.880*** 0.810*** 0.902*** 0.970***
Cleveland 0.729*** 0.664*** 0.752*** 0.808***
Richmond 0.681*** 0.525*** 0.778*** 0.730***
Atlanta 0.402*** 0.358*** 0.342*** 0.699***
Chicago 0.486*** 0.495*** 0.429*** 0.650***
St. Louis 0.394*** 0.336*** 0.351*** 0.666***
Minneapolis 0.587*** 0.569*** 0.546*** 0.762***
Kansas City 0.316*** 0.380*** 0.224*** 0.465***
Dallas 0.501*** 0.634*** 0.385*** 0.572***
San Francisco 0.712*** 0.687*** 0.726*** 0.727***
This table shows the results of the Ledoit and Wolf (2003, 2004) shrinkage based estimator of the covari-
ance matrix for the analysis on commercial bank level. rMVP − rFRD measures the difference between
returns of the actual portfolio and the returns of the minimum variance portfolio. (σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD
measures the relative difference in portfolio risk between the actual and minimum variance portfolio.
A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been effectively eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no
improvements are possible. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions of the
actual and minimum variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.B.3: Portfolio optimization using the Ledoit and Wolf (2003, 2004) covariance ma-
trix - Weights
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5%
Boston −63.7*** −53.1*** −66.4*** −79.2***
New York −74.4*** −70.3*** −79.9*** −65.9***
Philadelphia −58.9*** −43.9*** −62.3*** −82.6***
Cleveland −74.8*** −58.6*** −80.4*** −94.0***
Richmond −76.0*** −60.8*** −82.3*** −90.4***
Atlanta −61.1*** −56.6*** −62.5*** −67.1***
Chicago −59.9*** −48.4*** −67.5*** −61.8***
St. Louis −47.1*** −39.5*** −52.4*** −47.1***
Minneapolis −61.4*** −47.8*** −64.0*** −84.9***
Kansas City −42.1*** −36.3*** −45.4*** −45.0***
Dallas −50.8*** −49.5*** −52.5*** −48.3***
San Francisco −67.1*** −65.7*** −66.8*** −71.1***
MVP 5% - FRD 5%
Boston −26.0*** −9.7*** −36.2*** −30.2***
New York −47.9*** −29.9*** −65.4*** −32.9***
Philadelphia −30.7*** −7.4*** −44.3*** −40.3***
Cleveland −60.2*** −40.5*** −68.3*** −79.5***
Richmond −62.0*** −44.5*** −73.9*** −63.4***
Atlanta −53.9*** −47.2*** −59.8*** −49.9***
Chicago −57.8*** −46.8*** −65.9*** −57.0***
St. Louis −41.5*** −31.5*** −48.9*** −40.6***
Minneapolis −53.8*** −38.2*** −58.4*** −75.1***
Kansas City −37.4*** −29.1*** −42.5*** −40.1***
Dallas −41.2*** −33.8*** −46.2*** −42.3***
San Francisco −50.9*** −49.4*** −59.2*** −27.5***
This table shows the results of the Ledoit and Wolf (2003, 2004) shrinkage based estimator of the covari-
ance matrix for the analysis on commercial bank level. FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5% measures the average
difference between weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the actual top-5%
in the minimum variance portfolio. MVP 5% - FRD 5% measures the average difference between the
weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the new top-5% in the minimum vari-
ance portfolio. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions of the actual and
minimum variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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6.B.3 Equal and Random Starting Weights
Since our baseline specification deals with many banks, the minimization of the
portfolio risk is likely to be a complex, highly nonlinear problem comprising multiple
minima/solutions. The starting values for the optimization are chosen to be the actual
weights in the portfolio, and can have a large impact on whether a global or local
minimum is found as well as in what direction the distribution of weights will move.
To account for this possible bias, we run two robustness tests. First, we run, for BHC
data only, 100 repetitions per quarter using randomized starting values. The random
starting values are drawn from a half-normal distribution and then divided by its sum,
such that they add up to 1. In the second test, we choose, for the commercial bank data,
as starting value an equally weighted portfolio.
Figure 6.B.3 shows the results for the random starting values, while Figure 6.B.4
Tables 6.B.4 and 6.B.5 show the results for the equal starting weights. Figure 6.B.3
shows the minimum and maximum portfolio risk, return and concentration found in
each period and we can see that there is hardly any variation in the outcomes. The
optimization using equal starting weights show almost identical results to those of the
baseline specification. Overall, we take this as evidence that we approach a global
optimum in the baseline specification.
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Figure 6.B.3: Do different starting weights values matter in the optimization?
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The figure presents the robustness test in which 100 random starting values were chosen per quarter, to
test whether using the actual weights as starting values drives the results. The lower and upper bound
are displayed to show that starting values do not matter.
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Figure 6.B.4: Do different starting weights values matter in the optimization?
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The figure presents the robustness test in which an equally weighted portfolio was chosen as starting
weights, instead of the actual weights.
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Table 6.B.4: Portfolio optimization using equal starting weights - Risk-return trade-off
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
rMVP − rFRD
Boston 0.032*** 0.131*** −0.037*** 0.027
New York 0.044*** 0.167*** −0.016*** −0.046*
Philadelphia −0.105*** 0.036*** −0.271*** 0.107**
Cleveland 0.011*** 0.036*** −0.025*** 0.074**
Richmond −0.023*** 0.037*** −0.050*** −0.075*
Atlanta −0.028*** −0.041* −0.047*** 0.065***
Chicago 0.018*** 0.042*** −0.017** 0.079***
St. Louis −0.019*** −0.020*** −0.032*** 0.023
Minneapolis −0.123*** −0.091*** −0.150*** −0.114**
Kansas City −0.046*** −0.063*** −0.043*** −0.020
Dallas 0.012*** 0.070** −0.019*** −0.019
San Francisco −0.081*** −0.075** −0.100*** −0.030*
(σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD
Boston 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
New York 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Philadelphia 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Cleveland 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Richmond 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Atlanta 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Chicago 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
St. Louis 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Minneapolis 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Kansas City 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Dallas 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
San Francisco 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when using equal starting weights.
rMVP− rFRD measures the difference between returns of the actual portfolio and the returns of the mini-
mum variance portfolio. (σFRD− σMVP)/σFRD measures the relative difference in portfolio risk between
the actual and minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been effectively
eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements are possible. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests
are performed to see if the distributions of the actual and minimum variance portfolio are different from
each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.B.5: Portfolio optimization using equal starting weights - Weights
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5%
Boston −68.8*** −59.7*** −74.0*** −73.3***
New York −76.1*** −75.3*** −80.4*** −64.2***
Philadelphia −58.0*** −45.2*** −60.6*** −79.4***
Cleveland −75.6*** −62.3*** −79.8*** −92.6***
Richmond −78.0*** −66.8*** −82.4*** −89.3***
Atlanta −64.5*** −59.8*** −67.2*** −66.4***
Chicago −62.2*** −55.1*** −67.4*** −61.7***
St. Louis −48.5*** −43.6*** −52.4*** −47.1***
Minneapolis −62.4*** −50.5*** −63.9*** −85.0***
Kansas City −43.8*** −38.3*** −47.3*** −45.2***
Dallas −52.3*** −51.3*** −54.0*** −49.1***
San Francisco −71.1*** −75.2*** −67.8*** −72.3***
MVP 5% - FRD 5%
Boston −54.2*** −42.2*** −63.4*** −51.6***
New York −65.7*** −61.4*** −73.5*** −49.9***
Philadelphia −48.5*** −32.5*** −55.1*** −64.1***
Cleveland −68.1*** −52.6*** −74.9*** −82.1***
Richmond −68.0*** −53.7*** −74.8*** −79.1***
Atlanta −55.3*** −48.0*** −62.2*** −49.3***
Chicago −55.8*** −48.2*** −62.4*** −52.0***
St. Louis −38.3*** −33.7*** −42.6*** −35.1***
Minneapolis −52.6*** −40.2*** −55.2*** −72.9***
Kansas City −35.4*** −31.9*** −37.8*** −35.7***
Dallas −44.0*** −42.3*** −46.9*** −38.5***
San Francisco −62.4*** −65.3*** −62.6*** −55.2***
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when using equal starting weights.
FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5% measures the average difference between weight of the top-5% in the actual
portfolio with the weight of the actual top-5% in the minimum variance portfolio. MVP 5% - FRD
5% measures the average difference between the weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the
weight of the new top-5% in the minimum variance portfolio. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed
to see if the distributions of the actual and minimum variance portfolio are different from each other.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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6.B.4 Portfolio Optimization using a 16 Quarter Window
Finally, we explore if the choice of an 8 quarter window on which the covariance
matrices are estimated matters for the optimization. In order to see if our results are
robust, we run the analysis using a 16 quarter window. The results for the analysis
on BHC level is shown in Figure 6.B.5, whereas the results for the analysis on com-
mercial bank level are shown in Tables 6.B.6 and 6.B.7, with being quantitatively and
qualitatively similar to the baseline specification.
Figure 6.B.5: Robustness - 16 quarter analysis
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The figure shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP when
using 16 quarters to estimate the sample covariance matrix: panel 6.B.5a and 6.B.5b display
the difference in the risk and return of each portfolio. Panel 6.B.5c shows how the weights are
distributed in each portfolio by plotting their concentration ratios, as well as the weights that the
current largest banks have in the MVP.
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Table 6.B.6: Portfolio optimization using a 16 quarter window - Risk-return trade-off
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
rMVP − rFRD
Boston 0.015*** 0.140*** −0.045*** −0.018*
New York 0.048*** 0.202*** −0.003*** −0.063***
Philadelphia −0.143*** 0.081*** −0.269*** −0.139***
Cleveland −0.025*** 0.048*** −0.066*** −0.026
Richmond −0.010*** 0.050*** −0.025*** −0.073*
Atlanta −0.036*** −0.060*** −0.044*** 0.032
Chicago 0.013*** 0.042*** −0.009* 0.036*
St. Louis −0.026*** −0.023*** −0.037*** 0.005
Minneapolis −0.136*** −0.060*** −0.176*** −0.145***
Kansas City −0.054*** −0.087*** −0.042*** −0.035**
Dallas −0.002*** 0.056*** −0.024*** −0.035*
San Francisco −0.068*** −0.039*** −0.094*** −0.037
(σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD
Boston 0.993*** 0.996*** 1.000*** 0.963***
New York 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Philadelphia 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Cleveland 1.000*** 1.000*** 0.999*** 1.000***
Richmond 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 0.997***
Atlanta 0.999*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 0.995***
Chicago 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
St. Louis 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Minneapolis 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Kansas City 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Dallas 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
San Francisco 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when using 16 quarters to esti-
mate the sample covariance matrix. rMVP − rFRD measures the difference between returns of the actual
portfolio and the returns of the minimum variance portfolio. (σFRD− σMVP)/σFRD measures the relative
difference in portfolio risk between the actual and minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1 indicates
that the risk has been effectively eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements are pos-
sible. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions of the actual and minimum
variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.B.7: Portfolio optimization using a 16 quarter window - Weights
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5%
Boston −69.5*** −60.5*** −72.7*** −75.6***
New York −75.8*** −75.1*** −80.1*** −62.9***
Philadelphia −58.8*** −44.6*** −60.8*** −78.1***
Cleveland −75.8*** −62.0*** −78.6*** −91.6***
Richmond −79.0*** −66.4*** −82.8*** −89.3***
Atlanta −65.7*** −61.7*** −67.7*** −66.4***
Chicago −63.0*** −55.7*** −67.3*** −62.0***
St. Louis −49.0*** −44.5*** −51.9*** −47.5***
Minneapolis −61.7*** −51.7*** −61.2*** −81.8***
Kansas City −44.1*** −38.2*** −46.9*** −46.0***
Dallas −51.0*** −48.1*** −54.1*** −46.3***
San Francisco −66.1*** −74.1*** −67.3*** −47.9***
MVP 5% - FRD 5%
Boston −35.5*** −14.5*** −48.6*** −31.4***
New York −53.3*** −41.5*** −65.3*** −36.0***
Philadelphia −35.9*** −18.1*** −44.8*** −39.6***
Cleveland −57.8*** −42.4*** −63.8*** −66.3***
Richmond −54.8*** −39.8*** −64.3*** −51.0***
Atlanta −44.8*** −37.9*** −54.7*** −25.4***
Chicago −49.7*** −43.3*** −56.5*** −39.1***
St. Louis −27.6*** −25.8*** −30.4*** −22.0***
Minneapolis −42.8*** −32.8*** −45.1*** −53.0***
Kansas City −27.6*** −26.0*** −30.0*** −22.5***
Dallas −33.0*** −28.5*** −38.2*** −24.1***
San Francisco −49.7*** −54.3*** −57.0*** −17.4***
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when using 16 quarters to estimate
the sample covariance matrix. FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5% measures the average difference between
weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the actual top-5% in the minimum
variance portfolio. MVP 5% - FRD 5% measures the average difference between the weight of the
top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the new top-5% in the minimum variance portfolio.
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions of the actual and minimum variance
portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix 6.C Extensive results: Extensions and policy
implications
In this final section of the Appendix, we examine alternative scenarios which ap-
proximate better the current regulatory framework. In section 6.C.1 we examine sev-
eral scenarios that would limit the amount of reweighting a supervisor could perform
when determining its MVP. Finally, in section 6.C.2 we repeat the analysis on a more
realistic sample of banks in which the supervisor could invest.
6.C.1 Portfolio Optimization under Limited reweighting
Given the large amount of turnover in the baseline specification, a more realistic
scenario would be that the supervisor is able to change the size of a bank within certain
limitations. We explore several of these scenario’s here, starting with a static constraint
that the bank supervisor can add or subtract a certain percentage of an individual
institution. Figure 6.C.1 and Tables 6.C.1-6.C.2 show the results for the scenario when
supervisors can not change banks’ total assets more than 10%, and Figure 6.C.2 and
Tables 6.C.3-6.C.4 do the same for 20%. For both BHCs and commercial banks, any
improvement is hardly noticeable for the 10%-scenario, although the portfolio risk is
somewhat lower for the 20%-scenario. Neither, however, match up to the baseline
scenario and still exhibit the twin peaks in portfolio risk during the two crisis periods.
Another scenario is that the percentage with which the supervisor can reweigh his
individual holdings depends on the business cycle. We construct a measure of asset
growth in the quarter before the supervisor can set her weights, and allow reweight-
ing equal to at most the average growth and the standard deviation of this growth:
when average growth is larger, or more dispersed, this allows for more reweighting
by the supervisor in order to reduce systemic risk. The measure, which acts as a time-
varying constraint, is shown in Figure 6.C.3 using the data on asset growth for the
BHCs. Indeed we see that the measures indeed exhibit time-variation, especially the
standard deviation of the growth. In fact, the latter is even above 1 in 1997Q4, mean-
ing that based on this constraint alone, it would be possible for the supervisor to short
her banks. Since this is not possible, we cut the value off at 1 and thus end up in a
situation of unlimited reweighting similar to the baseline specification for this quarter.
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Figures 6.C.4 and Tables 6.C.5-6.C.6 display the results where the maximum amount
of reweighting equals the mean of the asset growth in the previous quarter, whereas
Figures 6.C.5 and Tables 6.C.7-6.C.8 do the same for the standard deviation of the
growth. Outside of 1997Q4, which equals the baseline specification, there are no real
improvements for both BHCs and commercial banks.
So far the supervisor has only been able to reweigh based on the weight that the
bank had in the actual portfolio. In the next test we allow for dynamic reweighting
where the supervisor can change the size of a bank with a percentage of its size in the
previous quarter’s MVP. In the first quarter that a bank is eligible for the portfolio, it
will enter with its actual size. However, once it has been given an MVP weight (which
lies in a range around its original size), the supervisor will keep on minimizing with
the constraint on the size the bank had in the MVP rather than the actual portfolio.
Since this is computationally more intensive, we perform this test only on BHC level.
Figure 6.C.6 shows the results for a dynamic reweighting of a maximum of 10%, while
Figure 6.C.7 shows the results for 20%. We can see no real improvement, although
portfolio risk is again reduce more in the 20%-scenario compared to the 10%-scenario.
Given the inability to reduce portfolio risk when constraining the reweighting of
individual banks, we finally explore some scenarios in which we constrain reweight-
ing of the largest 5% of banks. Specifically, we add a constraint that the largest 5% of
banks need to retain their current individual size, and allow unlimited reweighting
of the remaining banks while still adhering to the no-shorting and no-loss constraint.
The results for the commercial bank level are shown in Tables 6.C.9 and 6.C.10. There
are 3 districts which were able to reduce systemic risk to a minimum in each of the
three sub-samples. Interestingly, a common feature they share is that they have the
lowest levels of concentration among all districts. Since the weight of these largest
banks in the three successful districts never exceeds 60%, this leads us to a final test
using limited reweighting: is it possible to reduce portfolio risk while keeping the cu-
mulative weight of the largest 5% of banks between 50% and 60%? The results for
the commercial banks are reported in Tables 6.C.11 and 6.C.12. We observe that un-
der this limited reweighting scheme, it is possible to effectively eliminate risk while
maintaining similar returns.
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Figure 6.C.1: Portfolio optimization using limited reweighting - 10%
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The graph shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP when
constraining individual reweighting to 10% of the original bank size: panel 6.C.1a and 6.C.1b
display the difference in the risk and return of each portfolio. Panel 6.C.1c shows how the weights
are distributed in each portfolio by plotting their concentration ratios, as well as the weights that
the current largest banks have in the MVP.
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Table 6.C.1: Portfolio optimization using limited reweighting of 10% - Risk-return trade-
off
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
rMVP − rFRD
Boston 0.004*** 0.008 0.002 −0.000
New York 0.004*** 0.006 0.004 0.001
Philadelphia 0.000*** 0.005 −0.008 0.018
Cleveland 0.003*** 0.006 0.002 0.002
Richmond 0.003*** 0.005 0.001 0.002
Atlanta 0.002*** 0.004 −0.001 0.010
Chicago 0.004*** 0.006 0.001 0.009
St. Louis 0.002*** 0.002 0.000 0.006
Minneapolis −0.004*** 0.001 −0.008 −0.003
Kansas City 0.002*** 0.005 −0.000 0.004
Dallas 0.005*** 0.012 0.000 0.003
San Francisco 0.002*** 0.007 −0.003 0.004
(σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD
Boston 0.070*** 0.070 0.074 0.059
New York 0.077*** 0.060 0.081 0.103
Philadelphia 0.098*** 0.101 0.100 0.084
Cleveland 0.089*** 0.093 0.092 0.070
Richmond 0.066*** 0.086 0.059 0.038
Atlanta 0.087*** 0.076 0.105 0.052
Chicago 0.097*** 0.093 0.110 0.067
St. Louis 0.081*** 0.076 0.087* 0.070
Minneapolis 0.076*** 0.080 0.085** 0.038
Kansas City 0.084*** 0.085 0.088* 0.070
Dallas 0.082*** 0.062 0.097 0.083
San Francisco 0.092*** 0.086 0.108 0.057
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when constraining individual
reweighting to 10% of the original bank size. rMVP − rFRD measures the difference between returns of
the actual portfolio and the returns of the minimum variance portfolio. (σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD measures
the relative difference in portfolio risk between the actual and minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1
indicates that the risk has been effectively eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements
are possible. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions of the actual and
minimum variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.C.2: Portfolio optimization using limited reweighting of 10% - Weight
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5%
Boston −0.6*** −0.6 −0.7*** −0.4
New York −0.4*** −0.6 −0.2 −0.5
Philadelphia −0.4*** −0.2 −0.4 −0.6
Cleveland −0.2*** −0.5** −0.1 −0.0
Richmond −0.1*** −0.1 −0.1 −0.0
Atlanta −0.0*** 0.2 −0.0 −0.3
Chicago −0.2*** −0.2 −0.1 −0.5
St. Louis 0.0*** 0.3 −0.1 −0.3
Minneapolis −0.2*** −0.2 −0.2 −0.1
Kansas City 0.1*** 0.2* 0.0 0.0
Dallas −0.2*** −0.3 −0.1 −0.0
San Francisco −0.2*** −0.2 −0.3 −0.1
MVP 5% - FRD 5%
Boston −0.6*** −0.6 −0.6*** −0.4
New York −0.4*** −0.6 −0.2 −0.5
Philadelphia −0.4*** −0.2 −0.4 −0.6
Cleveland −0.2*** −0.5** −0.1 −0.0
Richmond −0.1*** −0.1 −0.1 −0.0
Atlanta 0.0*** 0.2 −0.0 −0.3
Chicago −0.2*** −0.2 −0.1 −0.4
St. Louis 0.0*** 0.3 −0.1 −0.3
Minneapolis −0.2*** −0.2 −0.2 −0.1
Kansas City 0.1*** 0.2* 0.1 0.0
Dallas −0.2*** −0.3 −0.1 0.0
San Francisco −0.2*** −0.2 −0.3 −0.0
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when constraining individual
reweighting to 10% of the original bank size. FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5% measures the average differ-
ence between weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the actual top-5% in the
minimum variance portfolio. MVP 5% - FRD 5% measures the average difference between the weight
of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the new top-5% in the minimum variance port-
folio. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions of the actual and minimum
variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 6.C.2: Portfolio optimization using limited reweighting - 20%
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The figure shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP when
constraining individual reweighting to 20% of the original bank size: panel 6.C.2a and 6.C.2b
display the difference in the risk and return of each portfolio. Panel 6.C.2c shows how the weights
are distributed in each portfolio by plotting their concentration ratios, as well as the weights that
the current largest banks have in the MVP.
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Table 6.C.3: Portfolio optimization using limited reweighting of 20% - Risk-return trade-
off
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
rMVP − rFRD
Boston 0.008*** 0.017 0.003 −0.001
New York 0.009*** 0.012 0.008 0.004
Philadelphia −0.001*** 0.010* −0.019* 0.035*
Cleveland 0.007*** 0.012** 0.004 0.004
Richmond 0.005*** 0.010 0.002 0.004
Atlanta 0.005*** 0.008 −0.002 0.019
Chicago 0.008*** 0.012 0.002 0.018
St. Louis 0.004*** 0.005** 0.001 0.012
Minneapolis −0.009*** 0.002 −0.017* −0.007
Kansas City 0.004*** 0.010* −0.000 0.007
Dallas 0.009*** 0.022 0.001 0.005
San Francisco 0.003*** 0.014** −0.006 0.007
(σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD
Boston 0.142*** 0.139 0.152 0.116*
New York 0.154*** 0.121 0.161*** 0.205*
Philadelphia 0.202*** 0.209*** 0.207* 0.169
Cleveland 0.175*** 0.178 0.184*** 0.140
Richmond 0.125*** 0.162 0.115 0.074
Atlanta 0.166*** 0.153** 0.194** 0.105
Chicago 0.188*** 0.188 0.203*** 0.140
St. Louis 0.163*** 0.150** 0.176*** 0.149
Minneapolis 0.156*** 0.163 0.175*** 0.076
Kansas City 0.176*** 0.181* 0.181*** 0.148
Dallas 0.167*** 0.127* 0.196* 0.164
San Francisco 0.185*** 0.180*** 0.210* 0.113
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when constraining individual
reweighting to 20% of the original bank size. rMVP − rFRD measures the difference between returns of
the actual portfolio and the returns of the minimum variance portfolio. (σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD measures
the relative difference in portfolio risk between the actual and minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1
indicates that the risk has been effectively eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements
are possible. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions of the actual and
minimum variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
189
6. BANK SIZE AND EXTREME EVENTS
Table 6.C.4: Portfolio optimization using limited reweighting of 20% - Weight
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5%
Boston −1.4*** −1.2** −1.6*** −0.9
New York −1.0*** −1.4** −0.6 −1.3
Philadelphia −1.0*** −0.5 −1.3** −1.3
Cleveland −0.5*** −1.1** −0.2 −0.0
Richmond −0.1*** −0.2 −0.2 −0.0
Atlanta 0.0*** 0.4 −0.0 −0.6
Chicago −0.3*** −0.4 −0.1 −1.0
St. Louis −0.1*** 0.5 −0.2 −0.7
Minneapolis −0.4*** −0.4 −0.4 −0.2
Kansas City 0.2*** 0.4** 0.2 0.0
Dallas −0.3*** −0.5 −0.2 −0.1
San Francisco −0.5*** −0.4* −0.7 −0.1
MVP 5% - FRD 5%
Boston −1.3*** −1.2** −1.5*** −0.9
New York −0.9*** −1.4** −0.6 −1.1
Philadelphia −0.9*** −0.2 −1.2** −1.3
Cleveland −0.5*** −1.0** −0.2 −0.0
Richmond −0.1*** −0.1 −0.2 −0.0
Atlanta 0.1*** 0.4 −0.0 −0.5
Chicago −0.3*** −0.4 −0.1 −0.9
St. Louis 0.0*** 0.6** −0.2 −0.6
Minneapolis −0.4*** −0.4 −0.4 −0.2
Kansas City 0.3*** 0.5*** 0.2 0.1
Dallas −0.2*** −0.4 −0.1 −0.1
San Francisco −0.5*** −0.4* −0.7 −0.0
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when constraining individual
reweighting to 20% of the original bank size. FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5% measures the average differ-
ence between weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the actual top-5% in the
minimum variance portfolio. MVP 5% - FRD 5% measures the average difference between the weight
of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the new top-5% in the minimum variance port-
folio. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions of the actual and minimum
variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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1990q1 1995q1 2000q1 2005q1 2010q1
Mean Growth t−1 Std. Dev. Growth t−1
The figure shows the mean and standard deviation of the asset growth in the previous quarter,
which are used as a time-varying constraint determining how much the supervisor can alter the
assets of individual banks.
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Figure 6.C.4: Portfolio optimization using limited reweighting - Mean of growth
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The figure shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP when
using the mean asset growth as a time-varying constraint for individual reweighting of banks:
panel 6.C.4a and 6.C.4b display the difference in the risk and return of each portfolio. Panel 6.C.4c
shows how the weights are distributed in each portfolio by plotting their concentration ratios, as
well as the weights that the current largest banks have in the MVP.
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Table 6.C.5: Portfolio optimization using limited reweighting - Mean of growth - Risk-
return trade-off
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
rMVP − rFRD
Boston 0.003*** 0.009 0.000 −0.000
New York 0.002*** 0.002 0.001 0.001
Philadelphia 0.002*** 0.002 −0.003 0.018
Cleveland 0.001*** 0.001 0.000 0.000
Richmond 0.001*** 0.001 0.000 0.000
Atlanta 0.001*** 0.001 −0.000 0.006
Chicago 0.001*** 0.001 0.000 0.003
St. Louis 0.000*** 0.000 0.000 0.001
Minneapolis −0.003*** −0.000 −0.002 −0.012
Kansas City 0.000*** 0.001 −0.000 0.001
Dallas 0.002*** 0.005 0.000 0.001
San Francisco 0.001*** 0.003 −0.002 0.002
(σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD
Boston 0.041*** 0.076 0.024 0.013
New York 0.031*** 0.024 0.033 0.037
Philadelphia 0.040*** 0.043 0.039 0.038
Cleveland 0.019*** 0.022 0.018 0.017
Richmond 0.021*** 0.027 0.021 0.010
Atlanta 0.028*** 0.020 0.035 0.024
Chicago 0.019*** 0.015 0.023 0.015
St. Louis 0.013*** 0.011 0.015 0.012
Minneapolis 0.027*** 0.013 0.024 0.069
Kansas City 0.011*** 0.011 0.012 0.011
Dallas 0.018*** 0.017 0.017 0.022
San Francisco 0.046*** 0.038 0.059 0.024
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when using the mean asset growth
as a time-varying constraint for individual reweighting of banks. rMVP − rFRD measures the difference
between returns of the actual portfolio and the returns of the minimum variance portfolio. (σFRD −
σMVP)/σFRD measures the relative difference in portfolio risk between the actual and minimum variance
portfolio. A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been effectively eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates
that no improvements are possible. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions
of the actual and minimum variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1.
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Table 6.C.6: Portfolio optimization using limited reweighting - Mean of growth - Weight
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5%
Boston −1.0*** −2.4 −0.2 −0.1
New York −0.2*** −0.2 −0.1 −0.2
Philadelphia −0.2*** −0.1 −0.2 −0.2
Cleveland −0.0*** −0.1 −0.0 −0.0
Richmond −0.0*** −0.0 −0.0 0.0
Atlanta −0.0*** 0.0 −0.0 −0.1
Chicago −0.0*** −0.0 −0.0 −0.1
St. Louis 0.0*** 0.1 −0.0 −0.0
Minneapolis −0.8*** −0.0 −0.0 −5.2
Kansas City 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 −0.0
Dallas −0.0*** −0.1 −0.0 −0.0
San Francisco −0.1*** −0.0 −0.2 −0.0
MVP 5% - FRD 5%
Boston −0.7*** −1.6 −0.2 −0.1
New York −0.1*** −0.2 −0.1 −0.1
Philadelphia −0.1*** −0.1 −0.2 −0.1
Cleveland −0.0*** −0.1 −0.0 −0.0
Richmond −0.0*** −0.0 −0.0 0.0
Atlanta −0.0*** 0.0 −0.0 −0.1
Chicago −0.0*** −0.0 −0.0 −0.1
St. Louis 0.0*** 0.1 −0.0 −0.0
Minneapolis −0.7*** −0.0 −0.0 −4.4
Kansas City 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 −0.0
Dallas −0.0*** −0.1 −0.0 −0.0
San Francisco −0.1*** −0.0 −0.2 −0.0
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when using the mean asset growth
as a time-varying constraint for individual reweighting of banks. FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5% measures
the average difference between weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the
actual top-5% in the minimum variance portfolio. MVP 5% - FRD 5% measures the average difference
between the weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the new top-5% in the
minimum variance portfolio. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions of the
actual and minimum variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 6.C.5: Portfolio optimization using limited reweighting - Std. dev. of growth
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The figure shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP level
when using the standard deviation of asset growth as a time-varying constraint for individual
reweighting of banks: panel 6.C.5a and 6.C.5b display the difference in the risk and return of each
portfolio. Panel 6.C.5c shows how the weights are distributed in each portfolio by plotting their
concentration ratios, as well as the weights that the current largest banks have in the MVP.
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Table 6.C.7: Portfolio optimization using limited reweighting - Std. dev. of growth - Risk-
return trade-off
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
rMVP − rFRD
Boston 0.008*** 0.021 0.002 −0.001
New York 0.008*** 0.011 0.008 0.002
Philadelphia 0.005*** 0.015* −0.024 0.079
Cleveland 0.005*** 0.010 0.002 0.001
Richmond 0.004*** 0.010 0.001 0.002
Atlanta 0.005*** 0.008 −0.002 0.022
Chicago 0.005*** 0.008 0.001 0.010
St. Louis 0.001*** 0.000 0.001 0.003
Minneapolis −0.009*** −0.000 −0.014 −0.015
Kansas City 0.002*** 0.006 −0.000 0.003
Dallas 0.010*** 0.028 0.001 0.002
San Francisco −0.002*** 0.008 −0.012 0.009
(σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD
Boston 0.126*** 0.169 0.110 0.080
New York 0.142*** 0.110 0.163* 0.147
Philadelphia 0.215*** 0.267*** 0.178 0.215
Cleveland 0.112*** 0.157 0.093 0.065
Richmond 0.094*** 0.138 0.080 0.040
Atlanta 0.154*** 0.134*** 0.180** 0.119
Chicago 0.128*** 0.113 0.156** 0.070
St. Louis 0.092*** 0.092 0.104** 0.053
Minneapolis 0.120*** 0.088 0.153*** 0.087
Kansas City 0.109*** 0.109 0.124* 0.061
Dallas 0.095*** 0.115 0.088 0.074
San Francisco 0.223*** 0.230** 0.246** 0.134
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when using the standard deviation
of asset growth as a time-varying constraint for individual reweighting of banks. rMVP− rFRD measures
the difference between returns of the actual portfolio and the returns of the minimum variance portfolio.
(σFRD− σMVP)/σFRD measures the relative difference in portfolio risk between the actual and minimum
variance portfolio. A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been effectively eliminated, while a score of
0 indicates that no improvements are possible. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the
distributions of the actual and minimum variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.C.8: Portfolio optimization using limited reweighting - Std. dev. of growth -
Weight
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5%
Boston −2.3*** −4.5** −1.2*** −0.6
New York −0.9*** −1.3** −0.7 −0.8
Philadelphia −4.1*** −4.1 −3.2** −6.6
Cleveland −0.9*** −2.5** −0.1 −0.0
Richmond −0.7*** −2.0 −0.1 −0.0
Atlanta −1.2*** 0.3 −1.3 −4.4
Chicago −0.8*** −0.2 −1.3 −0.5
St. Louis −0.4*** −0.9 −0.1 −0.2
Minneapolis −2.2*** −0.2 −2.6 −5.3
Kansas City 0.1*** 0.2 0.1 0.0
Dallas −0.7*** −1.8 −0.1 −0.0
San Francisco −5.4*** −4.6* −6.0 −5.2
MVP 5% - FRD 5%
Boston −1.9*** −3.4** −1.2*** −0.6
New York −0.8*** −1.3** −0.5 −0.7
Philadelphia −3.2*** −2.2 −3.0** −6.0
Cleveland −0.8*** −2.2** −0.1 −0.0
Richmond −0.6*** −1.6 −0.1 −0.0
Atlanta −1.0*** 0.4 −1.3 −3.2
Chicago −0.7*** −0.2 −1.2 −0.4
St. Louis −0.3*** −0.6 −0.1 −0.2
Minneapolis −1.9*** −0.2 −2.4 −4.5
Kansas City 0.1*** 0.2* 0.1 0.0
Dallas −0.6*** −1.5 −0.1 0.0
San Francisco −4.9*** −4.0* −5.7 −3.9
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when using the standard deviation
of asset growth as a time-varying constraint for individual reweighting of banks. FRD 5% in MVP -
FRD 5% measures the average difference between weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with
the weight of the actual top-5% in the minimum variance portfolio. MVP 5% - FRD 5% measures the
average difference between the weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the
new top-5% in the minimum variance portfolio. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the
distributions of the actual and minimum variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Figure 6.C.6: Portfolio optimization using dynamic limited reweighting of 10%
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The figure shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP when
constraining individual reweighting to 10% of the bank size in the previous quarter’s MVP:
panel 6.C.6a and 6.C.6b display the difference in the risk and return of each portfolio. Panel 6.C.6c
shows how the weights are distributed in each portfolio by plotting their concentration ratios, as
well as the weights that the current largest banks have in the MVP.
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Figure 6.C.7: Portfolio optimization using dynamic limited reweighting of 20%
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The figure shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP when
constraining individual reweighting to 20% of the bank size in the previous quarter’s MVP:
panel 6.C.7a and 6.C.7b display the difference in the risk and return of each portfolio. Panel 6.C.7c
shows how the weights are distributed in each portfolio by plotting their concentration ratios, as
well as the weights that the current largest banks have in the MVP.
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Table 6.C.9: Portfolio optimization keeping the largest 5% at their actual weight - Risk-
return trade-off
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
rMVP − rFRD
Boston 0.060*** 0.094*** 0.046*** 0.025
New York −0.001*** 0.041 −0.009* −0.076*
Philadelphia 0.005*** 0.063*** −0.032* −0.010
Cleveland 0.005*** −0.011 0.015** 0.008
Richmond −0.028*** −0.032 −0.026*** −0.028
Atlanta −0.014*** −0.044 −0.016* 0.061**
Chicago −0.029*** −0.061*** −0.017 0.006
St. Louis −0.035*** −0.036*** −0.033*** −0.038
Minneapolis −0.037*** −0.114*** −0.002* 0.028
Kansas City −0.052*** −0.072*** −0.035*** −0.059**
Dallas −0.010*** 0.047** −0.035*** −0.062**
San Francisco −0.018*** −0.090*** 0.027* 0.001*
(σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD
Boston 0.634*** 0.784*** 0.608*** 0.373*
New York 0.623*** 0.646*** 0.620*** 0.579***
Philadelphia 0.798*** 0.975*** 0.869*** 0.157
Cleveland 0.738*** 0.966*** 0.747*** 0.183
Richmond 0.651*** 0.994*** 0.476*** 0.425
Atlanta 0.927*** 1.000*** 0.999*** 0.520*
Chicago 0.905*** 0.950*** 0.893*** 0.844***
St. Louis 0.998*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 0.987***
Minneapolis 0.876*** 0.990*** 0.943*** 0.391***
Kansas City 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Dallas 0.965*** 0.908*** 1.000*** 0.980***
San Francisco 0.898*** 0.933*** 0.967*** 0.594***
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when constraining the largest
5% of banks to their individual current weigh, while allowing unlimited reweighting for the remaining
banks. rMVP − rFRD measures the difference between returns of the actual portfolio and the returns
of the minimum variance portfolio. (σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD measures the relative difference in portfolio
risk between the actual and minimum variance portfolio. A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been
effectively eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no improvements are possible. Kolmogorov-
Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions of the actual and minimum variance portfolio
are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.C.10: Portfolio optimization keeping the largest 5% at their actual weight - Weight
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5%
Boston 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 0.0
New York 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 0.0
Philadelphia 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 0.0
Cleveland 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 0.0
Richmond 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 0.0
Atlanta 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 0.0
Chicago 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 0.0
St. Louis 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 0.0
Minneapolis 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kansas City 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dallas 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 0.0
San Francisco 0.0*** 0.0 0.0 0.0
MVP 5% - FRD 5%
Boston 7.8*** 13.3*** 5.7*** 1.6*
New York 8.3*** 10.4*** 5.3*** 13.2***
Philadelphia 13.8*** 16.3*** 14.0*** 7.2***
Cleveland 7.9*** 13.1*** 6.1*** 1.5***
Richmond 7.0*** 7.5*** 7.6*** 4.1***
Atlanta 6.9*** 5.8*** 3.7*** 19.9***
Chicago 9.8*** 13.4*** 4.9*** 17.6***
St. Louis 8.6*** 5.1*** 7.4*** 20.5***
Minneapolis 12.4*** 18.0*** 10.0*** 7.3***
Kansas City 5.6*** 3.9*** 5.1*** 11.1***
Dallas 11.6*** 17.9*** 5.3*** 17.7***
San Francisco 7.3*** 8.4*** 6.6*** 7.2***
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when constraining the largest
5% of banks to their individual current weigh, while allowing unlimited reweighting for the remaining
banks. FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5% measures the average difference between weight of the top-5% in
the actual portfolio with the weight of the actual top-5% in the minimum variance portfolio. MVP 5%
- FRD 5% measures the average difference between the weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio
with the weight of the new top-5% in the minimum variance portfolio. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are
performed to see if the distributions of the actual and minimum variance portfolio are different from
each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.C.11: Portfolio optimization keeping the largest 5% between 50% and 60% - Risk-
return trade-off
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
rMVP − rFRD
Boston 0.060*** 0.140*** 0.003 0.058
New York 0.051*** 0.128*** 0.021*** −0.028*
Philadelphia −0.049*** 0.057*** −0.178*** 0.123**
Cleveland 0.032*** 0.067*** −0.011*** 0.093***
Richmond −0.006*** 0.034*** −0.026*** −0.037
Atlanta 0.006*** 0.001 −0.017*** 0.091***
Chicago 0.044*** 0.085*** 0.005 0.076***
St. Louis 0.002*** 0.010*** −0.022*** 0.059***
Minneapolis −0.074*** −0.033** −0.108*** −0.060
Kansas City −0.017*** −0.029** −0.013** −0.003
Dallas 0.031*** 0.102** −0.013*** 0.005
San Francisco −0.013*** 0.015* −0.035*** −0.004*
(σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD
Boston 0.994*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 0.964***
New York 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Philadelphia 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Cleveland 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Richmond 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Atlanta 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Chicago 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
St. Louis 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Minneapolis 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Kansas City 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
Dallas 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
San Francisco 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000*** 1.000***
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when constraining the largest
5% of banks to have a weight between 50% and 60%. rMVP − rFRD measures the difference between
returns of the actual portfolio and the returns of the minimum variance portfolio. (σFRD − σMVP)/σFRD
measures the relative difference in portfolio risk between the actual and minimum variance portfolio.
A score of 1 indicates that the risk has been effectively eliminated, while a score of 0 indicates that no
improvements are possible. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions of the
actual and minimum variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 6.C.12: Portfolio optimization keeping the largest 5% between 50% and 60% - Weight
1984Q4 - 2010Q4 1984Q4 - 1993Q4 1994Q1 - 2006Q4 2007Q1 - 2010Q4
FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5%
Boston −24.2*** −14.9*** −29.0*** −29.9***
New York −30.6*** −29.4*** −35.2*** −18.3***
Philadelphia −13.1*** 0.1*** −15.9*** −34.1***
Cleveland −30.6*** −17.5*** −34.8*** −46.8***
Richmond −33.0*** −22.1*** −37.3*** −44.0***
Atlanta −19.3*** −14.5*** −22.1*** −21.1***
Chicago −17.3*** −10.0*** −22.8*** −15.9***
St. Louis −3.9*** 1.4*** −8.4*** −1.8***
Minneapolis −18.1*** −5.7*** −20.0*** −40.3***
Kansas City 1.2*** 6.5*** −2.3*** 0.2***
Dallas −7.1*** −5.9*** −8.9*** −3.9***
San Francisco −26.1*** −30.0*** −23.0*** −27.2***
MVP 5% - FRD 5%
Boston −16.9*** −8.3*** −24.5*** −12.1***
New York −27.1*** −24.8*** −34.1*** −9.5***
Philadelphia −9.8*** 2.2*** −14.7*** −21.2***
Cleveland −29.5*** −16.6*** −34.6*** −43.2***
Richmond −30.7*** −19.0*** −36.1*** −40.0***
Atlanta −17.5*** −12.2*** −21.9*** −15.7***
Chicago −16.6*** −9.6*** −22.8*** −12.8***
St. Louis −2.8*** 2.4*** −7.7*** 0.9
Minneapolis −17.1*** −4.8*** −19.5*** −37.7***
Kansas City 2.0*** 7.1*** −1.7*** 2.2***
Dallas −5.9*** −4.1*** −8.3*** −1.9
San Francisco −25.0*** −28.4*** −22.7*** −24.6***
This table shows the results of the analysis on commercial bank level when constraining the largest 5%
of banks to have a weight between 50% and 60%. FRD 5% in MVP - FRD 5% measures the average
difference between weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the actual top-5%
in the minimum variance portfolio. MVP 5% - FRD 5% measures the average difference between the
weight of the top-5% in the actual portfolio with the weight of the new top-5% in the minimum vari-
ance portfolio. Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests are performed to see if the distributions of the actual and
minimum variance portfolio are different from each other. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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6.C.2 Portfolio Optimization using Listed BHCs
Lastly, we check whether the results hold if we only consider BHCs that had pub-
licly traded equity, using the database of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (2013).
Banks without a listing are removed and only those that do have one are considered
for the portfolio the investor can manage. Figure 6.C.8 shows the results, which are
again similar to the baseline scenario.
Figure 6.C.8: Portfolio optimization using listed BHCs
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The figure shows the comparison between the FED portfolio and the hypothetical MVP when
using only BHCs that have publicly traded equity: panel 6.C.8a and 6.C.8b display the difference
in the risk and return of each portfolio. Panel 6.C.8c shows how the weights are distributed in
each portfolio by plotting their concentration ratios, as well as the weights that the current largest
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Dit proefschrift bestudeert gedragsveranderingen van economische actoren in fi-
nanciële beslissingen als gevolg van extreme gebeurtenissen. Hierbij staan drie vragen
centraal. Ten eerste, hoe houden economische actoren ex-ante rekening met extreme
gebeurtenissen in financiële beslissingen? Ten tweede, hoe veranderen extreme ge-
beurtenissen het gezamelijke gedrag van economische actoren ex-post? Ten derde,
hoe kunnen we de gevolgen van extreme gebeurtenissen minimaliseren? In tegen-
stelling tot voorgaande literatuur, welke deze gedragsveranderingen analyseren door
middel van experimentele technieken, worden de veranderingen in dit proefschrift
geanalyseerd aan de hand van geaggregeerde (prijs) data.
Prijsbesluiten, voorspellingen en extreme gebeurtenissen
Het tweede en derde hoofdstuk beantwoorden de vraag hoe economische actoren
ex-ante rekening houden met extreme gebeurtenissen in financiële beslissingen. In
deze hoofdstukken wordt het gedrag van een market maker geanalyseerd die wordt
geconfronteerd met twee soorten tegenpartijen: handelaren met gewone kennis (noise
traders) en handelaren met voorkennis (insiders). Deze laatste groep heeft superieure
kennis vergeleken met de market maker, waardoor deze zijn prijzen zal aanpassen
om zo min mogelijk geld te verliezen aan de insiders. De markt die wordt geanaly-
seerd in de hoofdstukken is een gok-markt waar de market maker weddenschappen
accepteert tegen vaste kansen (ook wel odds genoemd). In deze markt wordt geld in-
gezet op een weddenschap met een duidelijk eindpunt. Deze eigenschappen maken
de gok-markt dan ook extreem geschikt om hypothesen te testen die oorspronkelijk
zijn ontwikkeld voor financiële markten (Vaughan Williams, 1999). Omdat de market
maker (in gokmarkten ook wel bookmaker genoemd) grote posities inneemt op de
uitkomst van de weddenschap (Levitt, 2004), wil deze geen geld verliezen aan gok-
kers met superieure kennis van zaken. Hoofdstuk 2 ontwikkelt een model waarin een
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bookmaker prijzen moet vaststellen wanneer deze wordt geconfronteerd met de twee
soorten gokkers. De assumptie hierbij is dat insiders een betere kennis van zaken heb-
ben dan de bookmaker met betrekking tot de werkelijke kansen, wat in de lijn ligt met
de Bayesiaanse gokker in Silver (2012). Echter, deze definitie is anders dan de voor-
gaande literatuur, welke uitgaat van insiders die vantevoren weten wie er gaat winnen
(Shin, 1991, 1992, 1993). Het hoofdstuk laat zien dat de prijzen die worden vastgesteld
door de bookmaker gelijk zijn aan een (reële) call-optie die wordt aangeboden aan de
insider: hoe groter het verschil tussen de prijzen van de bookmaker en de verwach-
ting van de insider, hoe hoger de kans dat de insider deze optie zal uitvoeren. Deze
dynamiek is het belangrijkst bij weddenschappen op longshots (een kleine kans op
winnen met een mogelijk hoge uitbetaling), aangezien de bookmaker hier meer geld
op dreigt te verliezen dan op favorieten (een hoge kans op winnen met een lage uit-
betaling). Het model voorspelt dat door de aanwezigheid van insiders, bookmakers
hun odds zullen aanpassen om weddenschappen op longshots minder aantrekkelijk
te maken voor insiders en hun mogelijke verlies te minimaliseren. Hiermee is het
model consistent met, en geeft het een mogelijke oorzaak voor de favorite-longshot
bias in gok-markten (Vaughan Williams en Patton, 1997; Snowberg en Wolfers, 2010).
Deze bias wordt geconstateerd wanneer de kansen die worden geïmpliceerd door de
prijzen van de bookmaker onjuist zijn, omdat favorieten (longshots) een consistent la-
gere (hogere) impliciete winstkans hebben dan achteraf blijkt. Door het maken van
bepaalde assumpties over hoe nieuws dat relevant is voor de weddenschappen zich
ontwikkelt, is het mogelijk om de call-opties die aan de insider worden aangeboden
te simuleren. Hierna wordt het model gekalibreerd op bookmaker odds die zijn ver-
zameld in Australische paarden-races in 1998. Uit de prijzen kan worden opgemaakt
dat de bookmaker verwacht dat 97% van het ingezette geld van insiders komt. Wan-
neer dit wordt gecombineerd met objectieve (ex-post) observaties over insider trading,
komt ruwweg 60% van de weddenschappen van insiders en 40% van noise traders. De
bookmaker overschat in grote mate de kans dat hij verlies zal maken door de aanwe-
zigheid van insiders, wat consistent is met het niet juist kunnen inschatten van de kans
dat extreme gebeurtenissen plaatsvinden (Tversky en Kahneman, 1973). Hoofdstuk 3
bekijkt verder of deze call-opties extra informatie bevatten vergeleken met de prijzen
– in welke alle publiek verkrijgbare data zijn verwerkt. Hoewel er, statistisch gezien,
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extra verklarende kracht voortkomt uit de call-opties, is de economische impact klein
aangezien er op basis van deze call-opties geen winstgevende trading rule kan worden
gevonden.
Gedrag van investeerders en extreme gebeurtenissen
Hoofdstuk 4 analyseert hoe extreme gebeurtenissen het gedrag van economische
actoren kan beïnvloeden na het plaatsvinden. Eerder onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat
extreme gebeurtenissen dit gedrag op zowel korte- als lange-termijn kan veranderen.
Eén extreme gebeurtenis die vaak bestudeerd wordt, is de terroristische aanslag van 11
september op het World Trade Center in New York, en met name de invloed op finan-
ciële markten.1 Over het algemeen wordt gevonden dat aandeelprijzen reageren op
extreme gebeurtenissen zoals terrorisme (Chen and Siems, 2004; Drakos, 2004; Eldor
and Melnick, 2004; Karolyi and Martell, 2010; Chesney et al., 2011), maar deze reacties
verschillen per aanval, per sector van de economie en per land. Hoewel het is vastge-
steld dat terroristische aanvallen kunnen leiden tot reacties van aandeelprijzen in een
ander land, is het nog onduidelijk via welk kanaal deze schokken zich bewegen. Aba-
die en Gardeazabal (2003) en Drakos (2010a) hebben recent geopperd dat de schokken
zich voortbewegen door middel van de economische verbanden – zoals handel – tus-
sen landen. Deze studies gebruiken echter alleen aanvallen vóór of ná 11 september
2001, en voeren geen vergelijkende studie uit wat de invloed van 9/11 op dit verband
was. Hoofdstuk 4 voert deze vergelijkende studie wel uit, en bevestigt dat economi-
sche verbanden inderdaad kunnen verklaren hoe verschillende landen reageren op
aanvallen in het buitenland. De analyse op Amerikaanse aandeelprijzen laat zien dat
deze prijzen reageren op terroristische aanslagen buiten Amerika. Daarnaast zijn deze
reacties inderdaad evenredig aan de hoeveelheid investeringen van Amerikaanse be-
drijven in deze regio: aanvallen in regio’s met meer Amerikaanse investeringen leiden
tot een grote reactie in de aandeelprijzen. In de vergelijkende studie vóór en ná 11 sep-
tember 2001, wordt gevonden dat het kanaal alleen statistisch significant is na 9/11.
Na vervolgonderzoek is de meest aannemelijke verklaring dat de Amerikaanse beleg-
gers vóór 9/11 leiden aan kortzichtigheid met betrekking tot terroristische aanvallen
1Voor een uitgebreid overzicht over de invloed van 9/11 op financiële markten en andere terreinen
verwijs ik naar Frey and Luechinger (2005).
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omdat ze hier weinig aan waren blootgesteld. Ná 9/11 reageren de beleggers wel op
aanvallen in het buitenland en doen dit meer voor aanvallen in gebieden waar Ameri-
kaanse bedrijven meer investeringen hebben. Dit duidt erop dat de aanslagen van 11
september 2001 een wake-up call was voor beleggers, met als gevolg een groter besef
voor de gevolgen van terrorisme in het buitenland voor Amerikaanse bedrijven.
Gedrag van deposito-houders, bank grootte en extreme
gebeurtenissen
De laatste twee hoofdstukken van dit proefschrift zijn geïnspireerd door de ex-
treme gebeurtenissen in de bankensector en financiële sector in de Verenigde Staten in
2007 en 2008. De financiële crisis die het gevolg was van deze extreme gebeurtenissen
leidde tot het faillissement van grote financiële instellingen, bijvoorbeeld de zaken-
bank Lehman Brothers, en bedreigde de veiligheid van het financiële bestel. Hoewel
overheden over de hele wereld moesten bijspringen om de grootbanken overeind te
houden, gingen kleine banken wél failliet. In de Verenigde Staten bijvoorbeeld zijn er
ongeveer 400 commerciële banken gesloten door de Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration (FDIC) sinds het begin van de crisis, en er zijn nog eens 500 noodlijdende
banken overgenomen door gezondere banken. In Hoofdstuk 5 worden de effecten van
deze faillissementen op spaarders bekeken. Spaarders hebben een rol in het toezicht
op banken en kunnen deze ‘straffen’ door het opnemen van hun tegoeden wanneer ze
de banken ervan verdenken te risicovol om te gaan met hun spaargeld. De reddings-
operaties en bankfaillissementen kunnen spaarders gemengde signalen geven over de
noodzaak om toe te zien op de activiteiten van hun banken. Aan de ene kant kunnen
reddingsoperaties een verminderde prikkel geven aan spaarders, omdat deze er dan
van uit gaan dat andere banken ook zullen worden geredt ongeacht hoe risicovol ze
zijn. Aan de andere kant heeft voorgaande literatuur vastgesteld dat faillissementen
kunnen leiden tot extra toezicht van spaarders, wat veroorzaakt wordt door een ho-
gere risico-aversie (Martinez Peria en Schmukler, 2001; Karas et al., 2010, 2013; Iyer en
Puri, 2012). Omdat er tijdens de crisis zowel reddingsoperaties als bankfaillissementen
hebben plaatsgevonden, is het onduidelijk welke van deze effecten zal domineren in
het gedrag van spaarders. Hoofdstuk 5 stelt vast dat in markten met faillissementen,
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spaarders meer toezicht houden op banken ondanks de reddingsoperaties. Daarnaast
is er meer toezicht in regio’s met meerdere faillissementen.
Hoofdstuk 6 probeert lessen te trekken uit de recente financiële crisis met als doel
om een nieuwe crisis te voorkomen. De vele reddingsoperaties hebben de overheids-
financiën flink belast en veel nieuwe voorstellen zijn gedaan om dit in de toekomst te
vermijden. De nadruk in deze voorstellen ligt vaak op de onderlinge verbondenheid
van de grootbanken, de mate van inkomensdiversifiëring, of de omvang van banken
(De Jonghe, 2010; Zhou, 2010; Adrian en Brunnermeier, 2011; Markose et al., 2012; Ber-
tay et al., 2013). Hoofdstuk 6 bekijkt deze crisis uit het oogpunt van de toezichthouder
als beheerder van een portefeuille van banken, en bestudeert de optimale portefeuille
die de toezichthouder zou willen hebben om zoveel mogelijk het systeem risico te
verminderen. De bevindingen zijn dat de concentratie in de huidige portefeuille con-
sequent te hoog is en dat een minder geconcentreerde banken-portefeuille een veel
lager risico met gelijkaardige opbrengsten zou hebben.
Suggesties voor vervolgonderzoek
De hoofdstukken zijn verbonden door gedrag van economische actoren dat afwijkt
van rationeel gedrag, veroorzaakt door het niet juist kunnen inschatten van de kans
dat extreme gebeurtenissen plaatsvinden (Tversky en Kahneman, 1973; Kahneman en
Tversky, 1979). Dit proefschrift laat zien dat dit gedrag zich ook voordoet wanneer er
wordt gekeken naar geaggregeerde (prijs) data. Zodoende verschaft het bewijs dat de
standaard modellen in de economie, die uitgaan van rationeel gedrag van de populatie
van actoren, onjuist zijn en dat de actoren samen ook irrationele beslissingen nemen
als gevolg van extreme gebeurtenissen. Toekomstig onderzoek zal hier rekening mee
moeten houden en zich moeten focussen op de groepsdynamiek van financiële beslis-
singen. Daarnaast is er ook meer onderzoek nodig naar ander bewijs van irrationeel
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